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I investigate how the firm diversification affects the value of large customers and 
large suppliers, and how the presence of large customers affects corporate payout 
policy. In Chapter Two, I report the findings that that the value of large customers for 
shareholders is lower in diversified firms than single-segment firms. I also find that 
more resources are allocated to a weak segment in a diversified firm when the 
segment has large customers, and that a diversified firm gives more trade credit to 
large customers than single-segment firms. Moreover, by using the setting of tariff 
cut as an exogenous shock, I find that a reduction in the level of large customers is 
associated with a decrease (an increase) in the value of single-segment firms 
(diversified firms). Furthermore, I find that the presence of large customers is 
associated with a higher (lower) announcement return for non-diversifying M&As 
(diversifying M&As). The results support the hypothesis that firm diversification 
affects the value of large customers for shareholders through the perspective of 
bargaining position. Chapter Three examines the relation between firm diversification 
and the value of large suppliers for shareholders. I find that the value of large 
suppliers for shareholders is higher in diversified firms than single-segment firms. 
The presence of large suppliers is positively valued by shareholders in diversified 
firms through the perspective of relationship-specific investments. In addition, I 
examine the setting of tariff cut and find that a reduction in the ratio of the purchases 
made by all suppliers is associated with an increase (a decrease) in the value of 
single-segment firms (diversified firms). In the event study of M&As, I find that the 
presence of large suppliers increases both the announcement return and the 
operating performance of a diversifying M&A. I conclude that the results support the 
hypothesis that firm diversification affects the value of large suppliers for 
shareholders through the perspective of relationship-specific investments. 
Finally, in Chapter Four, I examine whether large customers affect corporate 
payout policy. In terms of share repurchases, I find that both the cumulative 
abnormal return and the net change in operating performance around the 
announcement of share repurchases are lower with the presence of large customers. 
In terms of dividends, I find that both the cumulative abnormal return around the 
announcement of an increase in dividends are higher with the presence of large 
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customers. In addition, a firm with the presence of large customers prefers to use 
share repurchases rather than increase dividends. Also, the presence of large 
customers reduces the level of total payout. I conclude that the presence of large 
customers has a different value consequence between share repurchases and 
dividends as two forms of corporate payout policy either through the channel of 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
     This thesis examines how firm diversification affects the value of large customers 
and large suppliers for shareholders. I also analyse how large customers affect 
share repurchases and dividend increases as two forms of payout policy.   
1.1. Background and Motivation 
     There is a literature that examines the role of large customers in the corporate 
finance area including capital structure, dividends, corporate cash holdings, 
bargaining position, and firm risk. In terms of the role of customers in firms’ capital 
structure, Titman (1984) argues that a firm can commit to reducing the risk of 
liquidation by choosing a lower leverage in the situation that a firm requires its 
customers to undertake relationship-specific investments that will lose value if the 
firm goes into liquidation. Kale and Shahrur (2007) find that a firm’s leverage can be 
affected by its customers because of both the relationship-specific investments and 
the bargaining power. Furthermore, on the bargaining position between suppliers 
and customers, Dass, Kale and Nanda (2014) argue that trade credit is associated 
with a firm’s bargaining position. Trade credit increases with the supplier firms’ 
relationship-specific investments and customer firms’ market power, but it decreases 
with supplier firms’ bargaining power. Moreover, the presence of large customers is 
associated with a higher level of risk. Hertzel, Li, Officer and Rodgers (2008) find that 
distress related to bankruptcy filings of a major customer is associated with negative 
and significant stock price effects for suppliers.  
     A growing literature analyses the role of large suppliers in various areas of 
corporate finance such as capital structure, stock market valuation, trade credit, 
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seasoned equity offerings, managerial compensation and dividends. In terms of 
capital structure, a firm can reduce the leverage ratio to maintain the relationship 
with its large suppliers. The level of debt is positively related to the bargaining power 
of the firm, and negatively related to the bilateral surplus available for suppliers (Kale 
and Meneghetti, 2014). For the role of large suppliers in a firm’s stock valuation, 
Menzly and Ozbas (2010) argue that the returns of related suppliers and customers 
can be cross predicted by each other’s stocks. Moreover, the previous literature 
examines the effects of large suppliers on trade credit. For example, Fabbri and 
Klapper (2016) find a negative relation between suppliers’ bargaining position and 
the extent of trade credit. Suppliers with weaker bargaining power over their 
customers have a greater propensity to offer trade credit including an extended 
payment period and a larger number of goods sold on credit.  
     The thesis extends this literature by examining how the firm diversification affect 
the value of large customers and large suppliers for shareholders. Firm 
diversification is a prevalent corporate strategy. Berger and Ofek (1995) show that 
the diversified firms occupy around 32% of the observations in their sample. Given 
the importance of firm diversification as a corporate structure, I investigate the value 
consequences of large customers and large suppliers with the presence of firm 
diversification. 
     An extensive literature discusses the determinants of firm diversification. Various 
determinants of firm diversification have been identified in the literature, such as the 
agency problems, an efficient internal capital market, the coinsurance effect and risk 
reduction. In terms of agency problems, Shin and Stulz (1998) and Rajan, Servaes 
and Zingales (2000) argue that diversified firms conduct inefficient cross-
subsidization because of the agency problem and that corporate resources are 
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diverted from the divisions with good investment opportunities to the divisions with 
poor investment opportunities. In addition, there is a ‘‘more-money’’ effect which 
exists in diversified firms. This means that firm diversification reduces firms’ credit 
constraints and bankruptcy risks through the coinsurance effect (Stein, 2002). 
Lewellen (1971) argues that the coinsurance effect stemming from imperfectly 
correlated cash flows among different segments reduces the bankruptcy risk of a 
diversified firm and alleviates a firm’s financial constraints.  
Share repurchases and dividends are two forms of corporate payout policy. Both 
share repurchases and dividend increases signal a firm’s profitable prospects and 
reduced risk in the future. Wang (2012) only examines the fact that the dividend 
payout is negatively impacted by a firm’s dependence on customer-supplier 
relationships because the relationship-specific investments are associated with high 
financial distress costs. The thesis extends this literature by examining the impact of 
large customers on share repurchases. It is important to examine share repurchases 
as an alternative form of corporate payout. Grullon and Michaely (2002) report that 
84 percent of firms initiated a repurchase programme and 80 percent of firms 
repurchased shares in 2000. 
     A great number of studies have discussed payout policy from various 
perspectives including the signalling effect, agency theory, and substitution effects. 
Both share repurchases and dividend increases have signalling effects on future 
profitability, financial leverage and systematic risks. Vermaelen (1981) suggests that 
firms with share repurchases experience a permanent increase in their share prices 
and there is an increase in earnings per share around the repurchase announcement 
date. Woolridge (1983) finds that positive (negative) dividend change 
announcements lead to positive (negative) share price changes. The main reason for 
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the positive relation between dividend announcements and share price changes is 
the market signalling effect. Moreover, the substitution effect means that firms use 
dividends and share repurchases at different times by considering for example, their 
cash flows, level of debt, and financial flexibility. Guay and Harford (2000) show that 
firms choose dividend payout to distribute relatively permanent cash and choose 
share repurchases to distribute temporary cash.  
1.2. Main Findings 
Chapter Two shows that the value of large customers for shareholders is lower in 
diversified firms than single-segment firms. The results show that more resources 
are transferred into the weak segment of a diversified firm when the segment has 
large customers, and that a diversified firm gives more trade credit to large 
customers. Moreover, by using the setting of tariff cut as an exogenous shock, I find 
that a reduction in the level of large customers is associated with a decrease (an 
increase) in the value of single-segment firms (diversified firms). Furthermore, I find 
that the presence of large customers is associated with a higher (lower) 
announcement return for non-diversifying M&As (diversifying M&As). The results 
support the hypothesis that the firm diversification reduces the value of large 
customers through the perspective of bargaining position. 
     Chapter Three examines how the firm diversification affects the value of large 
suppliers for shareholders. I find that the value of large suppliers for shareholders is 
higher in diversified firms than single-segment firms. I also find that this positive 
relation is stronger when the size of suppliers is relatively larger, when a diversified 
firm operates in unrelated industries, and when the suppliers’ industry R&D 
expenses are higher. Moreover, in the setting of tariff cut, I find that a reduction in 
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the level of large suppliers is associated with an increase (a decrease) in the value of 
single-segment firms (diversified firms). Furthermore, I find that the presence of large 
suppliers is associated with a higher announcement return and operating 
performance for diversifying M&As. I conclude that the results support the 
hypotheses that firm diversification increases the value of large suppliers through the 
perspective of relationship-specific investments. 
     In Chapter Four, I investigate whether large customers affect corporate payout 
policy. In terms of share repurchases, I find that find that both the cumulative 
abnormal return and the net change in operating performance around the 
announcement of share repurchases are lower with the presence of large customers. 
In terms of dividends, I find that both the cumulative abnormal return and the net 
change in operating performance around the announcement of an increase in 
dividends are higher with the presence of large customers. In addition, a firm with the 
presence of large customers prefer to use share repurchases rather than increase 
dividends. Also, the presence of large customers reduces the level of total payout. I 
conclude that the presence of large customers has a different value consequence 
between share repurchases and dividends as two forms of corporate payout policy 
either through the channel of bargaining position or the channel of relationship-
specific investments. 
1.3. Contributions 
     My thesis makes contributions to four categories of literatures. They are the 
literatures relating to large customers, large suppliers, firm diversification, and 
corporate payout policy.  
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     Above all, this thesis makes the following contributions in the literature about 
large customers. we contribute to the literature on the value of large customers. First, 
there is a debate in the literature about how large customers affect firm value. On 
one hand, large customers reduce the firm performance of suppliers by giving 
pressure to the suppliers to provide concessions. Another branch of literature argues 
that large customers increase the firm performance of suppliers through 
collaborations in marketing, information sharing, and the reduction in operating 
expenses. Chapter Two adds to this debate and shows that firm diversification 
reduces the value of large customers. Second, I extend the literature that examines 
the role of large customers in the corporate finance area. Previous literature has 
examined the role of customers in the setting of capital, dividends, corporate cash 
holdings, trade credit and so on. I provide evidence on the relation between firm 
diversification and the value of large customers in Chapter Two. Chapter Four 
provides more comprehensive evidence on the relation between large customers 
and the value of corporate payout.  
     What is more, this thesis makes the following contributions in the literature about 
large suppliers. First, while the results in Chapter Two support the interpretation that 
the firm diversification reduces the value of large customers for shareholders, the 
findings in Chapter Three reveal the opposite results that the firm diversification 
increases the value of large suppliers for shareholders. The difference in the results 
between the two chapters implies that the firm diversification has different value 
consequences for large customers and large suppliers. Moreover, I also identify 
different channels through which firm diversification affects the value of large 
customers and large suppliers. Second, I contribute to the literature on the role of 
large suppliers in corporate finance by studying how firm diversification affects the 
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value of large suppliers for shareholders. The previous literature has discussed the 
effects of large suppliers at the firm level. For instance, a number of studies have 
analysed the role of suppliers in the areas of capital structure, managerial 
compensation, dividends, stock market valuation, and so on. I move one step 
forward and extend the examination to the segment level. I therefore extend the 
literature on non-financial stakeholders in the area of corporate finance by 
conducting further analysis of firm diversification at the segment level.  
     Furthermore, this thesis reconciles the different findings in the literature to some 
extent by disclosing the difference in the value of large customers/suppliers for 
shareholders under different corporate structure. The results reveal both a positive 
impact of large customers on firm value for single-segment firms and a negative 
impact of large customers on firm value for diversified firms. Depending on the 
different corporate structure, the value of large customers/suppliers for shareholders 
are different in single-segment firms and diversified firms. To my knowledge, this has 
not been documented in the literature before.   
     Last but not least, this thesis makes the following contributions in the literature 
about payout policy. First, only Wang (2012) examine how the firm’s relationships 
with major customers affect the level of dividend payments. I extend the literature by 
examining the impact of large customers on both share repurchases and dividend 
increases. In consideration of signalling effects of corporate payout, my Chapter 
Four shows that large customers positively affect the value of dividend increases 
through the relationship-specific investments. I also disclose a different channel 
through which the large customers are associated with lower value of share 
repurchases. Second, there are various determinants of the payout policy have been 
identified in previous literature, including financial resource distributions, agency 
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problem, signalling effects, tax, executive stock options and so on. My Chapter Four 
extends the literature by documenting the large customers as a new determinant of 
corporate payout policy.  
1.4. Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two presents the research on the 
impact of firm diversification on the value of large customers. Chapter Three reports 
the research on the effects of firm diversification on the value of large suppliers. 
Chapter Four shows my research on the relation between large customers and 
corporate payout policy. Each Chapter has its own introduction, literature review, 
hypotheses, data and variables, empirical results and a conclusion. Chapter Five 
concludes the main findings, explains the limitation of my research, and provides 




Chapter 2. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large 
Customers 
2.1. Introduction 
     Various literature examines the role of large customers in the corporate finance 
area. For example, Titman (1984) argues that a firm can commit to reducing the risk 
of liquidation by choosing a lower leverage in the situation in which the firm requires 
its customers to undertake the relationship-specific investments that will lose value if 
the firm goes into liquidation. Kale and Shahrur (2007) find that a firm’s leverage can 
be affected by its customers because of both the relationship-specific investments 
and the bargaining power. Besides leverage, more recently other areas in corporate 
finance have been examined in the literature. For example, Wang (2012) examines 
the payout policies and suggests that a firm’s relationship with its principal customers 
or suppliers is an important determinant of its shareholders’ income. Itzkowitz (2013) 
finds that as a precaution against the additional operating risk induced by being in an 
important relationship with a customer, suppliers in such relationships hold more 
cash on average than suppliers that are not in important relationships.   
     In this paper, I extend this literature by examining how firm diversification affects 
the value of large customers for shareholders. Firm diversification is a prevalent 
phenomenon. For example, Berger and Ofek (1995) find that around 32% of the 
observations in their sample are from diversified firms.1 Given the importance of firm 
diversification as a corporate structure, I examine how the large customers are 
valued by shareholders with the presence of firm diversification. 2  I develop two 
                                            
1 See Berger and Ofek (1995), page 43. 
2 To clarify the research objective related to “large customers” and “firm diversification”, I use the 
measures for the magnitude of customers in this paper instead of the degree of the concentration of 
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hypotheses from different perspectives. From the perspective of relationship-specific 
investments, the value of large customers for shareholders is higher in diversified 
firms than single-segment firms. From the perspective of bargaining position, the 
value of large customers for shareholders is lower in diversified firms than single-
segment firms. 
     I use a sample of 12677 firms with 110084 firm-year observations with a sample 
period from 1976 to 2013. I first examine how the level of firm diversifications affects 
the level of the value of large customers. I use the excess value as documented in 
Berger and Ofek (1995) as a measure of the firm value. I find that the firm 
diversification reduces the value of large customers. In terms of the economic 
magnitude, for diversified firms, the existence of large customers is associated with 
0.064 decrease in excess value. I also find that the value of large customers is lower 
with the presence of firm diversification when the diversity in the investment 
opportunities across segments is higher. 
     I conduct further analysis to better understand the lower value of large customers 
for shareholders in diversified firms. I examine the resource allocation within 
diversified firms, and find that more resources are allocated to a weak segment in a 
diversified firm when the segment has large customers. Moreover, I find that the 
value of large customers is lower in diversified firms with higher diversity in the 
investment opportunities across segments. In addition, I find that more extended 
                                                                                                                                       
customers. This follows the stream of the literature which uses the measures for the magnitude of 
customers (e.g., Fee and Thomas, 2004; Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim, 2008; 
Hui, Klasa and Yeung, 2012; Huang and Kale, 2017; Liu, Masulis and Stanfield, 2017), instead of the 
stream of literature which uses the measures for the degree of the concentration of customers (e.g., 
Patatoukas, 2012; Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling and Shaikh, 2016). Therefore, the term “firm diversification” 
in this paper means the classic industrial diversification where a firm operates in different industries 
and has nothing to do with the diversification in a customer base. To my knowledge, a diversified firm 
does not necessarily have a more diversified customer base than a single-segment firm, and no 
previous literature has concluded that the classic industrial diversification is related to a higher or 
lower degree of concentration of customers. 
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trade credits are given to large customers in diversified firms than single-segment 
firms.  
     Moreover, I conduct the empirical analysis in the setting of tariff cut to mitigate the 
endogeneity problem. The reduction of tariff for an industry represents an exogenous 
shock which results in a more competitive environment in the industry (e.g., Fresard, 
2010; Valta, 2012; Alimov, 2014), and this can affect the existing customer-supplier 
relationship (e.g., Liu, Masulis and Stanfield, 2017). I identify the magnitude of tariff 
reduction in the industry that a large customer belongs to and construct an 
instrumental variable based on the tariff cut, and use the 2SLS estimation. I find that 
a reduction in the level of large customers is associated with an increase in excess 
value for diversified firms. 
     Furthermore, I get a sample of 7282 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) from 1979 
to 2013. I use the announcement return and the net change in ROA as the measures 
for the change in firm performance. I find that the presence of large customers is 
associated with a lower announcement return and operating performance for 
diversifying M&As. I find consistent results after I use the Heckman two-stage 
estimation to control for the self-selection problem.  
     I conclude that the results support the bargaining hypothesis that the value of 
large customers for shareholders is lower in diversified firms than single-segment 
firms. 
     My paper makes the following contributions. First, I contribute to the literature on 
the value of large customers. There is a debate in the literature about how large 
customers affect firm value. On one hand, a long literature argues that large 
customers reduce the firm performance of suppliers by giving pressure to the 
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suppliers to provide concessions (e.g., Galbraith, 1952; Scherer, 1970; Lustgarten, 
1975; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979; Balakrishnan, Linsmeier, 
and Venkatachalam, 1996). On the other hand, relatively more recent literature 
argues that large customers increase the firm performance of suppliers through 
collaborations in marketing, information sharing, reduction in operating expenses, 
and so on (e.g., Jackson, 1985; Cowley, 1988; Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995; 
Patatoukas, 2012).   
     The results in my paper reconcile the different findings in the literature to some 
extent by disclosing the difference in the value of large customers for shareholders 
under different corporate structure. My results reveal both a positive impact of large 
customers on firm value for single-segment firms and a negative impact of large 
customers on firm value for diversified firms. This provides an explanation for the 
debate in the literature in terms of why both positive and negative impact of large 
customers on firm value has been found in the previous research. Namely, 
depending on the different corporate structure, the value of large customers for 
shareholders can be either positive for single-segment firms or negative for 
diversified firms. To my knowledge, this has not been documented in the literature 
before.   
      Second, I extend the literature that examines the role of large customers in the 
corporate finance area. Previous literature has examined the role of customers in the 
areas of capital structure (e.g., Titman, 1984; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Kale 
and Shahrur, 2007), dividends (e.g., Johnson, Kang, and Yi, 2010; Wang, 2012), 
corporate cash holdings (Itzkowitz, 2013; Bae and Wang, 2015), seasoned equity 
offerings (e.g., Johnson, Kang, Masulis, and Yi, 2017), trade credit (Campello and 
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Gao, 2017; Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh, 2016; Dass, Kale, and Nanda, 
2014), and so on. My paper extends this literature by examining how firm 
diversification, as well as its associated coinsurance effect and internal capital 
market, affects the value of large shareholders for shareholders.  
     Third, I contribute to the literature on firm diversification by disclosing a new 
channel, namely large customers as a type of non-financial stakeholders, through 
which firm diversification affects firm value. While there is a large literature on the 
value consequence of firm diversification and the various channels through which the 
value consequence occurs (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Stein, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 
1998; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Hoechle, 
Schmid, Walter and Yermack, 2012), there is only limited literature that examines the 
relation between firm diversification and large customers. To my knowledge, only 
Hann, Ogneva and Ozbas (2013) examine the impact of firm diversification on the 
cost of capital and argue that firm diversification reduces the risk stemmed from the 
defections by important stakeholders such as customers. My paper differs from Hann 
et al. (2013) in that I take a different perspective. My results reveal that firm 
diversification affects the value of large customers for shareholders through the 
bargaining position. This channel has not been documented in previous literature. 
     Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the literature. Section 3 
develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the variables. Section 5 
presents the results on the relationship between firm diversification and the value of 
large customers. Section 6 presents the analysis based on the setting of tariff cut. 
Section 7 presents the analysis in the setting of M&As. Section 8 conducts 




2.2. Literature Review  
     I review the literature about large customers and firm diversification in this section. 
2.2.1 Large Customers 
     There is an extensive discussion on large customers in previous literature. I 
mainly review the literature about the effects of large customers on firm value, 
bargaining power, and firm risks. 
2.2.1.1 The role of large customers in corporate finance 
     First, previous literature has examined the role of customers in firms’ capital 
structure. Titman (1984) finds that liquidation affects the relationship-specific 
investments which are undertaken by a firm with a particular product. A firm may 
take into account its customers by taking lower leverage. Maksimovic and Titman 
(1991) find that a firm’s debt capacity maintains a reputation for high quality products 
and the financial distress may induce the firm to cut down costs and lower the 
product quality. So, a firm’s financial distress and bankruptcy has a negative impact 
on the relationship with its customers. Kale and Shahrur (2007) examine firms’ 
leverage ratio and the relationship with customers. They find that a lower debt level 
can be an incentive to make a long-term connection between suppliers and 
customers and conduct relationship-specific investments. Banerjee, Dasgupta and 
Kim (2008) further support Titman (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988). They 
suggest that the customer–supplier relationships affect the corporate capital 
structure choice. In particular, there is a relatively lower leverage ratio for the 
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suppliers in durable goods industries if they have important relationships with 
principal customers. 
     Second, the presence of large customers affects the corporate dividends policy, 
initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Wang (2012) 
find that the relationship with large customers negatively impacts a firm’s dividend 
payments. This is due to the high financial distress costs related to relationship-
specific investments. Johnson, Kang, and Yi (2010) suggest that the relationship with 
large customers plays a certificating role for IPO firms. IPO firms with the presence 
of large customers experience better operating performance and higher valuation 
than IPO firms without large customers. Johnson, Kang, Masulis, and Yi (2017) 
explore how the SEOs affect the market value and the relationship heath of both the 
issuers and their large customers. They suggest that both the issuer and its large 
customer have a negative operating performance on SEO announcements, and this 
is more pronounced if the customer-supplier relationships are crucial.  
     Besides, corporate cash holdings are also influenced by the presence of large 
customers. Itzkowitz (2013) argues that as a precaution against the customer-
induced risks, suppliers with the presence of large customers hold more cash than 
suppliers without the presence of large customers. Similarly, Bae and Wang (2015) 
suggest that relationship-specific investments result in a higher level of cash 
holdings. The customer-supplier relationship is one of the determinants of corporate 
cash holdings. 
2.2.1.2 The effects of large customers on firm value 
     There is a debate in the literature about how large customers affect firm value. On 
one hand, previous literature argues that large customers reduce the firm 
29 
 
performance of suppliers by putting pressure on the suppliers to provide concessions 
(e.g., Galbraith, 1952A; Scherer, 1970; Porter, 1974; Lustgarten, 1975; Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995). Large customers 
have the propensity to require lower product prices, take extra inventory, and exploit 
trade credit from their dependent suppliers. For example, Galbraith (1952B) and 
Porter (1974) suggest that in line with the arguments of bargaining power, the 
customer-base market capitalization is negatively associated with the accounting 
rates of return. Lustgarten (1975) shows that the customer concentration is 
negatively associated with a supplier’s price cost margin. A high customer 
concentration reduces the supplier’s ability to charge high prices.  Kalwani and 
Narayandas (1995) find that major customers are able to reduce the inventory 
holding and control costs of manufacturing suppliers in long-term relationships. They 
suggest that suppliers in long-term relationships have a better performance by 
reducing their discretionary expenses than others who employ a transactional 
method in serving their customers.   
     On the other hand, the more recent literature argues that large customers 
increase the firm performance of suppliers through, for example, collaborations in 
marketing, information sharing, and a reduction in operating expenses (e.g., Jackson, 
1985; Cowley, 1988; Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995; Patatoukas, 2012). More 
specifically, the presence of large customers increases the operating performance of 
a firm both from cross-sectional and time series analyses. Patatoukas (2012) 
suggests that the customer concentration is positively related to the predict efficiency 
gains because of the lower operating costs per unit of sales and improved asset 
utilization.  Cen, Dasgupta, and Sen (2015) find the strong relationship with large 
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customers is a protection against takeovers, and firms choose to strengthen the 
relationship with large customers and therefore improve their operating performance. 
2.2.1.3. Large customers and bargaining power  
     Brown, Fee, and Thomas (2008) find that leverage buyouts improve a customer 
firm’s bargaining power with suppliers. The suppliers of leverage buyout firms have 
negative abnormal returns. This is especially significant for the suppliers who have 
made substantial specific investments in their relationship with the customer firms, 
as they experience the reductions both on abnormal returns and profit margins at the 
announcements of downstream leverage buyouts. Similarly, Hennessy and Livdan 
(2009) also suggest that the debt overhang increases a firm’s bargaining power over 
suppliers. Weak firms choosing a higher level of debt can extract a larger proportion 
of total surplus. 
     Raskovich (2003) presents that a buyers’ merger will reduce their bargaining 
power as a large size is not beneficial for a firm in terms of bargaining position. Once 
the customer has become pivotal to the supplier’s production decision, the pivotal 
customer tends to bargain less aggressively, cover the supplier’s costs, and cross-
subsidize smaller customers. In contrast, Bhattacharyya and Nain (2010) state that 
the customer firms’ consolidation enhances their bargaining power and worsens the 
performance of dependent suppliers. In horizontal mergers of customer firms, the 
dependent suppliers experience a remarkable reduction in both their selling prices 
and revenues, as the consolidation improves customers’ bargaining power.   
     Moreover, the presence of large customers has a significant effect on the trade 
credit provided by suppliers. Campello and Gao (2017) find that a more concentrated 
customer base increases both the number of restrictive covenants and interest rate 
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spreads in bank loan contracts, and this effect is more pronounced using trade credit 
between suppliers and customers. Dhaliwal et al., (2016) suggest a positive 
relationship between the concentration of the customer base and a supplier’s 
financing costs. Also, suppliers experience larger negative abnormal stock returns if 
they offer more trade credit to their customers.  Dass, Kale and Nanda (2014) argue 
that trade credit is associated with a firm’s bargaining power. Trade credit increases 
with the supplier firms’ relationship-specific investments and customer firms’ market 
power but it decreases with supplier firms’ bargaining power.  
2.2.1.4. The effects of large customers on firm risk  
     The presence of large customers is associated with a higher level of risk. The 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.131 states that “…… major 
customers of an enterprise represent a significant concentration of risk”. Itzkowitz 
(2013) argues that suppliers experience significant loss due to customer-induced 
risks. For example, customers cannot guarantee that they will continue to buy the 
products when they are in financial distress, and this results in a sudden loss of 
operating income for suppliers. Hertzel, Li, Officer and Rodgers (2008) find that 
distress related to bankruptcy filings of a major customer is associated with negative 
and significant stock price effects for suppliers. Dhaliwal et al. (2016) find that a more 
concentrated customer base increases a supplier's risk, which results in a higher 
cost of equity.  
2.2.2. Firm Diversification  
     There is an extensive literature about firm diversification. I focus on reviewing the 
literature about the firm diversification and the determinants of diversification value. 
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2.2.2.1. Firm diversification and firm value 
     There is a debate regarding the consequence of firm diversification in previous 
literature. Some researchers argue that the firm diversification reduces firm value, 
that is, diversification discount. Lang and Stulz (1994) find that there was a negative 
relationship between firm diversification and Tobin’s q in the 1980s. Firms with a 
poor performance tend to choose to diversify and diversified firms have a relatively 
lower q ratio than comparable single-segment firms. Berger and Ofek (1995) find the 
discount value of firm diversification by comparing the actual value of diversified 
firms and the imputed value as if the segments are operated as single-segment firms 
in the same industries. The reasons for the diversification discount can be attributed 
to the overinvestment and cross-subsidization in diversified firms. Servaes (1996) 
find the firm diversification is not beneficial for firms, which further supports the 
findings of Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995). Servaes’s (1996) 
reveals a significant diversification discount and a negative relationship between 
insider ownership and firm diversification during the 1960s. During the 1970s, firms 
with good insider ownership are the first to diversify and the costs of diversification 
decrease to zero. The findings of Dos Santos, Errunza, and Miller (2008) show that 
in the period from 1990 to 2000, acquisitions of foreign business divisions generally 
does not destroy firm value, but there is a significant diversification discount for the 
industrial-unrelated cross-border acquisitions.  
     In contrast, another part of literature argues that firm diversification does not 
destroy firm value. Compa and Kedia (2002) find that the endogeneity of the 
diversification decision and the self-selection bias explains the diversification 
discount. They conclude that diversification does not destroy firm value.  Graham, 
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Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) suggest that firm diversification does not destroy firm 
value. The value destruction occurs because firms acquire discounted business 
segments, rather than the diversification reducing the firm value. They also argue 
that the excess value, which is the measure of diversification value in Berger and 
Ofek (1995), should be reconsidered as the segment of diversified firms is not 
comparable to single-segment firms. Glaser and Muller (2010) find that the 
diversification discount can be partly explained by the book value bias of corporate 
debt. As firm diversification reduces the level of firm risk, the measures of firm value 
based on book values of corporate debt undervalue diversified firms relative to 
undiversified firms. However, there is no diversification discount when they use 
market value of debt instead of book value of debt to measure the value of 
diversified firms. Whited (2001) argues that the calculation of the imputed value 
based on segment q is flawed, and the diversification discount is an artefact of 
measurement error. Custodio (2014) suggests that the q-based measures of 
diversification value are biased in the accounting of mergers and acquisitions. The 
diversification discount can be attributed to the relatively lower q in diversified firms 
compared with single-segment firms. However, the market-to-sales-based measures 
eliminate this bias, and the diversification discount can be mitigated after subtracting 
goodwill from the book value of assets.  
2.2.2.2. The determinants for the value of diversification 
     There is a large section of the literature which discusses the determinants of the 
value of firm diversification. Stein (2003) documents the importance of paying 
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attention to the “cross section” when one examines the value of firm diversification.3 
Various determinants of the value of firm diversification have been identified in the 
literature, such as agency problem, efficient internal capital market, coinsurance 
effect, risk reduction, and asymmetric information.  
     In terms of agency problems, Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) suggest that agency 
problems are the cause of value-reducing diversification. The decreased level of 
diversification is related to financial distress, management turnover, and external 
treats. Shin and Stulz (1998) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) argue that 
diversified firms conduct inefficient cross-subsidization because of the agency 
problems and that corporate resources are diverted from the divisions with good 
investment opportunities to the divisions with poor investment opportunities. Hoechle, 
Schmid, Walter and Yermack (2012) state that the diversification discount is driven 
by poor corporate governance. They find the diversification discount can be 
narrowed when they add governance variables in different models including panel 
data models, Heckman selection models, and dynamic panel generalized method of 
moments models. In general, better corporate governance is related to less 
destruction of firm value. 
     From the perspective of an efficient internal capital market, Stein (1997) argues 
that for a given amount of capital, the headquarters of a diversified firm can conduct 
the winner-picking in a way that more resources are allocated to the divisions with 
better investment opportunities. Shin and Stulz (1998) find that the investment of one 
segment is associated with the cash flows of other segments in a diversified firm. 
                                            
3 Stein (2003) states that “…… the diversification discount may indeed be a useful measure, but 
perhaps one should pay less attention to its mean value, and more to its cross-sectional variation”. 
See Stein (2003), p145. 
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Thus, an efficient internal capital market creates value for shareholders of diversified 
firms.  
     In addition, firm diversification is associated with coinsurance effect, risk reduction 
and information asymmetry. Lewellen (1971) argues that the coinsurance effect 
stemming from imperfectly correlated cash flows among different segments reduces 
the bankruptcy risk of a diversified firm and alleviates a firm’s financial constraints. 
Mansi and Reeb (2002) suggest that firm diversification is insignificantly related to 
excess firm value, and the diversification discount can be attributed to the risk-
reducing effects of diversification. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find there 
is information asymmetry in diversified firms, and the division spin-off improves firm 
value as it mitigates the asymmetric information problems. 
     Moreover, a more recent paper links the value of firm diversification with the 
presence of large customers. Hann, Ogneva and Ozbas (2013) examine the impact 
of firm diversification on cost of capital through the perspective of customers, and 
argue that firm diversification reduces the risk stemming from the defection by 
customers and is associated with a lower cost of capital. Their findings imply that 
firm diversification is beneficial for shareholders with the presence of large 
customers. Fee and Thomas (2004) suggest that customers experience negligible 
stock price reactions at merger announcements and insignificant changes in 
operating performance after upstream mergers. As a result, taking customers into 






     I develop the hypotheses in this section. 
2.3.1. Relationship-Specific Investments 
     Bankruptcy risk affects the relationship-specific investments undertaken by 
customers and suppliers. For example, Titman (1984) argues that a firm can commit 
to reducing the risk of liquidation by choosing lower leverage in the situation that the 
firm requires its customers to undertake the relationship-specific investments that will 
lose value if the firm goes into liquidation.  Titman and Wessels (1988) find that firms 
that can potentially impose high costs on their customers in the event of liquidation 
tend to choose lower debt ratios. Kale and Shahrur (2007) find that a firm’s leverage 
is negatively related to the R&D intensities of its customers. 
Given the importance of the bankruptcy risk in the setting of the relationship-specific 
investments, firm diversification can have an impact through the channel of reduction 
in bankruptcy risk. For example, Lewellen (1971) argues that the coinsurance effect 
stemmed from imperfectly correlated cash flows among different segments reduces 
the bankruptcy risk of a diversified firm and alleviates a firm’s financial constraints. 
Since firm diversification reduces the bankruptcy risk, more relationship-specific 
investments will be motivated to be taken on between a diversified firm and its large 
customers. This channel is not available for single-segment firms. Therefore, I 
expect that this is beneficial for shareholders of diversified firms. I have the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The value of large customers for shareholders is higher in diversified 
firms than single-segment firms. 
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2.3.2. Bargaining Position 
     Previous findings in a long literature reveal that large customers reduce the firm 
performance of their suppliers by giving pressure to the suppliers to provide 
concessions such as lower price, extended trade credit and so on (e.g., Galbraith, 
1952; Scherer, 1970; Lustgarten, 1975; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; 
Williamson, 1979; Balakrishnan, Linsmeier, and Venkatachalam, 1996). A related 
literature on the bargaining between customers and suppliers examines the role of 
firm surplus available for sharing in the bargaining. For example, Kale and Shahrur 
(2007) develop their hypothesis based on the intuition in Bronars and Deere (1991)4 
that higher leverage increases a firm’s bargaining position with labor union by 
reducing the amount of firm surplus available for sharing with labor, and find a 
positive relation between firm debt level and the degree of concentration in customer 
industries. 
     Given the role of firm surplus in the bargaining between a firm and its large 
customers, firm diversification weakens a firm’s bargaining position through two 
channels by increasing the firm surplus available to make concessions to large 
customers through two channels. First, since the coinsurance effect alleviates a 
diversified firm’s financial constraints (e.g., Lewellen, 1971) and is associated with 
the “more money” effect (Stein, 2003), this increases the potential resources 
available to be extracted by large customers. Consequently, large customers may 
demand more concessions from diversified firms than single-segment firms.  
     Second, since previous findings in the literature reveal that the transfer of 
resources among different segments can take place within a diversified firm (e.g., 
                                            
4 See Kale and Shahrur (2007), p322 and p326. 
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Shin and Stulz 1998; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Stein, 1997), this may 
increase the potential resources available to be extracted by large customers 
because a diversified firm may transfer the resources from a segment without large 
customers to a segment with large customers when the diversified firm is under 
pressure to give concessions. Consequently, large customers may demand more 
concessions from diversified firms than single-segment firms.  
     These two channels are not available for single-segment firms. Therefore, I 
expect that such kind of weakening in bargaining position is not beneficial for 
shareholders of diversified firms. I have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The value of large customers for shareholders is lower in diversified 
firms than single-segment firms. 
2.3.3. Summarizing the Hypotheses 
     The above three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. I empirically examine 
which are most important to explain how firm diversification affect the value of large 
customers. I combine the above three hypotheses into the following table. 
The impact of firm diversification on the value of large customers 
Relationship-specific investments Bargaining position 
+ – 
     This table summarizes the predictions of the three hypotheses. A plus (minus) 





2.4. Data and Variables 
     In this section, I describe the data and variables. 
 2.4.1. Data Sources 
     I obtain the data from the following sources. I collect the firm-level data from the 
Compustat Annual database and the segment data from the Compustat Historical 
Segments database. I obtain the data on large customers from Compustat Customer 
Segments database. I get the stock return data from CRSP. I use the tariff data in 
Fresard and Valta (2016). 5  I obtain the data on mergers and acquisitions from 
Thomson One Banker database. 
     The sample period is from 1976 to 2013. I use the following screening procedures. 
I exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) as well as firms with financial segments. I 
also exclude firms with sales less than $20 million. I follow Berger and Ofek (1995) 
and require that the sum of segment sales must be within 1% of the firm sales. I 
exclude the observations with incomplete data. After the screening procedures, I 
obtain a final sample of 12677 firms with 110084 firm-year observations. Among 
them, diversified firms have 34481 firm-year observations, and single-segment firms 
have 75603 firm-year observations. 
2.4.2. Data on Large Customers 
     As Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) No.14 requires firms to report 
their important customers which account for over 10% of total annual sales, the 
Compustat Customer Segments database provides the data on these customers as 
                                            
5 The data was available on the webpage of Philip Valta: http://www.valta.ch/ when I wrote the first 
draft paper. Fresard and Valta (2016) construct the tariff data based on Fresard (2010), Feenstra 
(1996), Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002), and Schott (2010). 
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well as the segments responsible for the sales to these customers. However, only 
the names of customers are provided in the Compustat Customer Segments 
database, and they are generally listed as abbreviations instead of full names. I 
match the names of customers with firm identifiers in the Compustat Annual 
database by hand. I link the abbreviations of customer names with their original 
names by using an algorithm in which I first check the order and number of letters in 
the abbreviation and then identify the most likely corresponding full names in the 
Compustat Annual database.  
     For example, the abbreviation of the name of a customer is shown as “GEN MTR” 
in Compustat Customer Segments database. I use the above algorithm and find that 
it corresponds to the General Motors Co. in Compustat Annual database. For 
another example, “ALA PWR” in the Customer Segments database corresponds to 
the Alabama Power Co. in the Compustat Annual database. However, for those 
abbreviations which are ambiguous and cannot be precisely linked with the full 
names of any firm in Compustat, I exclude these observations from my sample.  
2.4.3. Variables 
     I describe the variables in this section.  
2.4.3.1. Excess value  
     I follow Berger and Ofek (1995) and use Excess Value as a measure of the firm 
value. For single-segment firms, Excess Value equals the percentage difference 
between a firm’s actual value and the median valuation ratio in the same industry. 
For diversified firms, this measure compares a firm’s actual market value with an 
imputed value as if its segments were operated as single-segment firms. The 
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imputed value for each segment is calculated by multiplying the segment’s sales by 
the median ratio of the market value to sales for single-segment firms in the same 
industry.6 The imputed value of the firm is the sum of the imputed value for each 
segment. Excess Value equals the percentage difference between a firm’s total 
value and its imputed value. I provide more details on the calculation of Excess 
Value in Appendix A1. 
2.4.3.2. The Measures of large customers 
     I use three measures for large customers. First, I construct a dummy variable 
called Large Customer, which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer 
which account for over 10% of the firm’s total annual sales, and equals zero 
otherwise. Second, I construct a variable called Top Large Customer, which is the 
ratio of the purchases made by the top large customer to the total sales of the firm. 
Third, I construct a variable called All Large Customers, which is the ratio of the 
purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. 
2.4.3.3. Firm diversification 
     I use “Firm Diversification” to indicate the status of diversification. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two 
segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. 
2.4.3.4. Control variables 
     I follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and use the following control variables. Size is 
the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. 
                                            
6 Custodio (2014) argues that q-based measures of the diversification discount are biased upward by 
mergers and acquisitions and its accounting implications, and that market-to-sales-based measures 
do not have this bias. 
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CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales. Leverage is the ratio 
of long-term debts to assets. The variable S&P is a dummy variable that equals one 
when the firm is part of the S&P index and equals zero otherwise. PNDIV is the 
fraction of all firms in the industry that are diversified firms. PSDIV is the fraction of 
industry sales accounted for by diversified firms. GDP Growth is the growth rate in 
real GDP. Contraction is the number of months in a year when the economy is in 
recession. MAJOREX is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is listed on 
Nasdaq, NYSE, or AMEX, and equals zero otherwise. FOREIGN is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated outside the United States and 
equals zero otherwise. 
 
2.5. Results 
     I report the results in this section. First, I report the univariate analysis of excess 
value. Next, I examine the relationship between firm diversification and the value of 
large customers. Then I conduct some initial analysis on the endogeneity problem 
related to firm diversification.  
2.5.1. Univariate Statistics 
     Table 1.1 shows the univariate statistics. Panel A shows that the mean of the 
variable Large Customers is 0.0977, indicating that around 9.77% of the firms in my 
sample have at least one large customer. The mean of the variable Top Large 
Customer is 0.1933. This means that, on average, the largest customer of a firm 
accounts for more than 19% of total sales, which indicates the important role of the 
largest customer. Panel A also shows that the mean of the variable All Large 
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Customers is 0.2302. Panel B shows the univariate statistics of Excess Value for 
both diversified firms and single-segment firms. The mean of Excess Value is -
0.0923 for diversified firms and the median is -0.1007. The mean of Excess Value is 
0.0083 for single-segment firms and the median is 0.0000. 7  The magnitude of 
Excess Value is consistent with the findings in the literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 
1995; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter and Yermack, 2012). 
2.5.2. Univariate Analysis of Excess Value 
     Table 1.2 shows the univariate analysis of excess value for diversified firms. I 
divide the sub-sample of diversified firms into two groups based on the dummy 
variable Large Customer. Column 1 shows the results for the group of diversified 
firms with large customers. The mean of Excess Value is -0.1445 and the median is -
0.1568. Column 2 shows the results for the group of diversified firms without large 
customers. The mean of Excess Value is -0.0807, and the median is -0.0927. I 
conduct the mean test and the median test for the difference. I find that they are 
significantly different between the two groups. The difference in the mean is -0.0638 
(p-value= 0.01) and the difference in the median is -0.0641 (p-value = 0.01). 
Therefore, the results in Table 1.2 imply that the excess value is lower for the group 
of diversified firms with large customers. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
                                            
7 For single-segment firms, Excess Value equals the percentage difference between a firm’s actual 
value and the median valuation ratio in the same industry. Therefore, the median of Excess Value is 
zero for single-segment firms by construction. This is consistent with the results in Berger and Ofek 
(1995). See Berger and Ofek (1995, Table 1.2, page 48).  
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2.5.3. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large Customers 
     Table 1.3 shows the regressions8. I cluster the standard errors by firm and year in 
the tables. The dependent variable is Excess Value across all columns. Column 1 
shows the regression when I use Large Customers as the measure for large 
customers. I construct an interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers to 
measure the impact of firm diversification on the value of large customers. I find that 
the coefficient of Large Customer is 0.022 (p-value=0.01) and the coefficient of the 
interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers is -0.086 (p-value = 0.01). 
This implies that the value of large customers for shareholders is lower for diversified 
firms than single-segment firms.  For single segment firm, the existence of large 
customers is associated with 0.022 increase in excess value. However, for 
diversified firms, the existence of large customers is associated with 0.064 decrease 
(0.022-0.086= -0.064) in excess value. I conduct an F-test on the sum of the 
coefficient of Large Customers and the coefficient of the interaction term Firm 
Diversification * Large Customers, and find that the sum of the coefficients is 
significant (p-value = 0.01). 
     I find a similar pattern in Column 2 and Column 3 when I use Top Large 
Customer and All Large Customers as the measures for large customers. I conduct 
an F-test on the sum of the coefficient of Top Large Customer and the coefficient of 
the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Large Customer, and find that the sum 
of the coefficients is significant (p-value = 0.01).  It implies that a higher level of the 
                                            
8 I do not use fixed effect regression in this analysis because there is not a large variation in the status 
of the presence of large customers over time. I examine my sample and find that only 5.56% of 
observations involve a change in the status of the dummy variable Large Customers from year t-1 to 
year t. This implies that there is no change in the status of the presence of large customers over time 
for nearly 95% of the observations in my sample. Zhou (2001) argues that fixed effect regression is 
not a proper method when there is not a large variation for the independent variable over time. I have 
used the year fixed effect in each regression, and the results are consistent.  
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largest customer is associated with a lower level of Excess Value for diversified firms. 
I find a similar pattern in Column 3 when the variable All Large Customers is used as 
the measure for large customers. 
     Therefore, the results in Table 1.3 support Hypothesis 2 that the value of large 
customers for shareholders is lower in diversified firms.   
2.5.4. Diversity 
     I conduct further analysis to better understand the results in Table 1.3. I examine 
the two channels related to the bargaining perspective. First, as stated in Section 3.3, 
the transfer of resources among different segments can potentially weaken the 
bargaining position of a diversified firm. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) argue 
that the diversity in the investment opportunities across segments is related to the 
efficiency of the resource transfer. When the difference in investment opportunities 
across segments is larger, there will be a more negative impact of the resource 
transfer from a strong segment to a weak segment. Therefore, I examine how the 
diversity in the investment opportunities across segments affects the relationship 
between firm diversification and the value of large customers. 
     I follow Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) to construct a variable called 
Diversity, which is the ratio of the standard deviation of segment asset-weighted q to 
the equally-weighted average q across segments. A higher level of Diversity 
indicates a large difference in the investment opportunities across segments. I use 
the triple interaction terms such as Firm Diversification * Large Customers * Diversity 
to examine the impact of diversity on the relationship between firm diversification and 
the value of large customers. 
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     Panel A of Table 1.4 shows the results. The dependent variable is Excess Value 
across all columns. Column 1 shows the regression when I use the dummy variable 
Large Customers as the measure for large customers. I find that the coefficient of 
Large Customers is 0.023 (p-value=0.01) and the coefficient of the interaction term 
Firm Diversification * Large Customers is -0.063 (p-value = 0.01). The coefficient of 
the interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers * Diversity is -0.179 (p-
value = 0.02). The sum of the coefficient of Large Customers and the coefficient of 
the interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers is -0.040 (0.0227+(-
0.0633) = -0.041). I conduct an F-test on the sum of the coefficient of Large 
Customers and the coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Large 
Customers, and find that the sum of the coefficients is significant (p-value = 0.01).  It 
implies that a higher level of the largest customer is associated with a lower level of 
Excess Value for diversified firms with lower diversity. Moreover, the sum of the 
coefficient of Large Customers, the coefficient of the interaction term Firm 
Diversification * Large Customers, and the coefficient of triple interaction term Firm 
Diversification * Large Customers * Diversity is -0.219 (0.023+(-0.063)+(-0.179) = -
0.219). I conduct an F-test on the sum of the coefficient of Large Customers, the 
coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers, and the 
coefficient of triple interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers * Diversity. 
I find that the sum of the coefficients is significant (p-value = 0.01).  It implies that the 
presence of large customers is associated with a lower level of Excess Value for 
diversified firms with higher diversity.  
     I find a similar pattern in Column 2 and Column 3 in Table 1.4 when I use Top 
Large Customer and All Large Customers as the measures for large customers. The 
results imply that the presence of large customers is associated with a reduction in 
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the Excess Value when there is diversity in the investment opportunities across 
segments in a diversified firm, and that such reduction in excess value is larger when 
there is a higher diversity. 
     Therefore, the results in Panel A of Table 1.4 support the Hypothesis 2 that the 
value of large customers for shareholders is lower in diversified firms than single-
segment firms. 
2.5.5. Unrelatedness 
     The second channel related to the bargaining perspective is the “more money” 
effect as stated in Section 3.3. Since the “more money” effect stems from imperfectly 
correlated cash flows among different segments, I expect that this effect would be 
stronger for a diversified firm with the segments in the unrelated industries than a 
diversified firm with all segments in the related industries. I construct a dummy 
variable called Unrelatedness, which equals one if the segments of a diversified firm 
do not operate in the same industries, and equals zero otherwise. I examine how the 
variable Unrelatedness affects the relationship between firm diversification and the 
value of large customers. 
     Panel B of Table 1.4 shows the results. The dependent variable is Excess Value 
across all columns. Column 1 shows the regression when I use the dummy variable 
Large Customers as the measure for large customers. I find that the coefficient of 
Large Customer is 0.023 (p-value=0.01) and the coefficient of the interaction term 
Firm Diversification * Large Customers is -0.065 (p-value = 0.01). The coefficient of 
the interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers * Unrelatedness is -0.008 
(p-value = 0.72). This implies that the unrelated diversification does not significantly 
affect the value of large customers.  
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     I find a similar pattern in Column 2 and Column 3 when I use Top Large 
Customer and All Large Customers as the measures for large customers. In Column 
2, I find that the coefficient of Large Customer is 0.180 (p-value=0.01) and the 
coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers is -0.486 (p-
value = 0.01). The coefficient of the triple interaction term Firm Diversification * Top 
Large Customer * Unrelatedness is insignificant. In Column 3, I find that the 
coefficient of Large Customer is 0.023 (p-value=0.01) and the coefficient of the 
interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers is -0.063 (p-value = 0.01). 
The coefficient of the coefficient of the triple interaction term Firm Diversification * All 
Large Customers * Unrelatedness is insignificant. Therefore, there is no evidence 
shows that the unrelatedness affects the relationship between firm diversification and 
the value of large customers. However, as the coefficient of Firm Diversification * 
Large Customers is significant, the results are still consistent with the interpretation 
that the value of large customers are lower for diversified firms. 
2.5.6. The Efficiency of Resource Transfer within Diversified Firms 
     To corroborate the results in Panel A of Table 1.4, I examine the efficiency of the 
transfer of resources among different segments within a diversified firm with the 
presence of large customers. I follow Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and use 
the variable Segment-level Resource Transfer as the measure of the amount of 
resource transfer within diversified firms. Segment-level Resource Transfer is the 
difference between the industry-adjusted investment in a segment and the weighted 
average industry-adjusted investments across all the segments of a firm. More 
details on the calculation of this measure can be found in Appendix A2. The variable 
measures the amount of resources transferred into or out of a segment in a 
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diversified firm. A positive value of variable indicates the net transfer of resources 
into a segment, and a negative value indicates the net transfer out of a segment.  
     I also construct the variables to measure the efficiency of resource transfer within 
diversified firms. Weak Investment Opportunities is a dummy variable which equals 
one if the segment q is below the firm’s average q, and equals zero otherwise. Weak 
Resource-weighted Investment Opportunities is a dummy variable which equals one 
if the resources-weighted segment q is below the firm’s resources-weighted average 
q, and equals zero otherwise, where the resources are measured by the segment’s 
beginning-of-year share of total sales.  I use these two dummy variables to identify 
efficient or inefficient transfer of resources within diversified firms.  
     Table 1.5 shows the results. The dependent variable is Segment-level Resource 
Transfer. Column 1 shows the regression when I use Weak Investment 
Opportunities as the measure for the efficiency of resource transfer. The coefficient 
for Large Customers is -0.004 (p-value =0.01). The coefficient of the interaction term 
Large Customers * Weak Investment Opportunities and Weak Resource-weighted 
Investment Opportunities is 0.004 (p-value = 0.01). Column 2 shows the regression 
when I use Weak Resource-weighted Investment Opportunities as the measure for 
the efficiency of resource transfer. the coefficient for Large Customers is -0.002 (p-
value =0.02). The coefficient of the interaction term Large Customers * Weak 
Resource-weighted Investment Opportunities is 0.003 (p-value = 0.05). Column 3 
shows the regression when I use Weak Investment Opportunities and Weak 
Resource-weighted Investment Opportunities as the measure for the efficiency of 
resource transfer. The coefficient for Large Customers is -0.002 (p-value =0.05). The 
coefficient of the interaction term Large Customers * Weak Investment Opportunities 
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and Weak Resource-weighted Investment Opportunities is 0.007 (p-value = 0.01). 
The results imply that for strong segments, they do not worry about the survival of 
segment, so they transfer the resources out of the strong segment instead to make 
concession for large customers. For weak segments, they have heavy dependence 
on large customers for the survival of segment, so they transfer resources into the 
segment to make concession for large customer. 
     Therefore, the results in Table 1.5 support the Hypothesis 2 that the value of 
large customers for shareholders is lower in diversified firms than single-segment 
firms.  
2.5.7. Trade Credit 
     I conduct further analysis of the perspective of the bargaining position. Extended 
trade credit has been identified in the literature as an important type of concession 
made by suppliers to large customers. Fabbri and Klapper (2016) find that firms with 
weaker bargaining power over their customers have greater propensity to offer trade 
credit. Chod, Lyandres, and Yang (2018) examine the link between supplier 
competition and trade credit. They show that a customer will obtain more trade credit 
if their suppliers operate in a competitive industry. Also, a customer will obtain more 
trade credit if the product substitutability among their suppliers is higher. 
     If firm diversification is associated with a weaker bargaining position, I expect that 
a diversified firm will give more extended trade credit with the presence of large 
customers. I follow the literature (e.g., Dass, Kale and Nanda, 2014) and use two 
measures of trade credit based on supplier-customer pairs (i.e., sales of a supplier to 
specific customers). One measure is called Supplier’s Accounts Receivable, which is 
defined as the log (1+(supplier’s accounts receivable)*(fraction of supplier’s overall 
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sales to the customer). A higher level of Suppliers’ Account Receivable means a 
higher level of trade credit provided by supplier. The other measure is called 
Customer’s Accounts Payable, which is defined as (1+ (customer firm’s accounts 
payable) * (supplier’s sales to the customer/customer’s overall costs of goods sold). 
A higher level of Customers’ Account Payable means a higher level of trade credit 
demanded by customers.    
    Table 6 shows the results. In Panel A of Table 6, the dependent variable is 
Supplier’s Accounts Receivable. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Large 
Customers is 0.804 (p-value = 0.01). It implies that a single-segment has more 
accounts receivable with the presence of large customers. Moreover, the coefficient 
of the interaction term Large Customers * Firm Diversification is 0.049 (p-value = 
0.07). It implies that firm diversification is associated with an additional positive 
impact of large customers on accounts receivable. This is consistent with the 
bargaining position hypothesis in that a diversified firm gives more concessions to 
large customers because of the weaker bargaining position. I find a similar pattern in 
Column 2 and Column 3 in Panel A of Table 6 when I use Top Large Customer and 
All Large Customers as the measures for large customers.  
     In Panel B of Table 6, the dependent variable is Customer’s Accounts Payable. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Large Customers is 0.741 (p-value = 0.01). It 
implies that when a customer is classified as a large customer, it has more accounts 
payable when its supplier is a single-segment firm. Moreover, the coefficient of the 
interaction term Large Customers * Firm Diversification is 0.089 (p-value = 0.01). It 
implies that there is an additional positive impact of the status of a large customer on 
accounts payable when its supplier is a diversified firm. This is consistent with the 
52 
 
bargaining position hypothesis in that a large customer demands more concessions 
when its supplier is a diversified firm because of the weaker bargaining position 
associated with firm diversification. I find a similar pattern in Column 2 and Column 3 
in Panel B of Table 6 when I use Top Large Customer and All Large Customers as 
the measures for large customers. Therefore, the results in both Panel A and Panel 
B of Table 6 are consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
2.6. Tariff Cut 
     In this section, I examine the potential endogeneity problem by using tariff cut as 
an instrumental variable. It has been identified in the literature that a tariff cut is 
associated with an exogenous change in the competitive environment. For example, 
Fresard (2010) argues that a change in tariff can be regarded as a quasi-natural 
experiment to isolate the causal effect, and uses the reduction in import tariffs to 
identify exogenous intensification of competition. Valta (2012) uses the reductions of 
import tariff rates to capture exogenous changes to a firm’s competitive environment. 
Alimov (2014) makes a similar identifying assumption that firms that experience 
larger import tariff reductions should be exposed to a greater increase in foreign 
competition.  
     Given that a tariff cut is associated with a more competitive environment, this can 
affect the existing customer-supplier relationship. For example, Liu, Masulis and 
Stanfield (2017) argue that “Tariff reductions unexpectedly intensify competitive 
pressures by significantly reducing a customer’s switching costs and this raises the 
probability of a firm losing major customers to a foreign rival”. Therefore, I conduct 




     I use the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation. I conduct the analysis by 
using the tariff cut as the identification for the change in large customers. Since the 
data on large customers are at the segment level and the segment SIC codes are 
available in the Compustat Segment database, I identify the magnitude of tariff 
reduction in the industry of the segment that a large customer belongs to. If there is a 
large tariff reduction in such an industry, it represents an exogenous shock 
specifically for the segment that a large customer belongs to. The corresponding 
change in the value of large customers can be better attributable to this exogenous 
shock, which can mitigate the endogeneity problem and reveal a causal relation. 
      Regarding the identification for the variable Firm Diversification, I follow Campa 
and Kedia (2002) and use the estimated probability of operating in multiple segments 
from a probit model as reported in Column 3 of Table 1.7 as a generated instrument 
for the diversification status. 9 
     I use the following specifications in the empirical analysis.  
△Excess Value = a + b1 * Firm Diversification + b2 *△Top Large Customer  
+ b3 * (Firm Diversification * △Top Large Customer) + Control Variables + ε      (1) 
 
△Excess Value = a + b1 * Firm Diversification + b2 *△All Large Customers  
+ b3 * (Firm Diversification * △All Large Customers) + Control Variables + ε      (2) 
 
     Equation (1) and equation (2) correspond to the empirical analysis that I conduct. 
Namely, holding constant the level of firm diversification (the item Firm 
Diversification), I examine how the change in Top Large Customer (the change in All 
                                            
9 See Campa and Kedia (2002, p1754) for details on the construction of the instrumental variable.  
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Large Customers) affects the excess value of diversified firms through the interaction 
term Firm Diversification * △Top Large Customer (the interaction term Firm 
Diversification * △All Large Customers). 
     I use the tariff data in Fresard and Valta (2016), which are the tariff data for the 
firms in manufacturing industries with the sample period from 1976 to 2005. 10  I 
construct a dummy variable Tariff Cut which equals one if the percentage reduction 
of tariff in the industry of the segment that a large customer belongs to is two times 
higher than its industry median percentage change, and equals zero otherwise. The 
variable Tariff Cut is used as the instrumental variable for the change in large 
customers (i.e., △Top Large Customer or △All Large Customers). Correspondingly, 
the interaction term Firm Diversification * △Top Large Customer (the interaction term 
Firm Diversification * △All Large Customers) is calculated based on both the 
instrumented Firm Diversification and the instrumented value of △Top Large 
Customer (the instrumented value of △All Large Customers). 
2.6.2. Results 
     Table 1.7 shows the first stage of the 2SLS estimation for the variables on the 
change in large customers. In Column 1, the dependent variable is △Top Large 
Customer. The independent variable is the instrumental variable Tariff Cut and all 
exogenous variables to be used in the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. I find 
that the coefficient of Tariff Cut is -0.003 (p-value = 0.01). This implies that a tariff cut 
is associated with a reduction in the level of the top large customer. I find similar 
results in Column 2 where the dependent variable is △All Large Customers. The 
                                            
10 The sample period of the data in Fresard and Valta (2016) is from 1974 to 2005. I match the data 
with my sample starting from 1976. 
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coefficient of Tariff Cut is -0.004 (p-value = 0.01), implying that a tariff cut is 
associated with a reduction in the level of all large customers. Column 3 shows a 
probit model for the diversification status. As stated before, the estimated probability 
of operating in multiple segments from the probit model is used as a generated 
instrument for the variable Firm Diversification. 
     Table 1.8 shows the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. The dependent 
variable is △Excess Value. In Column 1, the coefficient of △Top Large Customer is 
7.265 (p-value = 0.01). It implies that a reduction in the ratio of the purchases made 
by the largest customer is associated with a reduction in excess value in single-
segment firms. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * 
△Top Large Customer is -17.759 (p-value = 0.01). The sum of the coefficient of 
△Top Large Customer and the coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification 
* △Top Large Customer is -10.494 (=7.265 + (-17.759)). I conduct an F-test on the 
sum of the coefficient of Change in Top Large Customer and the coefficient of the 
interaction Change in Firm Diversification * △Top Large Customer, and find that the 
sum of the coefficients is significant (p-value = 0.02). It implies that a reduction in the 
ratio of the purchases made by the largest customer is associated with an increase 
in excess value in diversified firms. 
    In Column 2, The coefficient of △ All Large Customers is 6.190 (p-value = 0.01). It 
implies that a reduction in the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers is 
associated with a reduction in excess value in single-segment firms. Moreover, the 
coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * △ All Large Customer is -
10.813 (p-value = 0.02). The sum of the coefficient of △ All Large Customer and the 
coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * △ All Large Customer is -
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6.487 (=6.826 + (-13.313)). I conduct an F-test on the sum of the coefficient of △ All 
Large Customers and the coefficient of the interaction Firm Diversification * △ All 
Large Customer, and find that the sum of the coefficients is significant (p-value = 
0.05). It implies that a reduction in the ratio of the purchases made by all large 
customers is associated with an increase in excess value in diversified firms. 
     Therefore, the results in Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 are consistent with the 
Hypothesis 2. I find similar results after I control for the endogeneity problem by 
using the setting of the tariff cut.  
 
2.7. Event Study of M&As 
     I have so far used Excess Value as the measure of firm value. However, it has 
been argued in the literature that there are limitations associated with this measure. 
For example, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) argue that a segment of diversified 
firms is not comparable to single-segment firms. Whited (2001) argues that the 
calculation of the imputed value based on segment q is flawed because of the 
measurement error. In this section, I examine how large customers affect the 
performance of diversifying M&As. By using the event study, I use different 
measures for the performance in the setting of M&As. Therefore, I can mitigate the 





     I obtain the U.S. data on merger and acquisitions from the Thomson One 
database. The sample period is from 1979 to 2013.11  I chose the M&As whose Form 
of the Deal are recorded as “Mergers” or “Acquisition of Majority Interest” in the 
database. I also require that the public status of the acquirer is “Public” and that the 
deal status is “Completed”. I match the sample of M&As with the large sample used 
in the Section 5, and exclude the observations with incomplete data. After the 
screening procedure, I obtain a final sample of 7282 M&A events. 
2.7.2. Variables 
     I use the following variables in the setting of M&As.  
2.7.2.1. Announcement return  
     I use an acquirer’s announcement return, which is calculated as the cumulative 
abnormal return over days (-1, +1) around the announcement date, as a measure of 
the stock market performance of M&As. The cumulative abnormal return is 
calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the 
market return. To estimate the market model, I use an acquirer’s daily return and the 
return on the CRSP equally weighted index over days -200 to -20, where day 0 is the 
event date.  
2.7.2.2. Net change in operating performance 
     I use the net change in ROA as a measure of the operating performance of M&As. 
ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. I calculate the Change in ROA from 
                                            
11 The data on M&As starts from 1979 in the Thomson One database. 
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year t-1 to year t+1. Net Change in ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s 
change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to 
year t+1. I construct a sample of comparable firms with propensity score matching. I 
match each acquirer firm to a non-acquirer firm requiring that the non-acquirer firm 
has a minimum difference in propensity score based on firm size, market-to-book 
ratio, capital expenditure, leverage, cash flow, R&D, dividends and sales growth. I 
also match each acquirer firm to a non-acquiring firm within the same industry based 
on a two-digit SIC code by using the similar criteria on propensity score as a 
robustness check. Details about the propensity score matching are given in 
Appendix B. 
2.7.2.3. Diversifying M&As 
     I construct a variable called Diversifying M&As to identify whether an M&A 
increases the degree of firm diversification. Diversifying M&As is a dummy variable 
that equals one if both conditions are met: (1) the acquirer’s main two-digit SIC code 
is different from the target’s main two-digit SIC code, and (2) the acquirer’s 
Herfindahl index calculated based on segment sales at year t+1 is smaller than the 
acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based on segment sales at year t-1, and 
equals zero otherwise. 
2.7.2.4. Presence of large customers 
     I construct a variable called Presence of Large Customers to identify whether or 
not the combined firm after M&As has at least one large customer. Presence of 
Large Customers is a dummy variable that equals one if there exists at least one 
large customer in the combined firm after M&As, and that equals zero otherwise.  
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2.7.2.5. Control variables 
     I use the following control variables in the regressions. These control variables 
are commonly used in the literature on M&As. Unfriendly is a dummy variable that 
equals one if an M&A takes place in an unfriendly way, and equals zero otherwise. 
Private Target is a dummy variable that equals one if the target is a private firm, and 
that equals zero otherwise. Cash Payment is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
method of payment is cash for a deal, and equals zero otherwise. Deal Value is the 
ratio of deal value to the market capitalization of the acquirer. I also use other control 
variables such as Size, M/B, Capital Expenditures, and R&D. 
2.7.3. Results 
2.7.3.1. Univariate statistics  
     Table 1.9 shows the univariate statistics for the sample of M&A. The mean of 
CAR between day -1 and day 1 (event day=0) is 0.0069. The average net change in 
ROA is 0.0006. I can also find that the mean for Diversifying M&As is 0.1313 which 
implies that approximately 13.13% of events in the sample is diversified M&As. In 
addition, the mean of the variable Large Customers is 0.1633, which indicates that 
around 16.33% of the firms in my M&A sample have at least one large customer.  
2.7.3.2. Large customers and the value of M&A 
     Column 1 of Table 1.10 reports the regression about the announcement return. 
The dependent variable is CAR (-1, +1). I construct an interaction term Diversifying 
M&As * Presence of Large Customers to measure the impact of large customers on 
the change in firm value around the diversifying M&As. I find that the coefficient of 
the Presence of Large Customers is 0.008 (p-value = 0.01). It implies that the 
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presence of large customers is associated with a higher cumulative abnormal return 
around the announcement of non-diversifying M&As. The coefficient of the 
interaction term Diversifying M&As * Presence of Large Customers is -0.011 (p-value 
= 0.08). The sum of the coefficient of Presence of Large Customers and the 
coefficient of the interaction term Diversifying M&As * Presence of Large Customers 
is -0.003 (=0.008 + (-0.011)). I conduct an F-test on the sum of the coefficient of 
Presence of Large Customers and the coefficient of the interaction term Diversifying 
M&As * Presence of Large Customers, and find that the sum is not significant (p-
value =0.55). The results in Table 1.10 imply that when a firm conducts non-
diversifying M&As, shareholders place a higher value on the M&As when there is a 
large customer. However, when a firm conducts diversifying M&As, the presence of 
a large customer does not significantly affect shareholders’ valuation of M&As. The 
results are consistent with Hypothesis 2.      
Column 1 of Table 1.11 shows the relationship between the change in operating 
performance and the presence of large customers around the M&As. The dependent 
variable is Net Change in ROA. Column 1 shows the regression when I get 
comparable firms by using the propensity score matching based on the entire 
sample.  I find that the coefficient of the Presence of Large Customers is 0.006 (p-
value = 0.33). It implies that the presence of large customers is associated with a 
higher cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of non-diversifying 
M&As. The coefficient of the interaction term Diversifying M&As * Presence of Large 
Customers is -0.030 (p-value= 0.07). The sum of the coefficient of Presence of Large 
Customers and the coefficient of the interaction term Diversifying M&As * Presence 
of Large Customers is -0.024 (=0.006 + (-0.030)). I conduct an F-test on the sum of 
the coefficient of Presence of Large Customers and the coefficient of the interaction 
61 
 
term Diversifying M&As * Presence of Large Customers, and find that the sum is 
insignificant (p-value =0.11). The results in Table 1.10 imply that when a firm 
conducts non-diversifying M&As, shareholders place a higher value on the M&As 
when there is a large customer. However, when a firm conducts diversifying M&As, 
the presence of a large customer does not significantly affect shareholders’ valuation 
of M&As. This implies that the operating performance of a diversifying M&A is lower 
with the presence of large customers. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
2.7.4. Heckman Two-Stage Estimation 
     I conduct the robustness check by using the Heckman two-stage estimation to 
control for the self-selection problem. In the first stage, I estimate a probit model with 
the dummy variable Diversifying M&As as the dependent variable. The independent 
variables are the same the independent variables as reported in Column 3 of Table 
1.7. The probit model is used to model the likelihood that a firm chooses to conduct 
diversifying M&As. I calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio based on the estimates in the 
probit model. 
     Column 2 of Table 1.10 shows the second stage of Heckman estimation when I 
include the Inverse Mills Ratio in the regressions about the announcement return. I 
find that the coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Large Customers 
is -0.012 (p-value = 0.07).  Column 2 of Table 1.11 shows the second stage of 
Heckman estimation when I include the Inverse Mills Ratio in the regressions about 
the change in operating performance. The coefficient of the interaction term 
Diversifying M&As * Presence of Large Customers is -0.029 (p-value = 0.08).   
     Therefore, the results in Table 1.10 and Table 1.11 are consistent with the 
interpretation that both the announcement return and the net change in operating 
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performance are lower for diversifying M&As with the presence of large customers. 
They support Hypothesis 2 that the value of large customers for shareholders is 
lower in diversified firms than single-segment firms.   
 
2.8. Robustness Check 
     I show the robustness check in this section. 
2.8.1. Heckman Two-Stage Estimation and Instrumental Variables Approach 
     The literature on firm diversification has discussed the potential endogeneity 
problem (e.g., Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002). I follow 
Campa and Kedia (2002) and conduct the robustness check in this section. I use two 
econometrics methods. First, I use the Heckman two-stage estimation to control for 
the self-selection problem. Second, I use an instrumental variables approach to 
examine the underlying causality.    
     Table 1.12 shows the first stage of the Heckman estimation. I estimate a probit 
regression. The dependent variable is the dummy variable Firm Diversification. I 
follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and use the independent variables including the 
firm-level variables (such as Size, EBIT/SALES, and CAPX/SALES), the industry-
level variables (such as the fraction of all firms in the industry that are diversified 
firms), and the country-level variables (such as real GDP growth, the number of 
months in a year when the economy was in recession). Then I calculate the Inverse 
Mills Ratio based on the estimates in the probit regression, and use it in the second 
stage of Heckman estimation. 
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     Panel A of Table 1.13 shows the second stage of Heckman estimation when I 
include the Inverse Mills Ratio in the regressions. The results are consistent with 
those in Table 1.3. For example, Column 1 shows the regression when I use Large 
Customers as the measure for large customers. The coefficient of the interaction 
term Firm Diversification * Large Customers is -0.083 (p-value = 0.01). There is a 
similar pattern in other columns in Panel A of Table 1.13 when I use Top Large 
Customer and All Large Customers as the measures for large customers. 
     Panel B of Table 1.13 shows the results of the instrumental variables approach. I 
follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and use the estimated probability of operating in 
multiple segments from the probit model as reported in Table 1.12 as a generated 
instrument for the diversification status.  The results are consistent with those in 
Table 1.3. For example, Column 1 shows the regression when I use Large 
Customers as the measure for large customers. The coefficient of the interaction 
term Firm Diversification * Large Customers is -0.110 (p-value = 0.01). I find similar 
pattern in other columns in the Panel B of Table 1.13 when I use Top Large 
Customer and All Large Customers as the measures for large customers. 
     Therefore, there are consistent results in Table 1.13 after I use econometric 
methods to deal with the potential endogeneity problem. 
2.8.2. Alternative Measures for Firm Diversification 
     This section describes the alternative measures used for the firm diversification to 
do the robustness checks. The alternative measures are the number of segments 
and the firm concentration. 
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2.8.2.1. Number of segments 
     Comment and Jarrell (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Campa and Kedia 
(2002) also use the number of segments to measure firm diversification. Table 1.14 
shows how the firm diversification affect the value of large customers by using the 
Number of Segments as a proxy of firm diversification. The variable Number of 
Segments has negative and significant effects on the excess value, which is the 
same as the effects of the dummy variable Firm Diversification in Table 1.3. There 
are also negative and significant effects of the interaction terms (Number of 
Segments * Large Customers, Number of Segments * Top Large Customer, and 
Number of Segments * All Large Customers) on the excess value. The results are 
consistent with Table 1.3 that the value of large customers for shareholders is lower 
for diversified firms than single-segment firms.   
2.8.2.2. Firm concentration 
     Thomas (2002) use a Herfindahl Index as a proxy for firm diversification. Based 
on the Herfindahl Index, I construct a variable called Firm Concentration, which 
indicates the concentration level of a firm operating within its industry segments. The 
Firm Concentration is calculated as the sum of the squares of each segment’s 
assets as a percentage of the firm’s total assets. Firm Concentration equals one for 
single-segment firms, and less than one for diversified firms. The lower level of firm 
concentration means the higher level of firm diversification.  
     Table 1.15 shows how the firm diversification affects the value of large customers 
by using the Firm Concentration instead of Firm Diversification. The variable Firm 
Concentration has positive and significant effects on the excess value which is 
opposite to the effects of the dummy variable Firm Diversification in Table 1.3. There 
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are also positive and significant effects of the interaction terms (Firm Concentration * 
Large Customers, Firm Concentration * Top Large Customer, and Firm 
Concentration * All Large Customers) on the excess value. The results indicate that 
firm diversification increases the value of large customers when the firm has high 
level of concentration in its industries. The results support Table 1.3 that the value of 
large customers for shareholders is lower for diversified firms than single-segment 
firms.  
2.8.3. Alternative Measures for Large Customers 
     I use four alternative measures for large customers following Hui, Klesa, and 
Yeung (2012). I use the relative size of customers to the firm as firm-level proxies for 
the presence of large customers. Relative Size 1 is a ratio of average market value 
of customer to the market value of the supplier firm. Relative Size 2 is calculated by 
the average market value of firms in the industries that a customer belongs to 
divided by the market value of the supplier firm. I use the concentration ratio of 
customers as an industry-level proxy for the presence of large customers. 
Concentration 1 is defined as the average of firm’s Herfindahl-Hirschman index value 
in the industries that a customer belongs to. Concentration 2 is the average of the 
ratio of the market value of customer firm to the average market value of firms in the 
industries that a customer belongs to.  
     Table 1.16 shows the impact of firm diversification on the value of large 
customers by using alternative measures of large customers. The coefficient of the 
interaction term Firm Diversification*Relative Size 1 is -0.012 (p-value=0.01). Also, 
the coefficients of the other three interaction terms are negative and significant. 
Therefore, the results of Table 1.16 support Table 3. I can conclude that the value of 
66 
 
large customers for shareholders is lower for diversified firms than single-segment 
firms by using alternative measures of large customers. 
2.8.4. Bargaining Position and Trade Credit  
     To further support Table 1.6’s results regarding trade credit, I use alternative 
measures of large customers as the robustness check. Following Hui, Klesa, and 
Yeung (2012), I use the relative size of customers to the firm as a firm-level proxy for 
the presence of large customers. Relative Size 1 is the ratio of the average market 
value of the customer to the market value of the supplier firm. Relative Size 2 is 
calculated by the average market value of firms in the industries that a customer 
belongs to divided by the market value of the supplier firm. 
     Table 1.17 shows the results. In Panel A of Table 1.17, the dependent variable is 
Supplier’s Accounts Receivable. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of the 
interaction term Firm Diversification * Relative Size 1 is 0.051 (p-value = 0.01). This 
implies that a diversified firm has more accounts receivable when the relative size of 
large customers to the firm is higher. There is a similar pattern in Column 2 when I 
use Relative Size 2 as the measure for large customers. In Panel B of Table 1.17, 
the dependent variable is Customer’s Accounts Payable. Column 1 shows that the 
coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Relative Size 1 is 0.051 (p-
value = 0.01). This implies that large customers have more accounts payable to the 
diversified firm when the relative size of large customers to the firm is higher. There 




     Therefore, the results in Table 1.17 are consistent with the results of Table 6. The 
results support the interpretation that a diversified firm gives more extended trade 
credit to large customers due to a weaker bargaining position.  
2.8.5. Different Tariff Cut-off Points 
     I use the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation in Table 1.7 and Table 1.8. I 
conduct the analysis by using the tariff cut as the identification for the change in 
large customers. This section outlines the use of different tariff cut-off points to 
conduct the robustness check, as shown in Table 1.7 and Table 1.8. Tariff Cut 1.5 
(Tariff Cut 2.5 and Tariff Cut 3.0) is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
percentage reduction of tariff in the industry of the segment that a large customer 
belongs to is 1.5 (2.5 and 3) times higher than its industry median percentage 
change.  
     In Column 1 of Table 1.18, the independent variable is Tariff Cut 1.5, the 
coefficients for Change in Top Large Customer and Change in All Large Customers 
are -0.002 (p-value=0.01) and -0.004 (p-value=0.01) respectively. I find consistent 
results when I use Tariff Cut 2.5 and Tariff Cut 3.0 in Column 2 and Column 3. 
Therefore, the results of Table 1.18 are robust to the results of Table 1.7. This 
indicates that the tariff cut reduces the level of purchases made by large customers.  
     In Column 1 of Table 1.19, the coefficient of the interaction term Firm 
Diversification * △Top Large Customer is -20.302 (p-value = 0.01) and the coefficient 
of the interaction term Firm Diversification * △All Large Customer is -11.369 (p-value 
= 0.02). There are consistent results in the other two columns when I use Tariff Cut 
2.5 and Tariff Cut 3.0. Therefore, the results of Table 1.19 are robust to the results of 
Table 1.8. This implies that holding constant the level of firm diversification, a 
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reduction in the ratio of the purchases made by large customers is associated with 
an increase in excess value in diversified firms. 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
     I examine how firm diversification affects the value of large customers for 
shareholders. I develop two hypotheses based on bargaining position and 
relationship-specific investments. I use the excess value as a measure of the firm 
value, and find that the value of large customers for shareholders is lower in 
diversified firms than single-segment firms. More specifically, I find that the presence 
of large customers is associated with a reduction in the Excess Value when there is 
diversity in the investment opportunities across segments in a diversified firm, and 
that such reduction in excess value is larger when there is a higher diversity. 
Moreover, I examine the setting of a tariff cut which brings an exogenous change in 
the competitive environment, and find that a reduction in the level of large customers 
is associated with a decrease (an increase) in the value of single-segment firms 
(diversified firms). Furthermore, I find that both the announcement returns and the 
net change in ROA for diversifying M&As are lower with the presence of large 
customers.  
     I conclude that the results support the hypothesis that the value of large 
customers for shareholders is lower in diversified firms than single-segment firms 





Chapter 3. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large 
Suppliers 
3.1. Introduction 
     There is a literature that examines the role of large suppliers in various areas of 
corporate finance such as capital structure, stock market valuation, trade credit, 
seasoned equity offerings, managerial compensation, and dividends. In terms of 
capital structure, a firm can reduce the leverage ratio to maintain the relationship 
with its large suppliers. The level of debt is positively related to the bargaining power 
of the firm, and negatively related to the bilateral surplus available for suppliers (Kale 
and Meneghetti, 2014; Titman, 1984; Hennessy and Livdan, 2009). In addition, the 
performance of large suppliers is associated with the firm’s stock valuation. Menzly 
and Ozbas (2010) argue that the returns of related suppliers and customers can be 
cross predicted by each other’s stocks. Furthermore, there is a negative relation 
between a supplier’s bargaining position and the extent of trade credit (Fabbri and 
Klapper, 2016). Chod, Lyandres and Yang (2018) show that a customer will obtain 
more (less) trade credit if its suppliers operate in a competitive (non-competitive) 
industry. Also, a customer will obtain more (less) trade credit if the product 
substitutability among its suppliers is higher (lower). 
     My paper extends this literature by examining how firm diversification affects the 
value of large customers for shareholders. Firm diversification is a prevalent 
corporate strategy. For example, Berger and Ofek (1995) show that the diversified 
firms occupy around 32% of the observations in their sample.12 Given the importance 
                                            
12 See Berger and Ofek (1995), page 43. 
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of firm diversification as a corporate structure, I investigate how the firm 
diversification affects the value of large suppliers.  
I develop two competing hypotheses from the perspectives of firm surplus and 
relationship-specific investments. First, given the role of firm surplus in the 
bargaining between a firm and its large suppliers, firm diversification weakens a 
firm’s bargaining position by increasing the firm’s surplus available to make 
concessions to large suppliers. The Hypothesis 1 is that the value of large suppliers 
for shareholders is lower in diversified firms than single-segment firms. Second, as 
firm diversification is linked to a lower possibility of financial distress and bankruptcy 
risk, a diversified firm has a higher likelihood to engage in relationship-specific 
investments with its suppliers. The Hypothesis 2 is that the value of large suppliers 
for shareholders is higher in diversified firms than single-segment firms. 
In my sample, there are 12677 firms with 110084 firm-year observations and the 
sample period is from 1976 to 2013. I first examine how firm diversification affects 
the value of large suppliers for shareholders. Following Berger and Ofek (1995), I 
use the excess value to measure the value of firm. I conclude that the value of large 
suppliers is higher in diversified firms than single-segment firms. In terms of the 
economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the magnitude of 
purchases from the largest supplier increases the excess value by 0.27%. Following 
Campa and Kedia (2002), I use two econometrical methods as the initial analysis to 
mitigate the endogeneity problem and find consistent results.  
    I find stronger evidence supporting the hypothesis about relationship-specific 
investments. I use Supplier Industries R&D to measure the level of relationship-
specific investments, and find that the value of diversification is higher with the 
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presence of large suppliers when the degree of Supplier Industries R&D is higher. I 
also examine the trade credit between the diversified firm and its large suppliers, and 
the level of unrelatedness across segments. The results support the hypothesis 
about relationship-specific investments.  
     Moreover, I use the setting of a tariff cut to examine the potential endogeneity 
problem. Tariff reduction is an exogenous shock which brings more competition 
within the industry (e.g., Fresard, 2010; Valta, 2012; Alimov, 2014). It also affects the 
customer-supplier relationship (e.g., Liu, Masulis and Stanfield, 2017). I use the 
2SLS estimation by constructing an instrumental variable based on the tariff cut. I 
find that the level of large suppliers is positively related to the level of excess value 
for diversified firms. 
     Finally, I obtain a sample of 7282 mergers and acquisitions (M&A) from 1979 to 
2013. I use the announcement return and the net change in the ROA as the proxies 
for the change in firm value. My results show that the presence of large suppliers is 
associated with a higher announcement return for diversifying M&As. I find 
consistent results after controlling for the self-selection problem by using the 
Heckman two-stage method.    
I conclude that the results support the hypothesis of relationship-specific 
investments that the value of large suppliers for shareholders is higher in diversified 
firms than single-segment firms.  
     My paper makes the following contributions. First, while the results in the previous 
Chapter 2 support the interpretation that firm diversification negatively affects the 
value of large customers for shareholders, the findings in this Chapter 3 reveal the 
opposite results, namely, that firm diversification increases the value of large 
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suppliers for shareholders. The difference in the results between the two chapters 
implies that firm diversification has different effects on the value of large customers 
and large suppliers for shareholders. Moreover, I also identify different channels 
through which firm diversification affect the value of large customer and large 
suppliers. This has not been identified in the previous literature. 
Second, I identify a new channel through which the coinsurance effect brought 
by firm diversification affects the firm value. In the literature of diversification, it has 
been argued that the coinsurance effect brought by firm diversification affects the 
firm value through financial constraint (Lewellen, 1971; Dimitrov and Tice, 2006), 
through the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders (Mansi and 
Reeb 2002), and through risk reduction (Amihud and Lev, 1981). However, I 
contribute to the literature on the impact of the coinsurance effect brought by firm 
diversification on firm value from another perspective, namely the relationship-
specific investments, which has not been documented before.  
More broadly speaking, I contribute to the literature on firm diversification by 
disclosing a new channel, namely large suppliers as a type of non-financial 
stakeholders, through which firm diversification affects firm value. Firm diversification 
affect the firm value through the “smarter-money” effect (Alchian, 1969; Weston, 
1970; Williamson, 1975; Donaldson, 1984), the efficient internal capital market (e.g., 
Stein, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Rajan, Servaes, 
and Zingales, 2000), the coinsurance effect (e.g., Lewellen, 1971), the risk reduction 
(e.g., Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Ogneva and Ozbas, 2013), the agency problem (e.g., 
Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Amihud and Lev, 1981), and the asymmetric 
information (e.g., Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). I contribute to the 
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literature by documenting how the firm diversification affects the value of large 
suppliers.  
Third, I contribute to the literature on the role of large suppliers in corporate 
finance by studying the value of large suppliers in diversified firms and single-
segment firms. While the previous literature has discussed the effects of large 
suppliers at the firm level, I move one step forward and extend the examination to 
the segment level. For instance, a number of studies have analysed the role of 
suppliers in the area of capital structure (e.g., Titman, 1984; Kale and Shahrur, 2007), 
managerial compensation (e.g., Kale, Kedia, and Williams, 2013), dividends (e.g., 
Johnson, Kang, and Yi, 2010; Wang, 2012), stock market valuation (e.g., Menzly and 
Ozbas, 2010), and seasoned equity offerings (e.g., Johnson, Kang, Masulis, and Yi, 
2011)13. To my knowledge, the above papers just focus on the examination at the 
firm level. I therefore extend the literature on non-financial stakeholders in the area 
of corporate finance by conducting further analysis of firm diversification at the 
segment level.  
     This chapter is organized as follows. I review the relevant literature in Section 2. I 
develop three hypotheses in Section 3. In Section 4, I report the data and variables. I 
investigate the effects of firm diversification on the value of large suppliers in Section 
5. In Section 6, I conduct an analysis on the effect of a tariff cut. In Section 7, I show 
the results on the analysis of the sample of M&As, and Section 8 shows the 
robustness checks. Finally, Section 9 concludes this chapter.  
 
                                            
13 See Kale and Meneghetti (2014) for a detailed literature review. 
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3.2. Literature Review 
     I review the literature about large suppliers and firm diversification in this section.  
3.2.1. The Role of Large Suppliers in Corporate Finance  
     There is extensive literature which investigates the role of suppliers in the area of 
corporate finance. Many studies examine the effect of large suppliers from different 
perspectives such as capital structure, managerial compensation, dividends, stock 
market valuation and seasoned equity offerings. 
     First, the presence of large suppliers has a significant effect on corporate capital 
structure decisions. Kale and Meneghetti (2014) suggest two channels through 
which large suppliers affect a firm’s capital structure decisions, and they are leverage 
and bargaining position. The increased level of leverage reduces the firm’s surplus 
available to its suppliers, and therefore enhances the firm’s relative bargaining 
position with suppliers. Titman (1984) finds that the capital structure is serves as a 
bonding mechanism or pre-positioning in the relationship between the firm and its 
suppliers. Firms can reduce the likelihood of liquidation by holding lower leverage to 
maintain the relationship with their large suppliers. Hennessy and Livdan (2009) find 
that a firm’s optimal leverage is relates to the relationship with its large suppliers. 
The level of debt is positively related to the bargaining power of the firm, and 
negatively related to the bilateral surplus available for suppliers. They predict that 
firms tend to keep a higher leverage ratio in order to maintain a higher bargaining 
position relative to their large suppliers. 
     Second, the presence of large suppliers has effects on managerial compensation 
and corporate dividend policy. Kale, Kedia, and Williams (2013) show that managers 
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may undertake excessive risks if they obtain a higher proportion of high-power 
incentives such as stock options in their compensation package. The excessive risks 
undertaken by CEOs may increase the likelihood of financial distress for the firm. 
This lowers large supplier’s incentive to making relationship-specific investments. In 
terms of corporate dividend policy, Wang (2012) finds that a firm’s relationship with 
its principal customers or suppliers is an important determinant of its shareholders’ 
income. For sustaining a long-term customer-supplier relationship, firms tend to 
maintain a higher level of liquid assets, but the higher level of liquidity will lower a 
firm’s incentive to pay regular dividends. 
     Third, the performance of large suppliers is associated with a firm’s stock 
valuation and financing decisions. Menzly and Ozbas (2010) show that the cash 
flows of suppliers and customers are correlated because they are related to each 
other either directly through their trading interactions or indirectly through market 
valuations for their inputs and outputs. Therefore, the returns of related suppliers and 
customers can be cross predicted by each other’s stocks. Johnson, Kang, Masulis, 
and Yi (2011) suggest that the seasoned equity offering sends a negative signal 
about the reliability of the firm. They find negative cumulative abnormal returns for 
both trading partners, and a significant reduction in relationship specific investments 
and a decline in the duration of the customer-supplier relationship around the 
announcements of seasoned equity offerings.  
     Finally, performance of large suppliers is also related to the downstream mergers. 
Fee and Thomas (2004) find a decline in the operating performance of suppliers 
which operate in concentrated industries after downstream mergers. They conclude 
that the customers obtain an increased bargaining power relative to their suppliers 
76 
 
after mergers, as a reduction in the customer’s cost of goods sold to sales post-
merger leads to a significant decline in the cash flows to sales of its supplier 
subsequent to a downstream merger. 
3.2.2. Hold-up Problems and Bargaining Power 
Extensive literature argue that hold-up problems can exist in the supplier-customer 
relationship. In the situation of large suppliers, a customer can be more concerned 
about being held up because large suppliers may have stronger bargaining power. 
Williamson (1975, 1985) develops transaction-costs economics and argues that 
incomplete contracts and specific relationships are overshadowed by asymmetric 
information, bounded rationality, and opportunism. This will lead to the vertical 
integration between suppliers and customers. Gul (2001) and Lau (2008) argue that 
a customer may invest and increase its valuation of the object before bargaining with 
its supplier, and the investment made by the customer is sunk-cost at the bargaining 
stage and will not be compensated by its supplier. For example, a coal mine firm is 
reliant on the local railroad to provide transport services, or advertising firms are 
subject to manufacturing firms because they invest marketing expenditure to 
distribute manufacturing firms’ products. Customers must make a sunk investment 
prior to contracting with large suppliers to input an essential complementary product 
(Hermalin and Katz, 2009). 
Santalo and Berrera (2008) argue that the customer-supplier relationship is more 
likely to be impacted by hold-up problem if there is small number of customers and 
suppliers. In addition, vertically integrated firms have lower transaction costs when 
they deal with industries with only a small number of firms, therefore they have a 
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stronger competitive advantage than specialised firms in more concentrated 
industries.  
     Williams (2011) find that firms with a high capital intensity are more likely to have 
hold-up problems. There are two methods to mitigate the hold-up problems: making 
a long-term contract for the customer-supplier relationships and making vertical 
integration between upstream and downstream firms. Customers and suppliers tend 
to use contracts if the relationship-specific investment is in the form of an intangible 
investment. However, firms prefer to be vertically connected if the relationship-
specific investment is in the form of a tangible investment. 
     Martin and Otto (2017) find that the tariff cut in upstream industries increases 
customers’ bargaining power and therefore reduce the hold-up problems. If there is a 
tariff reduction in upstream industries, customers will increase their investment into 
suppliers’ industries. The effect is more enhanced when the customers are not 
vertically integrated into the industries that their suppliers belong to, when customers 
have a weak bargaining position, and when their suppliers produce differentiated 
products.  
     Dass et al. (2014) find that the trade credit provided by a firm can increase a 
supplier’s relationship-specific investments and a customer’s market power. The 
trade credit is also affected by the firm’s bargaining strength. Fabbri and Klapper 
(2016) find a negative relation between a supplier’s bargaining position and the 
extent of trade credit. Trade credit is more like a competitive device for suppliers in 
the product market. Suppliers with weaker bargaining power over their customers 
have a greater propensity to offer trade credit including an extended payment period 
and a larger amount of goods sold on credit. Chod, Lyandres and Yang (2018) 
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examine the link between supplier competition and trade credit. They show that a 
customer will obtain more (less) trade credit if their suppliers operate in a competitive 
(non-competitive) industry. Also, a customer will obtain more (less) trade credit if the 
product substitutability among their suppliers is higher (lower). 
3.2.3. Relationship-Specific Investments 
     There is extant literature which discusses the importance of relationship-specific 
investments to capital structure, compensation and payout policies, earnings 
management and accounting policies etc. 
     Above all, a number of previous studies argue that the possibility of financial 
distress and the level of bankruptcy risks are the major concerns for a firm which 
makes a decision about relationship-specific investments and the relationship-
specific investments have a significant effect on a firm’s capital structure decision. 
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) show that high leverage reduces suppliers’ incentive 
to make relationship-specific investments, because a high level of debt reduces the 
firm’s credibility to offer high-quality products. Therefore, a firm maintaining a lower 
leverage, which avoids default and liquidation, will attract suppliers’ relationship-
specific investments. Kale and Shahrur (2007) examine the effects of a firm’s 
leverage ratio on the customer-supplier relationships. The firm’s liquidation decision 
can significantly impact the relationship-specific investments because it is causally 
associated with the firm’s bankruptcy status. They find that a lower debt level can be 
an incentive to make a long-term connection between suppliers and customers and 
conduct relationship-specific investments. Similiarly, Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim 
(2008) find that firms in a bilateral relationship tend to produce unique products. 
Especially in the durable goods industries, the level of debt is negatively related to 
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the importance of purchases from dependent suppliers. This is consistent with the 
argument that a firm tries to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy in order to attract the 
relationship-specific investments from suppliers. Chu (2012) shows that the 
corporate leverage ratio declines with the level of competition in the supplier’s 
industry. The firm’s leverage and the competition in the supplier’s industry are 
substitutes, as both of them decrease the supplier’s willingness to make relationship-
specific investments with the firm and improve the firm’s bargaining position. 
Hennessy and Livdan (2009) show that the higher leverage ratio lowers the surplus 
available for large suppliers, and reduces the supplier’s incentives to make 
relationship-specific investments with the firm. 
     Moreover, the relationship-specific investments also affect the CEO’s 
compensation and payout policies. Kale, Kedia and Williams (2013) find that the 
supplier’s relationship-specific investments are negatively related to the risk-taking 
incentives of the firm’s CEOs. The negative relation is more pronounced when the 
firm has more volatile cash flows. Wang (2012) find that the relationship with 
suppliers negatively impacts a firm’s dividend payments because of the high financial 
distress costs related to relationship-specific investments. The negative impact is 
more pronounced when the firm has a higher likelihood of financial distress and 
when the relationship-specific investments are more important to the firm's operation. 
     In addition, some of the literature discusses how the relationship-specific 
investments affect corporate earnings management. Raman and Shahrur (2008) 
suggest that the industry-level of relationship-specific investments increase with the 
frequency of large earnings increases, the magnitude of discretionary accruals, and 
the volatility of earnings. The earnings management adversely affects the duration of 
80 
 
customer-supplier relationships, which means that the duration will be shorter if the 
degree of earnings management is high. 
     Finally, a firm’s accounting policy is significantly influenced by the relationship-
specific investments. Hui, Klasa, and Yeung (2012) find a link between the customer-
supplier relationship and a firm’s accounting conservatism. They argue that a firm 
will recognize losses more quickly if its suppliers have a higher bargaining position. 
The timely recognition of bad news is positively related to the level of the bargaining 
power of suppliers. 
3.2.4. Firm Diversification 
     This section explores the studies about firm diversification. They are classified as 
“smarter-money” effect, efficiency of internal capital market, “more-money” effect, 
and agency problems. 
     First, the firm diversification is involved with the “smarter-money” effect. The 
smarter-money effect indicates that the internal capital market of diversified firms 
may do a better job of allocating capital resources and investments across segments. 
Alchian (1969), Weston (1970), Williamson (1975) and Donaldson (1984) suggest 
that a firm’s directors are well-informed about the business prospects of each 
segment, and they have the strong control rights to make value-enhancing resources 
transfer across segments.  
     Second, many researchers which debate about the efficiency of the internal 
capital market within a diversified firm. From the perspective of efficient internal 
capital market, Stein (1997) argues that for a given amount of capital, the 
headquarters of a diversified firm can conduct the winner-picking in a way that more 
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resources are allocated to the divisions with better investment opportunities. Shin 
and Stulz (1998) find that the investment of one segment is associated with the cash 
flows of other segments in a diversified firm. Thus, an efficient internal capital market 
creates value for shareholders of diversified firms. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) 
show that the investment and growth of diversified firms are associated with both a 
firm’s segment-level productivity and fundamental industry-level factors. The majority 
of diversified firms experience growth across industry segments when they behave in 
a profit-maximizing way. However, diversified firms also have inefficient transfer of 
resources across segments. Shin and Stulz (1998) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 
(2000) argue that diversified firms conduct inefficient cross-subsidization because of 
the agency problem and that corporate resources are diverted from the divisions with 
good investment opportunities to the divisions with poor investment opportunities. 
     Third, there is a “more-money” effect in the literature about firm diversification. 
Previous literature documents that firm diversification reduces firms’ credit 
constraints and bankruptcy risks through the coinsurance effect (Stein, 2002). 
Lewellen (1971) argues that the coinsurance effect stemming from imperfectly 
correlated cash flows among different segments reduces the bankruptcy risk of a 
diversified firm and alleviates a firm’s financial constraints. Mansi and Reeb (2002) 
suggest that firm diversification is insignificantly related to the excess firm value, and 
the diversification discount can be attributed to the risk-reducing effects of 
diversification. Dimitrov and Tice (2006) show that in the banking industry, the credit 
constraints are significantly reduced through firm diversification. In a period of 
economic recession, the diversified firms have higher sales growth rates and 
inventory growth rates than single-segment firms. Hann, Ogneva and Ozbas (2013) 
examine the impact of firm diversification on the cost of capital through the 
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perspective of customers, and argue that firm diversification reduces the risk 
stemming from the defection by customers and is associated with a lower cost of 
capital. Hann et al.’s (2013) findings imply that firm diversification is beneficial for 
shareholders with the presence of large customers. 
     Furthermore, the value of firm diversification is related to agency problems and 
information asymmetry. Amihud and Lev (1981) discuss how the structure of 
corporate ownership affects firm diversification decisions. The agency problems 
determine the corporate acquisitions and risk strategy. Managers in manager-
controlled firms tend to diversify risks, and therefore firms have a higher likelihood of 
undertaking conglomerate mergers which reduce diversifiable risk. Firm 
diversification reduces a shareholder’s value because of the agency costs which 
stem from the interest conflicts between shareholders and managers. Similarly, 
Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) report that agency problems are the main reason for 
firms undertaking value-reducing diversification strategies. The managerial equity 
ownership negatively impacts on the level of diversification, but the reduced level of 
diversification is associated with higher managerial controls. In addition, the value of 
firm diversification is also determined by information asymmetry. Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) find there is information asymmetry in diversified firms, and the 




     I develop two hypotheses in this section. 
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3.3.1. Firm Surplus and Bargaining Position 
 The related literature on the bargaining between a firm and its suppliers 
examines the role of firm surplus available for sharing in the bargaining position. For 
example, Kale and Meneghetti (2014) suggest that the increased level of leverage 
reduces a firm’s surplus available to its suppliers, and therefore enhances the firm’s 
relative bargaining position with suppliers. Titman (1984) finds that firms can reduce 
the likelihood of liquidation by holding lower leverage to maintain the relationship 
with their large suppliers. Hennessy and Livdan (2009) find that a firm’s optimal 
leverage is positively related to its bargaining power, and negatively related the 
bilateral surplus available for suppliers. They predict that firms tend to keep a higher 
leverage ratio in order to maintain a higher bargaining position relative to their large 
suppliers. 
Given the role of firm surplus in the bargaining between a firm and its large 
suppliers, firm diversification weakens a firm’s bargaining position by increasing the 
firm’s surplus available to make concessions to large suppliers through two channels. 
First, since the coinsurance effect alleviates a diversified firm’s financial constraints 
(e.g., Lewellen, 1971) and is associated with the “more money” effect (Stein, 2003), 
this increases the potential resources available to be extracted by large suppliers. 
Consequently, large suppliers may demand more concessions from diversified firms 
than single-segment firms through the hold-up problem.  
Second, since previous findings in the literature reveal that the transfer of 
resources among different segments can take place within a diversified firm (e.g., 
Shin and Stulz 1998; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Stein, 1997), this may 
increase the potential resources available to be extracted by large suppliers because 
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a diversified firm may transfer the resources from a segment without large suppliers 
to a segment with large suppliers when the diversified firm is under pressure to give 
concessions. Consequently, large suppliers may demand more concessions from 
diversified firms than single-segment firms though the hold-up problem. I expect that 
such kind of weakening in the bargaining position is not beneficial for shareholders. 
Therefore, I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The value of large suppliers for shareholders is lower in diversified 
firms than single-segment firms. 
3.3.2. Relationship-Specific Investments 
     A firm is more motivated to undertake relationship-specific investments when it 
has large suppliers. The relationship-specific investments are only valuable within 
the relation between the firm and its supplier. The value of relationship-specific 
investments is significantly lower outside these two parties’ long-term contract (e.g., 
Kale, Kedia and Williams, 2013; Dass, Kale and Nanda, 2015) A large supplier is 
more attractive for a firm to engage in the relationship-specific investments than a 
small supplier, because the fixed costs and transaction costs can be better spread 
across the larger portion of input from its large supplier.  
     However, the relationship-specific investments are risky, because the relation-
specific investments are only valuable between the firm and its supplier but not 
beneficial for any other parties. Previous literature shows that the possibility of 
financial distress and the level of bankruptcy risks are the major concerns for a firm 
making a decision about relationship-specific investments. For example, Kale, Kedia 
and Williams (2013) conclude that the value of relationship-specific investments 
declines with a firm’s risky investments and a CEO’s risk-taking incentives. Wang 
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(2012) argues that a firm’s dependence on customer-supplier relationships has a 
negative impact on dividend payments, and the key reason is the high financial 
distress costs related to relationship-specific investments. In addition, suppliers may 
be unwilling to engage in a relationship-specific investment with a high levered 
customer, because the high level of debt reduces a firm’s willingness to provide high-
quality products and to build its reputation (Maksimovic and Titman, 1991). The 
firm’s liquidation decision can significantly impact the relationship-specific 
investments because it is causally associated with the firm’s bankruptcy status (Kale 
and Shahrur, 2007).  
     Firm diversification can affect the customer-supplier relationship-specific 
investments through their impact on the probability of financial distress and the level 
of bankruptcy risks. Previous studies indicate that firm diversification can reduce the 
level of bankruptcy risk. For example, Lewellen (1971) indicates that the coinsurance 
effect stemming from imperfectly correlated cash flows among segments decreases 
the bankruptcy risk of a diversified firm and alleviates corporate financial constraints. 
Dimitrov and Tice (2006) propose that sales growth rates and inventory growth rates 
decline more for bank-dependent single-segment firms than for rival segments of 
bank-dependent diversified firms during recessions, and find that firm diversification 
reduces credit constraints. Mansi and Reeb (2002), and Amihud and Lev (1981) 
suggest that diversified firms have relatively lower firm risks than single-segment 
firms because of the imperfectly correlated returns across all segments. Hann et al. 
(2013) argue that the coinsurance effect across divisions of a diversified firm can 
reduce systematic risk by avoiding countercyclical deadweight costs. 
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     Given the above literature, I anticipate that a diversified firm has a higher 
likelihood to engage in relationship-specific investments with its suppliers, because 
firm diversification is linked to a lower possibility of financial distress and bankruptcy 
risk. Therefore, I have the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The value of large suppliers for shareholders is higher in diversified 
firms than single-segment firms.  
3.3.3. Summarizing the Hypotheses 
     The above three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. I empirically examine 
which hypothesis is (or which hypotheses are) most precise to explain how firm 
diversification affects the value of large suppliers. The predictions of the hypotheses 
are summarized in the following table. A plus (minus) sign indicates a positive 
(negative) impact of firm diversification on the value of large suppliers. 
The impact of firm diversification on the value of large suppliers 
Firm surplus Relationship-specific investments 
– + 
      
3.4. Data and Variables 
     In this section, I describe the data and variables. 
3.4.1. Data Sources 
     The data are obtained from the following sources. I get the firm-level data from 
the Compustat Annual database and the segment-level data from the Compustat 
Historical Segments database. I construct the measures of large suppliers based on 
the data from Compustat Customer Segments database. The stock return data are 
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obtained from CRSP database. I use the tariff data in Valta (2016)14. The data on 
mergers and acquisitions are collected from the Thomson One Banker database. 
     I collect data for all firms during the periods from 1976 to 2013. I use the following 
screening procedures. Firms with financial service segments (SIC 6000-6999) are 
excluded from my sample. I also remove firms with sales less than $20 million. 
According to Berger and Ofek (1995), I require that the sum of segment sales must 
be within 1% of the firm’s total sales. The observations with incomplete data are 
removed from this sample. After the screening procedures, the final sample includes 
12677 firms and 110084 firm-year observations. In this data sample, single-segment 
firms have 75603 firm-year observations, and diversified firms have 34481 firm-year 
observations. 
3.4.2. Data on Large Suppliers 
     I construct the measures of large suppliers based on the data from the Compustat 
Customer Segments database. According to the requirements of FASB No.14 and 
SEC Regulation S-K, firms need to disclose their big customers which occupy more 
than 10% of total sales, assets, or profits of firms. In the Compustat Customer 
Segments database, I can obtain the sales made by customers, and the 
abbreviations of customer names instead of full names. In order to get the 
fundamental information about customers, I link the abbreviations of customers with 
the original names showed in the Compustat by hand. I firstly check the order and 
number of letters in the abbreviation, and then match the most likely corresponding 
full name in Compustat. 
                                            
14 The data was available on the webpage of Philip Valta: http://www.valta.ch/ when I wrote the first 
draft paper. Fresard and Valta (2016) construct the tariff data based on Fresard (2010), Feenstra 
(1996), Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002), and Schott (2010). 
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     For example, “CABOT MED” is the abbreviation of a customer’s name in the 
Compustat Customer Segments database. I use the above algorithm and find the 
corresponding full name of the supplier is “Cabot Medical Corp.” in the entire 
Compustat database. Another example is “ACCLAIM ENT”, I match the order and 
number of letters of this abbreviation, and find the customer name “Acclaim 
Entertainment Inc.” listed in Compustat. However, I remove some observations from 
my sample, because those observation are ambiguous abbreviations and cannot be 
precisely matched with the original names in Compustat. 
3.4.3. Variables 
     I provide the description of variables in this section.  
3.4.3.1. Excess value  
     Following Berger and Ofek (1995), I use Excess Value as a proxy of a firm’s 
value. Excess Value is constructed on the basis of industry-adjusted performance, 
and it compares the percentage difference between a firm’s total market value and 
its imputed value. For single-segment firms, Excess Value equals the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to the median valuation ratio in the 
same industry. For diversified firms, Excess Value compares a firm’s actual market 
value with an imputed value as if all of its segments are operated as stand-alone 
firms. The imputed value of the firm is the sum of the imputed value for each 
segment. The imputed value for each segment is calculated by multiplying the 
segment’s sales by the median ratio of the market value to sales for stand-alone 
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firms in the same industry. 15 The detailed calculation of Excess Value is provided in 
Appendix A1. 
3.4.3.2. The measures for large suppliers 
     I use two methods to construct the measures of large suppliers. First, I follow the 
methodology in Hui, Klasa and Yeung (2012), and calculate the ratios of the 
purchase made by a firm from its suppliers to the firm’s cost of goods sold. I use two 
variables to measure the presence of large suppliers. Top Supplier is defined as the 
ratio of the purchase made by a firm from its largest supplier to the firm’s cost of 
goods sold. All Suppliers is defined as the ratio of the purchase made by a firm from 
all its suppliers to the firm’s cost of goods sold. 
3.4.3.3. Firm diversification 
     I use Firm Diversification to indicate the status of diversified firms. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two 
segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. 
3.4.3.4. Control variables 
     I follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and use the following control variables. Size is 
the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. 
CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debts to assets. The variable S&P is a dummy variable that equals one 
when the firm is part of the S&P index and equals zero otherwise. PNDIV is the 
fraction of all firms in the industry that are diversified firms. PSDIV is the fraction of 
industry sales accounted for by diversified firms. GDP Growth is the growth rate in 
                                            
15 Custodio (2014) argues that q-based measures of the diversification discount are biased upward by 
mergers and acquisitions and their accounting implications, and that market-to-sales-based measures 
do not have this bias. 
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real GDP. Contraction is the number of months in a year when the economy is in 
recession. MAJOREX is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is listed on 
NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX, and equals zero otherwise. FOREIGN is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated outside the United States and 
equals zero otherwise. 
 
3.5. Results 
     I show the results in this section. Firstly, I describe the univariate analysis of key 
variables. Secondly, I analyse how the firm diversification impact the value of large 
suppliers. Thirdly, I conduct some initial tests to address endogeneity problems.  
3.5.1. Univariate Statistics 
     Table 2.1 reports the univariate statistics of key variables. The mean of the 
variable Top Supplier is 0.0519. This means that the purchase made by a firm from 
its largest supplier occupies over 5% of the firm’s cost of goods sold on average. The 
mean of the variable All Suppliers is 0.0601, which indicates that the sum of 
purchases made by the firm from all its suppliers is 6.01% of the firm’s cost of goods 
sold. Panel B reports the univariate statistics of Excess Value for both diversified 
firms and single-segment firms. The mean of Excess Value is -0.0923 for diversified 
firms and the median is -0.1007. The mean of Excess Value is 0.0083 for single-
segment firms and the median is 0.0000. 16 
                                            
16  As stated in Section 3.3.1, Excess Value is a measure of industry-adjusted performance. For 
single-segment firms, Excess Value equals the percentage difference between a firm’s actual value 
and the median valuation ratio in the same industry. Therefore, the median of Excess Value is zero 
for single-segment firms by construction. This is consistent with the results in Berger and Ofek (1995). 
See Berger and Ofek (1995, Table 2, p48).  
91 
 
3.5.2. Univariate Analysis of Excess Value 
     Table 2.2 presents the univariate analysis of Excess Value for diversified firms. I 
divided my sample into two groups. The first column shows the Excess Value for the 
firms with large suppliers. The mean of Excess Value is 0.0468 and the median is 
0.0270. The second column shows the Excess Value for the firms without large 
suppliers. The mean of Excess Value is -0.0940 and the median is -0.1017. After the 
mean test and the median test, I find that they are significantly different between the 
two groups. The difference in the mean is 0.1408 (p-value= 0.03) and the difference 
in the median is 0.0129 (p-value = 0.01). Therefore, the results in Table 2.2 indicate 
that the Excess Value is higher for the diversified firms with large suppliers. This is 
consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2. 
3.5.3. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large Suppliers 
     Table 2.3 presents the regressions17. I cluster the standard errors by firm and 
year in the tables. The dependent variable is Excess Value across all columns. 
Column 1 shows the regression when I use Top Supplier as the proxy for the 
presence of large suppliers. The coefficient of Top Supplier is 0.002 (p-value = 0.01) 
and the coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier is 0.068 
(p-value = 0.04). I conduct an F-test on the sum of the coefficient Top Supplier and 
the coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier, and find that 
the sum of the coefficients is significant (p-value = 0.04). This shows that a higher 
                                            
17 I do not use fixed effect regression in this analysis because there is not a large variation in the 
status of the presence of large customers over time. I examine my sample and find that only 5.56% of 
observations involve a change in the status of the dummy variable Large Customers from year t-1 to 
year t. This implies that there is no change in the status of the presence of large customers over time 
for nearly 95% of the observations in my sample. Zhou (2001) argues that fixed effect regression is 
not a proper method when there is not a large variation for the independent variable over time. I have 
used the year fixed effect in each regression, and the results are consistent. 
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level of the largest supplier is associated with a higher level of Excess Value for 
diversified firms.  
     I find a similar pattern in Column 2 when I use All Suppliers as the measure for 
large suppliers. The coefficient of All Suppliers is 0.001 (p-value = 0.18) The 
coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * All Suppliers is 0.065 (p-value 
= 0.04). I conduct an F-test on the sum of the coefficient All Suppliers and the 
coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * All Suppliers, and find that the 
sum of the coefficients is significant (p-value = 0.04). This implies that a higher level 
of large suppliers is associated with a higher level of Excess Value for diversified 
firms.  
     Therefore, the results in Table 3 are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2 
that large suppliers are positively valued by shareholders of diversified firms.  
3.5.4. Trade Credit 
     I conduct further analysis on the trade credit provided by large suppliers. 
Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2004) argue that the purpose of trade credit is to 
primarily extend financing. Fabbri and Klapper (2016) find a negative relation 
between a supplier’s bargaining position and the extent of trade credit. Suppliers with 
weaker bargaining power over their customers have greater propensity to offer trade 
credit. In my thesis, from the perspective of Hypothesis 2, I expect that a diversified 
firm is less financially constrained and therefore is able to pay more cash and use 
less trade credit when they purchase from suppliers. Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim 
(2008) argue that the large customers are able to pay for their suppliers more 
promptly because they value their specific investments on the customer-supplier 
relationship. Thus, my expectation is that in order to keep a good relationship with its 
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large supplier, a diversified firm is more likely to use less trade credit (and pay more 
cash) when it purchases from its large supplier. 
     I follow Dass, Kale and Nanda (2014) and use two proxies of trade credit on the 
basis of supplier-customer pairs (i.e., sales of a supplier to specific customers). The 
first proxy is called Supplier’s Accounts Receivable, which is defined as the log 
(1+(supplier’s accounts receivable)*(fraction of supplier’s overall sales to the 
customer). The second proxy is called Customer’s Accounts Payable, which is 
defined as (1+ (customer firm’s accounts payable) * (supplier’s sales to the 
customer/customer’s overall costs of goods sold). 
     Table 2.4 shows the results. In Panel A of Table 2.4, the dependent variable is 
Supplier’s Accounts Receivable. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Top Supplier 
is 0.150 (p-value = 0.03). It implies that a single-segment firm has more accounts 
receivable with the presence of suppliers.  the coefficient of the interaction term Firm 
Diversification * Top Supplier is -0.784 (p-value = 0.01). This implies that a large 
supplier has less accounts receivable when its customer is a diversified firm. I find 
the similar pattern in Column 2 when I use All Large Suppliers as the measure for 
large suppliers.  
     In Panel B of Table 2.4, the dependent variable is Customer’s Accounts Payable. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Top supplier is 0.128 (p-value = 0.01). It 
implies that a single-segment has more accounts payable with the presence of 
suppliers. The coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier is 
-0.541 (p-value = 0.01). This implies that a diversified firm has less accounts payable 
with the presence of large suppliers. I find a similar pattern in Column 2 when I use 
All Large Suppliers as the measure for large suppliers. 
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     Therefore, the results in Table 2.4 provide the evidence that a large supplier has 
less accounts receivable when its customer is a diversified firm, and that a diversified 
firm has less accounts payable with the presence of large suppliers. The results 
support the interpretation that the firms receive less trade credit from large suppliers 
for keeping a good customer-supplier relationship. This supports Hypothesis 2 about 
the relationship-specific investments. 
3.5.5. Relationship-Specific Investments 
     According to Hypothesis 2, firm diversification increases the value of large 
suppliers through relationship-specific investments. A diversified firm has a higher 
likelihood of engaging in relationship-specific investments with its suppliers, because 
firm diversification is linked to a lower possibility of financial distress and bankruptcy 
risk. I use Supplier Industries R&D to measure the level of relationship-specific 
investments. A higher level of supplier industries R&D is a proxy for more 
relationship-specific investments. Therefore, I examine how the supplier industries 
R&D affect the relation between firm diversification and the value of large suppliers. 
     I follow Kale and Shahrur (2007) to construct the variable. Supplier Industries 
R&D is defined as the weighted mean of each supplier’s industry R&D, where the 
weighting is the ratio of the purchase made from each supplier to the costs of goods 
sold of the firm (see Appendix A3). The Supplier Industries R&D will be high if the 
firm purchases a significant amount of goods or services from R&D intensive 
supplier industries. I use the triple interaction terms such as Firm Diversification * 




     Table 2.5 presents the results. The dependent variable is Excess Value across all 
columns. Column 1 shows the regression when I use Top Supplier as the measure 
for large suppliers. The coefficient of Top Supplier is 0.07 (p-value=0.62). It implies 
that the presence of large suppliers does not affect the shareholders’ valuation for 
single-segment firms without relationship-specific investments. The coefficient of the 
interaction term Top Supplier* Supplier Industries R&D is -0.003 (p-value=0.73). I 
conduct F-test for the sum of the coefficients of Top Supplier and the interaction term 
Top Supplier * Supplier Industries R&D, and find that the sum of coefficients is 
insignificant (p-value=0.36). It implies that the presence of large suppliers does not 
affect the shareholders’ valuation for single-segment firms with relationship-specific 
investments.  The coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top 
Supplier is -0.002 (p-value=0.94). I conduct F-test for the sum of the coefficients of 
Top Supplier and the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier, and find 
that the sum of coefficients is insignificant (p-value=0.81). It implies that the 
presence of large suppliers does not affect the shareholders’ valuation for diversified 
firms without relationship-specific investments. The coefficient of the interaction term 
Firm Diversification * Top Supplier * Supplier Industries R&D is 1.901 (p-value = 
0.01). The sum of the coefficients of Top Supplier, the interaction term Top Supplier* 
Supplier Industries R&D, the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier, and 
the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier * Supplier Industries R&D is 
1.903. I conduct F-test and find the sum of four coefficients is significant (p-
value=0.08). It implies that the presence of large suppliers is positively valued by 
shareholders in diversified firms with relationship-specific investments. 
     I find a similar pattern in Column 2 when I use All Suppliers as the measure for 
large suppliers. Therefore, the results in Table 2.5 imply that the presence of large 
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suppliers is positively valued by shareholders in diversified firms with relationship-
specific investments. They support Hypothesis 2 that the value of large suppliers for 
shareholders is higher in diversified firms through the relationship-specific 
investments. 
3.5.6. Unrelatedness 
I also examine Hypothesis 2 from the perspective of the level of firm diversification. 
I propose that the higher level of unrelatedness across segments is associated with 
a higher level of firm diversification. From the perspective of Hypothesis 2, I expect 
that firm diversification increases firm value through the relationship-specific 
investments, and this effect is stronger if the diversified firms have a higher level of 
unrelatedness.  The reason is that the coinsurance effect is stronger in unrelated 
diversification, and the higher level of coinsurance effect is associated with a lower 
level of bankruptcy risks.  
    I construct the variable Unrelatedness to measure the level of firm diversification. 
Unrelatedness is a dummy variable which equals one if the segments of a diversified 
firm do not operate in the same industries, and equals zero otherwise. I use a one-
digit SIC to classify segments which operate in different industries. I use the triple 
interaction terms such as Firm Diversification * Top Suppliers * Unrelatedness to 
examine the effect of firm diversification.  
     Table 2.6 presents the results. The dependent variable is Excess Value across all 
columns. Column 1 shows the regression when I use Top Supplier as the measure 
for large suppliers. I find that the coefficient of Top Supplier is 0.346 (p-value=0.01) 
and the coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier is -0.699 
(p-value = 0.01). The sum of the coefficients of Top Supplier and the interaction term 
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Firm Diversification * Top Supplier is -0.353 (0.346+ (-0.699) =-0.353). I conduct F-
test for the sum of coefficients and I find the sum of coefficients is significant (p-
value=0.06). It implies that a higher level of the largest supplier is associated with a 
lower level of Excess Value for diversified firms which diversified in related industries.                      
The coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier * 
Unrelatedness is 0.649 (p-value = 0.01). The sum of the coefficients of Top Supplier, 
the interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier, and the triple interaction term 
Firm Diversification * Top Supplier * Unrelatedness is 0.296 (0.346+ (-0.699) +0.649 
=-0.353). I conduct F-test for the sum of coefficients and I find the sum of coefficients 
is significant (p-value=0.01). It implies that a higher level of the largest supplier is 
associated with a higher level of Excess Value for diversified firms which diversified 
in unrelated industries.                       
     I find a similar pattern in Column 2 when I use All Suppliers as the measures for 
the firms’ suppliers. The results imply that the presence of large suppliers is 
associated with an increase in the Excess Value when the diversified firm operating 
in unrelated industries. Therefore, the results in Table 2.6 support the Hypothesis 2 
that the value of large suppliers for shareholders is higher in diversified firms. 
 
3.6. Tariff Cut 
In this section, I use the setting of a tariff cut as a more powerful method to 
mitigate the endogeneity problem. A number of studies have used the tariff reduction 
as an exogenous shock to the degree of the competitiveness of the market. For 
instance, Fresard (2010) finds that the globalization of economic activities and 
alleviation of a tariff barrier exacerbate substantial market competition between 
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domestic firms and foreign producers. Alimov (2014) argues that the tariff cut 
specified in the Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Canada triggers a 
sudden increase in competitive pressures on a large number of U.S. producers. 
Valta (2012) argues that the reduction of the tariff rate lowers the costs of importing 
and increases the amount of foreign goods and services in the domestic market, and 
this import penetration significantly stimulates competitive pressure faced by 
domestic firms. 
     In terms of the impact of tariff reduction on the presence of large suppliers, Martin 
and Otto (2017) argue that following tariff reductions in the supplier industries, the 
firms’ bargaining position against their domestic suppliers improves because of the 
lower cost of procuring inputs from alternative foreign suppliers. As a result, the 
domestic suppliers’ ability to hold-up their customers will be reduced after the tariff 
cut. I therefore use tariff reduction as an exogenous event to check the issue of the 
endogeneity problem. 
3.6.1. Methodology 
     I conduct the analysis by using the tariff cut as the identification for the change in 
large suppliers. Since the data on large suppliers are at the segment level and the 
segment SIC codes are available in the Compustat Segment database, I identify the 
magnitude of tariff reduction in the industry of the segment that its large suppliers 
belong to. Suppose there is a large tariff reduction in such an industry, it represents 
an exogenous shock specifically for the segment that a large customer belongs to. 
The corresponding change in the excess value can be better attributable to this 




     In terms of the identification of the variable Firm Diversification, I follow Compa 
and Kedia (2002) and use the estimated probability of operating in multiple segments 
from a probit model as reported in Column 3 of Table 2.9 as a generated instrument 
for the status of diversification.18 
     I use the following specifications in this empirical analysis.  
 
△Excess Value = a + b1 * Firm Diversification + b2 *△Top Large Supplier  
+ b3 * (Firm Diversification * △Top Large Supplier) + Control Variables + ε      (1) 
 
△Excess Value = a + b1 * Firm Diversification + b2 *△All Large Suppliers  
+ b3 * (Firm Diversification * △All Large Suppliers) + Control Variables + ε      (2) 
 
The equation (1) and the equation (2) demonstrate the empirical analysis of the 
effect of tariff cut. Holding the level of firm diversification (the item Firm 
Diversification) constant, I analyse how the excess value affected by the change in 
Top Large Supplier (the change in All Large Suppliers) through the interaction term 
Firm Diversification * △Top Large Supplier (the interaction term Firm Diversification * 
△All Large Suppliers). 
I use the tariff cut as the identification for the change of large suppliers. Following 
Fresard and Valta (2016), I use the data of tariff reduction for manufacturing firms 
with the sample period from 1976 to 2005.19 I construct a dummy variable Tariff Cut, 
which equals one if the reduction of tariff rate is 1.5 times higher than the its industry 
median change, and equals zero otherwise. The two-stage least square (2SLS) is 
conducted in this analysis. The variable Tariff Cut is used as the instrumental 
                                            
18 See Campa and Kedia (2002, p1754) for details on the construction of the instrumental variables. 
19 The sample period of the tariff date in Fresard and Valta (2016) is between 1974 and 2005. I match 
the data with my sample staring from 1976. 
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variable for the change in large suppliers (i.e., △Top Large Supplier or △All Large 
Suppliers). Accordingly, the interaction term Firm Diversification * △Top Large 
Supplier (the interaction term Firm Diversification * △All Large Suppliers) is 
calculated by the instrumented Firm Diversification and the instrumented value of 
△Top Large Supplier (the instrumented value of △All Large Suppliers). 
3.6.2. Results 
     Table 2.7 presents the first stage of the 2SLS estimation for the variables on the 
change in large suppliers. The independent variables are the instrumental variable 
Tariff Cut and all exogenous variables which are used in the second stage of the 
2SLS estimation. In Column 1, the dependent variable is △Top Large Supplier. I find 
that the coefficient of Tariff Cut is -0.046 (p-value = 0.01). I find similar results in 
Column 2 where the dependent variable is △All Large Suppliers. The coefficient of 
Tariff Cut is -0.036 (p-value = 0.01). The results indicate that a tariff cut reduces the 
amount of inputs from a firm’s largest supplier and from all its suppliers. Therefore, 
the results of Table 2.7 support the interpretation that a tariff cut reduces the 
dominance of large suppliers, as the tariff cut increase the presence of foreign goods 
and services and the competitive pressure on domestic suppliers.  
     Table 2.8 presents the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. The dependent 
variable is the Change of Excess Value. In Column 1, In Column 1, the coefficient of 
△Top Supplier is -6.190 (p-value = 0.01). It implies that a reduction in the ratio of the 
purchases made by the largest supplier is associated with an increase in excess 
value in single-segment firms. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term Firm 
Diversification * △Top Supplier is 9.966 (p-value = 0.03). The sum of the coefficient 
of △Top Supplier and the coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * 
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△Top Supplier is 3.776 ((-6.190) +9.966=3.776). I conduct an F-test on the sum of 
the coefficient of △Top Supplier and the coefficient of the interaction Change in Firm 
Diversification * △Top Supplier, and find that the sum of the coefficients is significant 
(p-value = 0.01). It implies that a reduction in the ratio of the purchases made by the 
largest supplier is associated with a decrease in excess value of diversified firms. 
    In Column 2, I find similar pattern when I use All Suppliers as the variable of large 
suppliers. The results indicate that a reduction in the ratio of the purchases made by 
all suppliers is associated with a decrease in excess value of diversified firms. 
Therefore, after controlling for the endogeneity problem by using the setting of a tariff 
cut, I find consistent results in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 which support my hypotheses 
2. 
 
3.7. Event Study of M&As 
     So far, I have used Excess Value as a measure of firm value. However, it has 
been debated in previous literature that there are self-selection and data limitations 
related to the measurement of excess value. For instance, Whited (2001) finds that 
the calculation of the investment made by segments of a diversified firm based on 
the Tobin’s q of a single-segment firm is deficient because of the measurement error. 
Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) argue that a division of diversified firms is not 
comparable to single-segment firms because of selection biases. Villalonga (2004) 
finds that after using a different database, the value of diversification no longer 
appears discounted. In this section, I analyse how the presence of large suppliers 
affect the performance of diversifying M&As. I will use different proxies for the 
performance in the setting of M&As. By using this event study, I can mitigate the 
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critique on the measure of firm diversification, and provide additional empirical 
evidence to further support my analysis.  
3.7.1. Data      
     I collect the U.S. data on merger and acquisitions from the Thomson One 
database. The sample period is from 1979 to 2013.20 I select the M&As whose Form 
of the Deal are recorded as “Mergers” or “Acquisition of Majority Interest” in the 
database. I also require that the Deal Status is “Completed” and the public status of 
the acquirer is “Public”. I match the small sample of M&A events with the large 
sample of excess value, and delete the observations with incomplete variables. I 
obtain a final sample of 7282 M&A events after the above screening procedure. 
3.7.2. Variables 
In this section, I describe the key variables used in the event study of M&As.  
3.7.2.1. Announcement return  
     I use an acquirer’s announcement return as a measure of the stock market 
performance of M&As. This is defined as the cumulative abnormal return over days 
(-5, +5) around the announcement date. The cumulative abnormal return is defined 
by using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market 
return. To estimate the market model, I use an acquirer’s daily return and the return 
on the CRSP equally weighted index over days -330 to -20, where day 0 is the event 
date.  
                                            
20 The data on M&As starts from 1979 in the Thomson One database. 
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3.7.2.2. Net change in operating performance 
     I use the net change in ROA as a proxy of the operating performance of M&As. 
ROA is defined as the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. I estimate the Change in 
ROA from year t-1 to year t+1. Net Change in ROA is the difference between an 
acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from 
year t-1 to year t+1. I match each acquirer firm to a non-event firm within the same 
industry based on two-digit SIC code. Then I select the comparable firms which have 
the minimum difference in size and market-to-book ratio with the M&A event firms.  
3.7.2.3. Diversifying M&As 
     I define a variable called Diversifying M&As to identify whether or not an M&A 
raises the degree of firm diversification. I estimate the degree of diversification by 
using the Herfindahl index which is calculated based on segment sales. Diversifying 
M&As is a dummy variable which equals one if the acquirer’s Herfindahl index at 
year t+1 is smaller than the acquirer’s Herfindahl index at year t-1, and equals zero 
otherwise.  
3.7.2.4. Presence of large suppliers 
     I define a variable called Presence of Large Suppliers to identify whether the 
combined firm after M&As has at least one large supplier. Presence of Large 
Suppliers is a dummy variable that equals one if the combined firm has at least one 
large supplier after M&As, and equals zero otherwise.  
3.7.2.5. Control variables 
     I follow Hoechle et al. (2012) and use the following control variables in the event 
study of M&As. Unfriendly is a dummy variable that equals one if an M&A event 
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proceeds in an unfriendly approach, and equals zero otherwise. Private Target is a 
dummy variable if the target firm is a private firm, and equals zero otherwise. Cash 
Payment is a dummy variable that equals one if the payment type is cash for the 
M&A deal, and equals zero otherwise. Deal Value is defined as the ratio of deal 
value to the acquirer’s market capitalization. This setting also includes other control 
variables such as Size, Capital Expenditures, M/B, and R&D. 
3.7.3. Results 
3.7.3.1. Univariate statistics  
     Table 2.9 shows the univariate statistics for the sample of M&A. The mean of 
CAR between day -5 and day 5 (event day=0) is 0.0063. The average net change in 
ROA is -0.0227. I also find that the mean for Diversifying M&As is 0.1690 which 
implies that approximately 16.90% of events in the sample are diversified M&As. In 
addition, the mean of the variable Large Suppliers is 0.0271, which indicates that 
around 2.71% of the firms in the M&A sample have at least one large supplier.  
3.7.3.2. Large suppliers and the value of M&A 
     Table 2.10 presents the regression about the relation between the presence of 
large suppliers and announcement returns. The dependent variable is CAR (-5, +5). 
The coefficient of Presence of Large Suppliers is -0.003 (p-vale=0.68). The 
coefficient of the interaction term Diversifying M&As * Presence of Large Suppliers is 
0.041 (p-value = 0.05). The sum of the coefficient of Presence of Large Suppliers 
and the coefficient of the interaction term Presence of Large Suppliers * Diversifying 
M&As is 0.038 ((-0.003) +0.041=0.038). the sum of the coefficient of Presence of 
Large Suppliers and the coefficient of the interaction term Presence of Large 
Suppliers * Diversifying M&As, and find that the sum is 0.038. I conduct an F-test on 
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the sum of coefficients and find it is significant (p-value =0.05). It implies that the 
presence of large suppliers is associated with a significant cumulative abnormal 
return around the announcement of diversifying M&As. The results are consistent 
with the interpretation that the presence of large suppliers in the combined firm is 
positively valued by shareholders for diversifying M&As. Therefore, the results in 
Table 2.10 are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2 that the value of large 
suppliers for shareholders is higher in diversified firms.  
     Table 2.11 presents the relation between the presence of large suppliers and the 
operating performance around the M&As. The dependent variable is Net Change in 
ROA. I obtain comparable firms by using the matching based on the same industry 
as defined by two-digit SIC code, and I select the comparable firms which have the 
minimum difference in size and market-to-book ratio with the M&A event firms. The 
coefficient of Presence of Large Suppliers is -0.045 (p-vale=0.01). The coefficient of 
the interaction term Diversifying M&As * Presence of Large Suppliers is 0.054 (p-
value = 0.08). The sum of the coefficient of Presence of Large Suppliers and the 
coefficient of the interaction term Presence of Large Suppliers * Diversifying M&As is 
0.038 (=(-0.045) +0.054). I conduct an F-test on the sum of the coefficient of 
Presence of Large Suppliers and the coefficient of the interaction term Presence of 
Large Suppliers * Diversifying M&As, and find that the sum is insignificant (p-value 
=0.75). It implies that when a firm conducts non-diversifying M&As, shareholders 
place a lower value on the M&As when there is a large supplier. However, when a 
firm conducts diversifying M&As, the presence of a large supplier does not 
significantly affect shareholders’ valuation of M&As. The results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 that the value of large suppliers for shareholders is higher in diversified 
firms.   
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3.7.3.3. Heckman two-stage estimation 
     I conduct the Heckman two-stage estimation to control for the self-selection 
problem as the robustness check. In the first stage, I estimate a probit model with the 
dummy variable Diversifying M&As as the dependent variable. The independent 
variables are the same as the independent variables as reported in Column 3 of 
Table 2.7. The probit model is used to model the likelihood that a firm chooses to 
conduct diversifying M&As. I calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio based on the estimates 
in the probit model. 
      Column 2 of Table 2.10 reports the second stage of the Heckman estimation. I 
find the similar pattern with Column 1 when I include Inverse Mills Ratio in the 
regressions about the announcement return.  Column 2 of Table 2.11 reports the 
second stage of the Heckman estimation. I find similar pattern with Column 1 when I 
include Inverse Mills Ratio in the regressions about the change in operating 
performance.  
     Therefore, after conducting the Heckman two-stage estimation to control for the 
self-selection problem, I find a positive effect of the presence of large suppliers on 
the firm value of M&As, which is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2. 
 
3.8. Robustness Check 
     I show the robustness check in this section. 
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3.8.1. Heckman Two-Stage Estimation and Instrumental Variables Approach 
     There is a comprehensive discussion about the potential endogeneity problem in 
the literature about firm diversification (e.g., Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002; 
Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). Following Campa and Kedia (2002), I 
report on the conducting of the robustness check in this section. I use two 
econometrics approaches. The first one is the Heckman two-stage estimation to 
control for the self-selection problem. The second method is the Instrumental 
Variables approach to examine the underlying causality. 
     In Table 2.12, I estimate a probit regression as the first stage of the Heckman 
estimation. The dependent variable is the dummy variable Firm Diversification 
across all columns. Referring to Campa and Kedia (2002), I implement the 
independent variables including the firm-level variables (such as Size, EBIT/SALES, 
CAPX/SALES, and the average values of the variables Size, EBIT/SALES, and 
CAPX/SALES), the industry-level variables (such as the fraction of all firms in the 
industry that are diversified firms, and the fraction of industry sales accounted for by 
diversified firms.), and the national level variables (such as real GDP growth, and the 
number of months in a year when the economy was in recession). On the basis of 
estimates in the probit regression, I calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio and use it in the 
second stage of the Heckman estimation. 
     Panel A of Table 2.13 presents the second stage of the Heckman estimation 
when I include Inverse Mills Ratio in the regressions. The results are consistent with 
Table 2.3. In Column 1 of the regression, I use Top Supplier as the measure for the 
presence of large suppliers. The coefficient of the interaction term Firm 
Diversification * Top Supplier is 0.071 (p-value = 0.03). Similarly, in Column 2, I use 
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All Suppliers as the measure for the presence of large suppliers. The coefficient of 
the interaction term Firm Diversification * All Suppliers is 0.068 (p-value = 0.03). The 
results are consistent with the interpretation that large suppliers are positively valued 
by shareholders in diversified firms.  
     Panel B of Table 2.13 presents the results of instrumental variables as an 
approach to mitigate the causality problem. I also use the instrumental variable for 
Firm Diversification which is the same as that mentioned in Section 6.1. In Column 1, 
I use Top Supplier as the measure for large suppliers. The coefficient of the 
interaction term Firm Diversification * Top Supplier is 0.122 (p-value = 0.02). In 
Column 2, the coefficient of the interaction term Firm Diversification * All Suppliers is 
0.043 (p-value = 0.01). The results are consistent with the interpretation that the 
presence of large suppliers is positively valued by shareholders in diversified firms.  
     Therefore, I find consistent results in Table 2.13 after I use the Heckman two-
stage and Instrumental Variables approach to mitigate the potential endogeneity 
problem. 
3.8.2. Number of Segments 
     Previous literature also use the number of segments to measure firm 
diversification (Comment and Jarrell,1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Campa and 
Kedia, 2002). In Table 2.14, I analyse how the firm diversification affects the value of 
large suppliers by using the Number of Segments instead of the dummy variable 
Firm Diversification in Table 2.3. As I can see from the coefficients of interaction 
terms (Number of Segments * Large Suppliers, Number of Segments * Top Large 
Supplier, and Number of Segments * All Large Suppliers), the results are consistent 





     I examine the relation between firm diversification and the value of large suppliers 
for shareholders, and find that the value of large suppliers for shareholders is higher 
in diversified firms. I find robust results to support Hypothesis 2 about the 
relationship-specific investments. the presence of large suppliers is positively valued 
by shareholders in diversified firms with relationship-specific investments. In addition, 
I analyse the impact of tariff cut on the competitive environment find that that a 
reduction in the ratio of the purchases made by all suppliers is associated with a 
decrease in excess value of diversified firms. In the event study of M&As, I find that 
the presence of large suppliers increases both the announcement return and the 
operating performance of a diversifying M&A.  
I conclude that the results support my hypothesis that the value of large suppliers for 




Chapter 4. Large Customers and Payout Policy 
4.1. Introduction 
     Large customers play an important role in the corporate finance area. For 
example, Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) find that a firm’s 
financial distress and bankruptcy have a negative impact on the relationship with its 
customers. A firm can commit to reducing the risk of liquidation by choosing a lower 
leverage in a situation where the firm is willing to establish specific relationship with 
its customers. Kale and Shahrur (2007) state that large customers affect a firm’s 
leverage ratio through the channel of relationship-specific investments and 
bargaining position. Besides leverage, more recently other areas in corporate 
finance have been analysed in the literature. For example, Wang (2012) shows that 
the corporate dividend payout is negatively impacted by a firm’s dependence on 
customer-supplier relationships because the relationship-specific investments are 
associated with high financial distress costs. Hertzel, Li, Officer and Rodgers (2008) 
find that distress related to the bankruptcy filings of a major customer is associated 
with negative and significant stock price effects for suppliers as customers impose 
the indirect costs of distress by shifting purchases to other suppliers. 
     In my thesis, I extend the literature by examining how large customers as non-
financial stakeholders affect the corporate payout policy. Share repurchases and 
dividends are two forms of corporate payout policy. Both share repurchases and 
dividend increases signal a firm’s profitable prospect and reduced risk in the future. It 
is important to examine share repurchases as an alternative form of corporate 
payout. Grullon and Michaely (2002) report that there are 84 percent of firms that 
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initiate a repurchase programme and 80 percent of firms that repurchase shares in 
2000.  
     I develop two hypotheses from different perspectives. First, the presence of large 
customers reduces both the level and value of payout through the channel of the 
bargaining position. Second, the presence of large customers increases both the 
level and value of payout through the channel of relationship-specific investments.  
     I first examine how the presence of large customers affect share repurchases. I 
obtain a sample of 8,411 repurchase events from Thomson One and a sample of 
86,164 observations from the Compustat Fundamental Annual database for the 
period from 1979 to 2013. I find that both the cumulative abnormal return and the net 
change in operating performance around the announcement of share repurchases 
are lower with the presence of large customers. I also analyse the impact of large 
customers’ bargaining position on the value of share repurchases. I conclude that 
the presence of a large customer reduces the value of share repurchases through 
the perspective of bargaining position. 
In addition, I conduct an empirical analysis of the relation between large 
customers and dividend increases. I collect the data of dividend increases from the 
Compustat Fundamental Annual database. The sample includes 65,314 
observations in the period from 1979 to 2013. I find that both the cumulative 
abnormal return and the net change in operating performance around the 
announcement of increase in dividends are higher with the presence of large 
customers. Also, I examine how the relationship-specific investments and the 
signalling effect of dividend increases affect the value of firms with the presence of 
large customers.  I conclude that the presence of a large customer increases the 
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value of dividend increases through the perspective of relationship-specific 
investments. 
      Moreover, I examine how the presence of large customers affects the managers’ 
decision on the selection of payout methods. The results show that firms with the 
presence of large customers are more likely to repurchase shares rather than to 
increase dividends. Firms with large customers will have higher risks, and they may 
put more effort into signalling their good future prospects by using share repurchases, 
rather than increasing dividends which require a steadier cash flow.  I also find a 
negative impact of large customers on the level of total payout through the channel 
of bargaining position. 
     This chapter makes the following contributions. First, only Wang (2012) examine 
how a firm’s relationships with major customers affect the level of dividend payments. 
As corporate payout policy includes both dividends and share repurchases, I extend 
the literature to examine the impact of large customers on share repurchases. I also 
analyse the effect of large customers on both the value and the level of corporate 
payout including share repurchases and dividends. Wang (2012) finds that the 
customer-supplier relationships negatively impact the level of dividends payout 
because of the relationship-specific investments. On one hand, this chapter 
complements the viewpoint of Wang (2012) that the level of total payout is reduced 
by the presence of large customers. On the other hand, in consideration of the 
signalling effects of corporate payout, this chapter shows that large customers 
positively affect the value of dividend increases through the relationship-specific 
investments. I also disclose a different channel through which the large customers 
are associated with a lower value of share repurchases; namely, that the large 
customers reduce the value of share repurchases through bargaining position.  
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     Second, I contribute to the literature about the determinants of corporate payout. 
Various determinants of the payout policy have been identified in previous literature, 
including financial resource distribution (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Stephens and Weisbach, 
1998; Grullon and Michaely, 2002), agency problem (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984; 
Faulkender and Wang, 2006), signalling effects (e.g., Vermaelen, 1981; Woolridge, 
1983; Bartov, 1991; Grullon and Michaely, 2004), tax (Allen and Michaely, 2003; 
Miller and Modigliani, 1961), executive stock options (Kahle, 2002) and so on. I 
extend the literature by documenting the large customers as a new determinant of 
corporate payout policy.  
     Third, I contribute to the literature on the role of large customers in the corporate 
finance area. Previous studies show that large customers affect a firm’s capital 
structure (e.g., Titman, 1984; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Kale and Shahrur, 
2007), corporate cash holdings (Itzkowitz, 2013; Bae and Wang, 2015), dividends 
(e.g., Johnson, Kang, and Yi, 2010; Wang, 2012) , trade credit (Dhaliwal, Judd, 
Serfling and Shaikh, 2016; Dass, Kale and Nanda, 2014), loan contract term 
(Campello and Gao, 2017), seasoned equity offerings (e.g., Johnson, Kang, Masulis, 
and Yi, 2017) and so on. This chapter provides more comprehensive evidence on 
the relation between large customers and the value of payout policy. 
     Fourth, I extend the literature which discusses the effect of large customers on 
firm value. There is a debate about how large customers affect firm value. On one 
hand, much of the literature argues that large customers reduce a firm’s performance 
as large customers demand more concessions or discount from their suppliers (e.g., 
Galbraith, 1952; Scherer, 1970; Lustgarten, 1975; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 
1978; Williamson, 1979; Balakrishnan, Linsmeier, and Venkatachalam, 1996). On 
the other hand, more recent studies argue that large customers increase a firm’s 
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performance through information sharing, collaboration in marketing, reduction in 
operating expenses, and so on (e.g., Jackson, 1985; Cowley, 1988; Kalwani and 
Narayandas, 1995; Patatoukas, 2012).  My thesis adds to this debate by providing 
another piece of evidence that large customers affect the value of corporate payout. 
4.2. Literature Review  
     I review the literature about large customers and payout policy in this section. 
4.2.1 Large Customers 
     The literature review about large customers is divided into four sections. The first 
three sections have been discussed in Chapter 2. They are “2.2.1.1. The role of 
large customers in corporate finance”, “2.2.1.2. The effects of large customers on 
firm value” and “2.2.1.3. Large customers and bargaining position”. I will mainly focus 
on the fourth section “The effects of large customers on firm risk” in this chapter. 
   The presence of large customers is related with a higher level of risk for supplier 
firms. Suppliers can be exposed to business risks both in the relationship with 
financially stable major customers and financially constrained major customers. 
There is also significant reduction in suppliers’ revenues if they lose large customers. 
     Above all, suppliers have risks in the relationship with financially stable major 
customers. Dhaliwal, Michas, Naiker, and Sharma (2014) argue that financially 
stable customers tend to demand unique designed products, which are unlikely to be 
redeployed for alternative uses. As a result, major customers with a higher 
bargaining position are likely to require concessions which reduce a supplier’s gross 
margins. From the perspective of auditing, greater dependence of suppliers on large 
customers show a potential risk of manipulating receivables and revenues. In order 
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to obtain targeted profits, suppliers can collude with their customers to fix prices, and 
engage in bribery such as kick-backs (Katz, 2012; KPMG 2010, 2011). The 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.131 states that “…… major 
customers of an enterprise represent a significant concentration of risk”.  
     Second, suppliers suffer a higher level of risks in the relationship with financially 
constrained customers. Hertzel, Li, Officer and Rodgers (2008) find that distress 
related to bankruptcy filings of a major customer is associated with negative and 
significant stock price effects for suppliers as customers impose indirect costs of 
distress by shifting purchases to other suppliers. As a result, customers cause 
financial distress to the current suppliers, and this negative impact is more 
pronounced when the contagion effect is more severe within suppliers. Lang and 
Stulz (1992) define the contagion effect as the situation when industrial competitors 
experience stock price declines when a rival firm suffers from financial distress. 
Similarly, Jorion and Zhang (2009) find a supplier who provides more trade credit to 
its major customer suffers more significant abnormal stock returns around the 
bankruptcy announcement of its major customer. 
     Third, suppliers’ business and financial condition decline significantly if they lose 
large customers. Dhaliwal, Michas, Naiker, and Sharma (2014) document the risks 
stemming from the dependence of suppliers on their major customers. There are 
three reasons why a supplier’s dependence on major customers have significant 
business risks as explained in Dhaliwal et al. (2014) and Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, 
and Shaikh (2016).  First, when a major customer suffers financial distress, the 
supplier will have the risk of losing future sales. If a major customer goes bankrupt, 
the supplier will have the risks of being unable to collect outstanding receivables and 
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will lack cash flow. Second, a major customer may switch to a different supplier 
when the customer is not satisfied with the supplier’s products or services. Third, 
when a major customer chooses to develop products internally, the supplier will 
experience substantial loss of future sales and have a new competitor in this industry.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2016) find that a more concentrated customer base increases a 
supplier's risk, which results in a higher cost of equity.  
     Furthermore, Itzkowitz (2013) argues that suppliers experience significant loss 
due to the customer-induced risks. Customers cannot guarantee that they will 
continue to buy the products when they are in financial distress. Losing a major 
customer may results in a sudden loss of operating income, or even destructive 
impact on the supplier firm. For example, Carillion plc was one of the largest British 
firms in the facilities management industry. The firm had strong power over its 
suppliers to dictate payment arrangements. A few years ago, Carillion was able to 
double its payment periods to its suppliers to 120 days (Plimmer, 2018). However, 
Carillion collapsed in January 2018, which resulted in a devastating impact on their 
suppliers.  Some suppliers went into bankrupt due to the money owned by Carillion. 
To take another example, retailers are connected with a broad network of suppliers, 
and the bankruptcies of retailing customers have a severe impact on the economy. 
Barbaro (2008) reports that furniture retailers in financial distress leave behind tens 
of millions of dollars in unpaid payments to furniture manufacturers, shipping firms, 
advertising agencies and mall owners. These suppliers are unlikely to be paid in full, 
eliminating their financial pain, or even emerging from bankruptcy. 
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4.2.2. Relationship-Specific Investments  
     There is extant literature which discusses how relationship-specific investments 
affect corporate capital structure, compensation and payout policies, earnings 
management and accounting policies, etc.  
     First, previous literature shows that relationship-specific investments have effects 
on firms’ capital structure. Titman (1984) finds that liquidation affects the 
relationship-specific investments which are undertaken by a firm with a particular 
product. A firm may consider its customers by taking lower leverage. Maksimovic 
and Titman (1991) find that a firm’s debt capacity maintains a reputation for high 
quality products and the financial distress may induce the firm to cut down costs and 
lower the product quality. Therefore, a firm’s financial distress and bankruptcy have a 
negative impact on the firm’s relationship with its customers. Kale and Shahrur (2007) 
examine firms’ leverage ratio and the relationship with customers. They find that a 
lower debt level can be an incentive to make a long-term connection between 
suppliers and customers and to conduct relationship-specific investments. Banerjee, 
Dasgupta and Kim (2008) further support the view of Titman (1984) and Titman and 
Wessels (1988). They suggest that the customer–supplier relationships affect the 
corporate capital structure choice. In particular, there is a relatively lower leverage 
ratio for the suppliers in durable goods industries if they have important relationships 
with principal customers.  
     Second, the customer-supplier relationship affects the corporate dividends policy, 
initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Wang (2012) 
finds that the relationship with large customers negatively impacts a firm’s dividend 
payments. This is due to the high financial distress costs related to relationship-
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specific investments. Johnson, Kang, and Yi (2010) suggest that the relationship with 
large customers plays a certificating role for IPO firms. IPO firms with the presence 
of large customers experience better operating performance and higher valuation 
than IPO firms without large customers. Johnson, Kang, Masulis, and Yi (2017) 
explore how the SEOs affect the market value and the relationship heath of both the 
issuers and their large customers. They suggest that both the issuer and its large 
customer have a negative operating performance on SEO announcements, and this 
is more pronounced if the customer-supplier relationships are significantly crucial. 
Corporate cash holdings are also influenced by the customer-supplier relationship. 
Itzkowitz (2013) argues that as a precaution against customer-induced risks, 
suppliers with the presence of large customers hold more cash than suppliers 
without the presence of large customers. Similarly, Bae and Wang (2015) suggest 
that relationship-specific investments result in a higher level of cash holdings. The 
customer-supplier relationship is one of the determinants of corporate cash holdings. 
     Furthermore, there are some studies which argue that relationship-specific 
investments are determined by the level of bankruptcy risk and financial distress. 
Hertzel, Li, Officer and Rodgers (2008) propose that a firm’s financial distress is 
related to a negative impact on its supplier’s share price. Raman and Shahrur (2008) 
show that firms prefer to establish a long-term connection with those customers who 
have good prospects. Kale, Kedia and Williams (2013) find a negative relation 
between firms’ risk-taking investments and the customer-supplier relationship. In 
particular, when firms tend to increase their cash flow volatility, the relationship-
specific investments are more sensitive to the managers’ risk-taking decisions. 
Banerjee, Chang, Fu and Li (2015) report a negative impact of suppliers’ 
environmental risk exposure on their relationship with large customers. The higher 
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level of suppliers’ environmental risk lowers the likelihood of establishing 
relationships with their principal customers and shortens the relationship duration. In 
other words, as Johnson, Kand and Yi (2010) find, customers do not value their 
relationship with those suppliers who have greater financial distress and bankruptcy 
risks. 
4.2.3. Payout Policy 
     In this section, the literature review on payout policy is classified as signalling 
effect, agency theory, substitution effects, and other areas in the payout policy. 
4.2.3.1. Signalling effect 
     Both share repurchases and dividend increases have signalling effects on future 
profitability, financial leverage and systematic risks.  
     In terms of future profitability, both share repurchases and dividend increases are 
a positive signal to the market. Vermaelen (1981) suggests that firms with share 
repurchases experience a permanent increase in their share prices and there is an 
increase in earnings per share around the repurchase announcement date. 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) report the traditional signalling 
hypothesis, which is induced by information asymmetry between a firm’s managers 
and the market. Managers might choose to repurchase shares if the firm is 
undervalued based on their assessment. Therefore, the announcement of share 
repurchases is regarded as a valuable signal to the less informed market. Kahle 
(2002) suggests that if the current share performance is poor or if a firm’s free cash 
flow is high, the firm will tend to repurchase shares than to raise the level of 
dividends. Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Kahle (2002) argue that share 
repurchase programmes are undertaken to signal undervaluation to investors, and 
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the announcement-day return is increased with the percentage of outstanding shares 
repurchased. 
     Dividend increase also signals future profitability and increased financial 
resources. Asquith and Mullins (1983) suggest that the dividend policy transmits the 
information about a firm’s current performance and future prospects from the internal 
management to outside investors. The signalling effects are shared by dividends and 
share repurchases. Share repurchases are more attractive because of the tax 
advantage but the timing of share repurchases is irregular. Dividends are more 
regular payments and outside investors should have regular signals sent by 
management. Bhattacharya (1980) shows that the cash dividend payout is a signal 
of expected cash flows in the setting of information asymmetry as the tax on cash 
dividends are higher than the tax on capital gain, and the outside investors have 
imperfect information about the firm’s profitability. Woolridge (1983) finds that 
positive (negative) dividend change announcements lead to positive (negative) share 
price changes. The main reason for the positive relation between dividend 
announcements and share price changes is the market signalling effect. Brickley 
(1983) finds there is a positive earnings change after the announcement of dividend 
increases. Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987) also find that both dividends and 
investment are efficient signals, and dividend changes have a positive effect on 
share prices.  
     Moreover, both share repurchases and dividend increases function as the signals 
of increased financial leverage and reduced systematic risks. Lintner (1956) and 
Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) suggest that managers repurchase 
shares and increase dividends when they find that the firm has a lower level of cash 
flow risk. In particular, the announcement of share repurchases signals to the market 
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both the reduction in agency costs and in firm risk. Bartov (1991) finds a decrease in 
the risk of share prices following the announcements of share repurchases, which is 
signalled by managers who raise a firm’s leverage through share repurchases when 
they anticipate firm risk reduction. Grullon and Michaely (2004) report that firms with 
share repurchases experience a significant decline in systematic risk relative to firms 
without share repurchases. For repurchasing firms, the level of reduction in firm risk 
is positively related to the level of reduction in R&D expenses and capital 
expenditure. In the long run, the increase in stock prices is positively related to 
changes in future profitability and negatively related to changes in firm risk and the 
cost of capital.  
     In terms of the dividend increases, Charest (1978) finds a significant positive 
change in share price following the announcement of dividend increases, and the 
share price change is partially induced by a risk reduction of the dividend-increasing 
firms. Boehme and Sorescu (2002) and Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) 
find a significant reduction in systematic risk for the firms which increase dividend 
payments. This results in a decrease in their cost of capital. In the long run, the 
dividend increasing firms with a large risk reduction also experience a significant 
increase in their share prices. They further conclude that mature firms are more likely 
to pay out large free cash flows in the form of share repurchases and dividends. 
Thus, for mature firms, dividend increases signal reduced systematic risks, a lower 
number of investment opportunities and declining profit growth.  
4.2.3.2 Agency theory 
     There is extensive finance literature which shows that firms decide to repurchase 
shares to distribute excess capital. This will therefore increase the leverage ratio. 
Jensen (1986) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) point out that share repurchasing 
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is a common method to distribute excess cash. Grullon and Michaely (2002, 2004) 
find that firms have a higher possibility to pay out cash through share repurchases, 
and repurchase events lower the amount of free cash flows at management’s 
disposal. Allen and Michaely (2003) point out that firms’ payout decisions involve a 
great amount of cash payment. Share repurchasing in particular is the preferred 
approach, rather than dividends, to distribute cash to shareholders (E.g., Grullon and 
Michaely, 2002; Brockman, Howe, and Mortal, 2008; Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; 
Elton and Gruber, 1968). Also, firms have the propensity to execute more share 
repurchases if they have strong cash flows (Jensen, 1986; Stephens and Weisbach, 
1998). Almeida, Fos and Kronlund (2016) examine the real effects of share 
repurchases on firms. Firms that repurchase shares will subsequently reduce 
employment and investment capital and hold less financial slack. EPS-driven share 
repurchases cause firms to decrease investment, employment, cash holdings and 
R&D.  
     Thus, due to the distribution of excess financial resources, share repurchases 
increase a firm’s leverage and bankruptcy risks. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) and 
Opler and Titman (1996) argue that firms repurchasing shares after a share price 
increase aim to have an optimal capital structure. Dittmar (2000) reports that firms 
with a large amount of excess cash or strong cash flow are more likely to repurchase 
shares, and therefore increase the leverage ratios. Wang (2012) shows that the 
corporate dividend payout is negatively impacted by a firm’s dependence on 
customer-supplier relationships because the relationship-specific investments are 
associated with high financial distress costs. 
     Lintner (1956) suggested that a dividend payout decision is determined by the 
long-run and sustainable earnings. The arguments of Lintner are strongly supported 
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by Fama and Babiak (1968). The stability of dividends is a firm’s primary concern 
and the dividend changes essentially depend on a firm’s earnings. Most firms have 
their fixed dividend payout ratio. Firms are reluctant to reduce dividends and they 
adjust their dividend slowly if there are sudden increases in earnings.  
     Based on Jensen's (1986) free cash flow argument, the existing literature on 
payout policy suggests that dividend payout is a way to distribute free cash flow. 
Jensen (1986) finds that equityholders can minimise the potential overinvestment 
conducted by management. It will be harder for management to invest in negative 
NPV projects if they have less discretionary cash.  Increasing the level of payout is a 
method to take unnecessary cash out of a firm. Jagannathan et al., (2000) find that 
dividend payout is positively related to the amount of operating cash flow. Firms that 
experience lower cash flow volatility tend to payout dividends, because dividend 
payout is more like a permanent commitment relative to share repurchases. Firms 
increase dividends following a good operating performance and dividends increase 
steadily over time.  
     Much of the literature examines the relation between agency problems and 
dividend payout. Faulkender and Wang (2006) show that firms use dividends rather 
than share repurchases to distribute a greater amount of cash, and the greater 
dividend payout reduces the marginal value of cash holdings. Easterbrook (1984) 
finds that the dividend payout can be a useful method to mitigate the agency 
problem of management. The dividend payout keeps firms on the capital market and 
adjusts the level of risk undertaken by managers and investors. Firms pay dividends 
and raise external capital simultaneously for carrying out daily operations. La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) argue that dividend payout is an 
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effective legal protection which enables minority shareholders to obtain dividend 
payments, and the level of dividend payment is positively related to the power of 
minority shareholders. Regular dividend payout also enables a firm to establish a 
reputation of decent treatment to investors. 
4.2.3.3. Difference and substitution between share repurchases and dividends 
     Firms use dividends and share repurchases at different times by considering their 
cash flows, level of debt, financial flexibility and so on.  
     Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) identify that firms pay dividends 
with operating cash flows, while repurchase shares with non-operating cash flows. 
Firms increase dividends following good stock market performance and repurchase 
shares following poor performance. Share repurchases substitute dividends because 
of their flexibility. Bonaimé, Hankins and Harford (2013) argue that the corporate 
payout is a determinant of financial flexibility. The financial flexibility can be adjusted 
by making choices between dividends and share repurchases. Repurchasing firms 
also have much more volatile cash flows and distributions.  
     Firms choose dividend payout to distribute relatively permanent cash and choose 
share repurchases to distribute temporary cash (Guay and Harford, 2000; 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 2000; Lee and Suh, 2011; Haw, Ho, Hu, and 
Zhang, 2011). Lee and Rui (2007) examine the time-series behaviour of dividends 
and share repurchases. They find the dividends and share repurchases are 
imperfectly substituted for each other. The announcement of share repurchases is 
related to the temporary components of earnings, but dividends are not.  
     Grullon and Michaely (2002) show that firms have gradually substituted share 
repurchases for cash dividends. Share repurchases have become the main form of 
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cash distribution for young firms. For mature firms, they also have a higher 
propensity to initiate share repurchases without dividend cuts. Based on the findings 
of Bagwell and Shoven (1989), Kahle (2002) shows that firms with a higher leverage 
ratio are less likely to repurchase shares. Highly levered firms have much more 
financing costs and tend to repurchase fewer shares. Firms with dividend increases 
have a higher level of debt than firms with share repurchases. The reason is that 
firms with dividend payouts have more stable cash flows and therefore take on more 
debt. 
     Jiang, Kim, Lie and Yang (2013) show that the premium of dividends payout has 
anegative impact on the choice of share repurchases, whereas the premium of share 
repurchases is negatively associated with the choice of dividend payments. This is 
consistent with the substitution effect between dividends and share repurchases. 
4.2.3.4. Other areas in the payout policy 
     Apart from the signalling effects, agency theory, and substitution theory, there are 
extensive studies which on other areas in the payout policy such as tax, executive 
stock options, and behavioural finance.  
     In terms of the tax in payout policy, Allen and Michaely (2003) suggest that 
individuals pay much more taxes on dividends than on share repurchases. The 
reason is that dividends are taxed as ordinary income and share repurchases are 
taxed on a capital gains basis. The tax rate on capital gains is normally lower than 
the tax rate on ordinary income. Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue that the different 
clienteles are taxed differently. Firms have the incentive to supply shares which 
minimize taxes for each clientele.   
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     For the relation between executive stock options and share repurchases, Kahle 
(2002) reports that firms are more likely to announce share repurchases when 
executives have considerable share options outstanding and when employees have 
substantial exercisable options. The amount of share repurchases is independent 
with executives’ options but positively associated with employees’ exercisable 
options. Kahle also argues that managers might choose to repurchase shares if a 
firm is undervalued based on their assessment. 
     Moreover, many papers find a relationship between behavioural finance and 
payout policy. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) document the long-term 
firm performance following the announcements of open market repurchases. They 
suggest that firms make announcements of share repurchases at the time when the 
firm value is under-priced. However, the market underreacts to open market 
repurchase announcements on average. The reason could be that either the 
managers are over optimistic about firm value, or the market neglects a considerable 
proportion of undervaluation signals. Baker and Wurgler (2004) identify a catering 
theory of dividends. Managers pay out dividends when prevailing investors demand 
dividends. They pay dividends when investors prefer dividend-paying firms, and tend 
to omit dividends when investors prefer firms without paying dividends. 
 
4.3. Hypotheses 




4.3.1. Bargaining Position 
          Many studies suggest that large customers reduce the firm performance of 
their suppliers by demanding more discounts or concessions from suppliers such as 
lower price, and extended trade credit (e.g., Galbraith, 1952; Scherer, 1970; 
Lustgarten, 1975; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979; 
Balakrishnan, Linsmeier, and Venkatachalam, 1996). In addition, the previous 
literature on the bargaining position between customers and suppliers investigates 
the role of firm surplus available for sharing in the bargaining. For example, Kale and 
Shahrur (2007) find a positive relation between a firm’s leverage and the degree of 
concentration in customer industries. They argue that a higher leverage increases a 
firm’s bargaining position with a labour union by lowering the amount of firm surplus 
available for sharing with labour. Therefore, the value of a firm can be discounted by 
the presence of large customers whose bargaining position is stronger than that of 
suppliers. 
     Furthermore, both share repurchases and dividend increases signal the future 
profitability to the market. Firms with share repurchases experience a permanent 
increase in their share prices and there is an increase in earnings per share around 
the repurchase announcement date (Vermaelen, 1981). Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995) suggest that the signalling effect is induced by information 
asymmetry between a firm’s managers and the market. Managers might choose to 
repurchase shares if the firm is undervalued based on their assessment (Kahle, 
2002). Therefore, the announcement of share repurchases is regarded as a valuable 
signal to the less informed market and the announcement-day return is increased 
with the percentage of outstanding shares repurchased (Comment and Jarrell, 1991). 
In terms of dividend increases, Woolridge (1983) finds that the market signalling 
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effect of dividend changes is the primary reason for the announcements of dividend 
increases producing positive changes in the share price. Brickley (1983) find there 
are positive earnings changes after the announcement of dividend increases. 
Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987) also find the positive announcement signalling 
effect of dividend changes on share prices. Outside investors realise the positive 
relation between current dividends and future earnings and invest more in corporate 
shares with higher historical dividends. 
     A firm’s large customers will be aware of the announcements of share 
repurchases and dividend increases. The announcements signal a firm’s better 
future profitability and increased level of financial resources. A firm’s bargaining 
position is negatively related to the firm’s surplus available to large customers, and 
positively related to the leverage ratio (Kale and Shahrur, 2007) Therefore, the 
bargaining position of a firm will be lowered with the improved future profitability 
signalled by share purchases and dividend increases, because the firm will have 
more potential resources available to be extracted by their large customers. Large 
customers, who are signalled by the payout announcements, may demand more 
concessions from the firms with an increased level of financial resources.  
Hypothesis 1: The presence of large customers reduces both the level and value of 
payout.  
4.3.2. Relationship-Specific Investments 
     Bankruptcy risk and financial distress affect the relationship-specific investments 
undertaken by customers and suppliers. A lower debt level can be an incentive to 
make a long-term connection between suppliers and customers (Maksimovic and 
Titman, 1991). Titman (1984) states that a firm can commit to decreasing the 
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liquidation risks by choosing a lower leverage in the situation that the firm requires its 
customers to undertake the relationship-specific investments that will lose value if 
the firm goes into liquidation. Firms that can potentially impose high costs on their 
customers in the event of liquidation tend to choose lower debt ratios (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Hennessy and Livdan, 2009). Kale and Shahrur (2007) suggest that 
a firm’s liquidation decision can significantly impact the relationship-specific 
investments because it is causally associated with the firm’s bankruptcy status. 
     In the literature of payout policy, both share repurchases and dividend increases 
are recognised as a signal of increased financial leverage and reduced bankruptcy 
risks. Managers repurchase shares and increase dividends when they find that the 
firm has a lower level of cash flow risk (Lintner, 1956; Brav, Graham, Harvey, and 
Michaely, 2003) and there is a decline in the risk of share prices following the 
announcements of share repurchases (Bartov, 1991). The level of reduction in firm 
risk is also positively related to the level of reduction in R&D expenses and capital 
expenditure (Grullon and Michaely, 2004). Furthermore, there is also a significant 
reduction in systematic risk and cost of capital for the firms which increase dividend 
payments. The large risk reduction can be one of reasons for the significant increase 
in their share prices around the announcement of dividend increases (Charest, 1978; 
Boehme and Sorescu, 2002; Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan, 2002). 
     Therefore, share repurchases and dividend increases enhance the customer-
supplier relationships through the reduction of bankruptcy risk and cost of capital. I 
expect the reduced bankruptcy risk and enhanced customer-supplier relationships 
will increase firm value. 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of large customers increases both the level and value 
of payout.  
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4.3.3. Summarizing the Hypotheses 
The above hypotheses predict the effects through different perspectives. I 
empirically examine which hypothesis is (or which hypotheses are) most precise to 
explain how the presence of large customers affects the level and value of share 
repurchases. The predictions of the hypotheses are summarized in the following 
table. A plus (minus) sign indicates a positive (negative) impact of large customers 
on the value of share repurchases. 
 Bargaining Position Relationship-specific investments 
Level of payout − + 
Value of payout − + 
 
4.4. Data and Variables 
      In this section, I describe the data and variables. 
 4.4.1. Data Sources 
     I obtain the U.S. data on repurchase events from Thomson One database, and I 
also collect the data of share repurchases and dividends from WRDS CRSP 
database. The data period is from 1979 to 2013. I exclude the financial firms (SIC 
between 6000 and 6999) and exclude the observations with incomplete data. I use 
quarterly dividends data in CRSP when I identity an event of dividends increase. 
After the screening procedure, I obtain a sample of 8,411 repurchase events and 
25,928 dividends increase events with CAR. I also collect the data about share 
repurchases and dividends from the Compustat Fundamental Annual database. The 
sample size of share repurchases is 86,164 observations which consist of 8,042 
repurchase events and 78,122 non-repurchase events. The sample size of dividends 
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is 65,314 observations, which includes 34,919 events of dividend increases and 
30,395 events of no dividend increases. 
4.4.2. Data on Large Customers 
      Since Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) No.14 requires firms to 
report their principal customers who occupy more than 10% of total annual sales, the 
Compustat Customer Segments database provides the data on these customers as 
well as the amount of sales to these customers from each segment. However, only 
the names of customers are reported in the Compustat Customer Segments 
database, and they are generally recorded as abbreviations instead of original 
names. I link the names of the customers with firm identifiers in the Compustat 
Annual database by hand. In order to match the abbreviations of customer names 
with their original names, I first check the order and number of letters in the 
abbreviation and then identify the most likely corresponding original names in the 
Compustat Annual database. For example, the abbreviation of the name of a 
customer is shown as “IBM” in the Compustat Customer Segments database. I use 
the above algorithm and find that it corresponds to the ‘‘Intl Business Machines Corp’’ 
in the Compustat Annual database. For another example, “Emerson EL” shown in 
the Customer Segments database corresponds to the ‘‘Emerson Electric Co’’ in the 
Compustat Annual database. However, I exclude those abbreviations which are 
ambiguous and cannot be precisely matched with the names of any firm in the 
Compustat.  
4.4.3. Variables 
     I present the description of variables in this section.  
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4.4.3.1. The proxies of large customers 
     I use three proxies for large customers. The first one is a dummy variable called 
Large Customers. Large Customers is equal to one if a firm has at least one large 
customer which accounts for over 10% of the firm’s total annual sales and equals 
zero otherwise. The second variable is called Top Large Customer. Top Large 
Customer is defined as the ratio of the purchases made by the top large customer to 
the total sales of the firm. The third variable is called All Large Customers. This is 
defined as the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales 
of the firm. 
4.4.3.2. The measures for share repurchases 
     I use announcement return as the measures of the stock market performance of 
share repurchases. The announcement return is calculated as the cumulative 
abnormal return over days (-1, +1) around the announcement date. I follow the 
method used in Chapter 2 to calculate the announcement return. The CRSP equally 
weighted index is used as the market return in the market model. The market model 
is estimated by using a firm’s daily return and the return on the CRSP equally 
weighted index over days -200 to -20, where day 0 is the event date.  
     I use the net change in ROA as a measure of the operating performance. ROA is 
the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. I calculate the Change in ROA from year t-1 to 
year t+1. Net Change in ROA is the difference between an event firm’s change in 
ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to year t+1. I 
construct a sample of comparable firms with propensity score matching. I match 
each event firm to a non-event firm requiring that the non-event firm has a minimum 
difference in the propensity score based on firm size, market-to-book ratio, capital 
expenditure, leverage, cash flow, R&D, dividends and sales growth. I also match 
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each event firm to a non-event firm within the same industry based on the two-digit 
SIC code. I provide the details about the propensity score matching in Appendix C. 
4.4.3.3. The measures for dividend increases 
     I use announcement return as the measure of the stock market performance of 
dividend increases. The announcement return is calculated as the cumulative 
abnormal return over days (-1, +1) around the announcement date. I use the same 
calculation method as the announcement return of share repurchases to obtain the 
announcement return of dividend increases.  
     I use the net change in ROA as a measure of the operating performance of 
dividend increases. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. I calculate the 
Change in ROA from year t-1 to year t+1. Net Change in ROA is the difference 
between an event firm’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change 
in ROA from year t-1 to year t+1. I use the same calculation method as the operating 
performance of share repurchases to obtain the operating performance of dividend 
increases. 
4.4.3.4. Control Variables 
     Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets 
minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of 
capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the 
ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment 
to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. 
Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Percent Sought is the number of 
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shares sought in the share repurchases scaled by the total shares outstanding. Run-
up is the sum of the monthly stock return six month prior to the announcement date. 
Firm Age is the age of the firm, calculated as the difference between the year in 
which the firm was originally formed and the current year. As a proxy for liquidity, 
Turnover is the ratio of the monthly trading volume to the total shares outstanding. 
 
4.5. Results 
     I report my results in this section. First, I report the univariate statistics. Next, I 
examine the relation between large customers and share repurchases. I also 
investigate how the relationship-specific investments affect the relation between 
large customers and the value of share repurchases. In addition, I analyse how the 
presence of large customers affects dividend increases. I show that the signalling 
effect of dividend increases influences the relation between large customers and the 
value of dividend increases.  
4.5.1. The Value of Share Repurchases  
4.5.1.1 Univariate statistics 
     Table 3.1 shows the univariate statistics. The mean of Share Repurchases CAR 
(-1, +1) is 0.0369 and the median is 0.0244. The mean of the variable Large 
Customers is 0.1129, indicating that around 11.29% of the firms in my sample have 
at least one large customer. The mean of the variable Top Large Customer is 0.1694. 
This shows that on average the largest customer of a firm occupies around 17% of 
total sales, which implies the important role of the largest customer, and the mean of 
the variable All Large Customers is 0.2040. The level of share repurchases is 1.43% 
of total assets. 
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4.5.1.2. Univariate analysis on the value of share repurchases 
     Panel A of Table 3.2 shows the univariate analysis on the announcement return 
of share repurchases. I divide the repurchasing firms into two groups based on the 
dummy variable Large Customer. In the table of CAR window from day -1 to day +1, 
Column 1 shows the results for the group of firms with large customers. The mean of 
the announcement return is 0.0287 and the median is 0.0186. Column 2 shows the 
results for the group of firms without large customers. The mean of announcement 
return is 0.0377 and the median is 0.0223. I conduct the mean test and the median 
test for the difference. I find that they are significantly different between the two 
groups. The difference in the mean is -0.0090 (p-value= 0.01) and the difference in 
the median is -0.0037 (p-value=0.05). 
     Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the univariate analysis on the operating performance 
of share repurchases. I divide the share repurchasing firms into two groups based on 
the dummy variable Large Customer. Column 1 shows the results for the group of 
firms with large customers. The mean of operating performance is -0.0125 and the 
median is -0.0080. Column 2 shows the results for the group of firms without large 
customers. The mean of operating performance is 0.0007 and the median is 0.0000. 
I conduct the mean test for the difference and they are significantly different between 
the two groups. The difference in the mean is -0.0132 (p-value=0.04) and the 
difference in the median is -0.0080 (p-value=0.09). The results in Panel B of Table 
3.2 imply that the operating performance of share repurchases is lower for the group 
of firms with large customers. Therefore, the results in Table 3.2 imply that the value 
of share repurchases is lower for the group of firms with large customers. This is 
consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1 that the presence of large customers 
reduces the value of share repurchases through the channel of bargaining position. 
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4.5.1.3. Large customers and the announcement return of share repurchases 
     Table 3.3 shows the regressions on the relation between large customers and the 
announcement return of share repurchases. The dependent variable is CAR (-1, 1) 
in year 0, and the independent variables are Large Customers, Top Large Customer, 
and All Large Customers in year t-1. Column 1 shows the regression when I use 
Large Customers as the measure for large customers. I find that the coefficient of 
Large Customers is -0.010 (p-value = 0.01). This implies that the presence of large 
customers is associated with a 0.10% reduction in the announcement return of share 
repurchases. The coefficient of Top Large Customer is -0.025 (p-value = 0.04), and 
the coefficient of All Large Customers is -0.022 (p-value = 0.03). This implies that the 
announcement return of share repurchases is lower when the purchases made by 
the largest customer or made by all large customers are higher. Therefore, the 
results in Table 3.3 are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1 that the value 
of share repurchases is lower with the presence of large customers. 
4.5.1.4. Large customers and operating performance of share repurchases 
     Table 3.4 reports the relation between the presence of large customers and the 
change in operating performance around the announcement date of share 
repurchases. This is a sample of 8278 repurchase events from 1979 to 2013. The 
dependent variable is Net Change in ROA across all columns. The coefficient of 
Large Customers is -0.014 (p-value = 0.02), which means the presence of large 
customers reduces the operating performance of share repurchases. The coefficient 
of Top Large Customer is -0.052 (p-value = 0.04), and the coefficient of All Large 
Customers is           -0.041 (p-value=0.05). The results imply that the operating 
performance of share repurchases is lower when the purchases made by the largest 
customer and all large customers are higher. Therefore, the results in Table 3.4 are 
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consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 1 that the presence of large customers 
lowers the value of share repurchases through the channel of bargaining position. 
4.5.1.5. Bargaining position and share repurchases 
   To explain the negative impact of large customers on share repurchases, I conduct 
further analysis from the perspective of bargaining position. Following Hui, Klesa, 
and Yeung (2012), I use both firm-level and industry-level proxies of bargaining 
position. First, I use the relative size of customers to the firm as the firm-level proxies 
for the bargaining position of large customers. Relative Size 1 is defined as the ratio 
of the average market value of the customer to the market value of the supplier firm. 
Relative Size 2 is the average market value of firms in the industries that a customer 
belongs to divided by the market value of the supplier firm. Second, I use the 
concentration ratio of customers as industry-level proxies for the bargaining position 
of large customers. Concentration 1 is the average of a firm’s Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index value in the industries that a customer belongs to. Concentration 2 is the 
average of the ratio of the market value of a customer firm to the average market 
value of firms in the industries that a customer belongs to.  
     In Table 3.5, Panel A shows the relation between the bargaining position of large 
customers and the announcement return of share repurchases. The dependent 
variable is CAR (-1, 1) across all columns. In Column 1 and 2, the coefficient of the 
Relative Size 1 is -0.02 (p-value = 0.01), and the coefficient of the Relative Size 2 is   
-0.02 (p-value = 0.01). This indicates that a larger relative size of large customers will 
reduce the announcement return of share repurchases. In Column 3 and 4, the 
coefficient of the Concentration Ratio 1 is -0.011 (p-value = 0.09), and the coefficient 
of Concentration Ratio 2 is -0.001 (p-value = 0.02).  The results indicate that a higher 
level of large customers’ concentration ratio is related to a lower announcement 
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return of share repurchases. Thus, Panel A indicates that the stronger bargaining 
position of large customers reduces the firm’s announcement return of share 
repurchases.   
     Panel B of Table 3.5 shows the relation between the bargaining position of large 
customers and the operating performance of share repurchases. The dependent 
variable is Net Change in ROA across all columns. In Column 1 and 2, the coefficient 
of the Relative Size 1 is -0.02 (p-value = 0.05), and the coefficient of the Relative 
Size 2 is -0.02 (p-value = 0.08). This indicates that a larger relative size of large 
customers will reduce the operating performance of share repurchases. In Columns 
3 and 4, the coefficient of the Concentration Ratio 1 is -0.044 (p-value = 0.05), and 
the coefficient of Concentration Ratio 2 is -0.001 (p-value = 0.07).  The results 
indicate that a higher level of large customers’ concentration ratio is related to a 
lower operating performance of share repurchases. Thus, Panel B indicates that the 
stronger bargaining position of large customers reduces the firm’s operating 
performance of share repurchases.   
     Therefore, the results in Table 3.5 support Hypothesis 1 that the value of share 
repurchases is lower with the presence of large customers through the channel of 
bargaining position.  
4.5.1.6. Heckman two-stage estimation 
As a robustness check, I use the Heckman two-stage estimation to control for the 
self-selection problem. I use the probit model of Table 3.5 as the first stage of the 
Heckman estimation. Panel A of Table 3.6 shows the second stage of the Heckman 
estimation when I include the Inverse Mills Ratio in the regressions of the 
announcement return. In the table of CAR window from day -1 to day 1, I find that 
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the coefficient of Large Customers is -0.010 (p-value = 0.01). The coefficient of the 
Top Large Customer is -0.025 (p-value = 0.04) and the coefficient of All Large 
Customers is -0.022 (p-value = 0.03). They support the findings of Table 3.3 that the 
announcement return of share repurchases is reduced by the presence of large 
customers.  
Panel B of Table 3.6 reports the second stage of the Heckman estimation in the 
regressions about the operating performance of share repurchases. The coefficient 
of Large Customers is -0.013 (p-value = 0.04). The coefficient of Top Large 
Customers is -0.046 (p-value = 0.07) and the coefficient of All Large Customers is -
0.036 (p-value = 0.09). The results are consistent with Table 3.4 that the presence of 
large customers reduces the operating performance of share repurchases. 
     Therefore, after controlling for the self-selection problem, I find consistent results 
in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 that both the announcement returns and the net change 
in operating performance are lower for repurchasing firms with the presence of large 
customers. 
4.5.2. The Value of Dividend Increases 
4.5.2.1. Univariate statistics 
     Table 3.7 shows the univariate statistics. The mean of Dividends CAR (-1, +1) is 
0.0095 and the median is 0.0049. The mean of the variable Large Customers is 
0.0516, indicating that around 5.16% of the firms in my sample have at least one 
large customer. The mean of the variable Top Large Customer is 0.2055. This shows 
that on average the largest customer of a firm occupies around 20.55% of total sales, 
which implies the important role of the largest customer, and the mean of the 




4.5.2.2. Univariate analysis on the value of dividend increases 
     Panel A of Table 3.8 shows the univariate analysis on the announcement return 
of dividend increases. I divide the dividend increasing firms into two groups based on 
the dummy variable Large Customer. In the table of CAR window from day -1 to day 
+1, Column 1 shows the results for the group of firms with large customers. The 
mean of announcement return is 0.0111 and the median is 0.0053. Column 2 shows 
the results for the group of firms without large customers. The mean of 
announcement return is 0.0089 and the median is 0.0049. I conduct the mean test 
and the median test for the difference. I find that they are significantly different 
between the two groups. The difference in the mean is 0.0022 (p-value= 0.02). 
     Panel B of Table 3.8 shows the univariate analysis on the operating performance 
of dividend increases. I divide the dividend increasing firms into two groups based on 
the dummy variable Large Customer. Column 1 shows the results for the group of 
firms with large customer. The mean of announcement return is 0.0157 and the 
median is 0.0014. Column 2 shows the results for the group of firms without large 
customer. The mean of operating performance is 0.0099 and the median is 0.0001. I 
conduct the mean test for the difference and there are significant differecest between 
the two groups. The difference in the mean is 0.0058 (p-value= 0.07). Therefore, the 
results in Table 3.8 imply that the operating performance of dividend increases is 
higher for the group of firms with large customers. This is consistent with the 
prediction of Hypothesis 2 that the presence of large customers increases the value 
of dividend increases through the channel of relationship-specific investments. 
4.5.2.3. Large customers and the announcement return of dividend increases 
     Table 3.9 shows the regressions on the relation between large customers and the 
announcement return of dividend increases. The dependent variable is CAR (-1, 1) 
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in year 0, and the independent variables are Large Customers, Top Large Customer, 
and All Large Customers in year t-1. The coefficient of Large Customers is 0.001 (p-
value = 0.15). The coefficient of Top Large Customer is 0.011 (p-value = 0.01), and 
the coefficient of All Large Customers is 0.010 (p-value = 0.01). This implies that the 
announcement return of dividend increases is increased with the purchases made by 
the largest customer or made by all large customers, although the results are weaker 
for the events of dividends increase. Therefore, the results in Table 3.9 support 
Hypothesis 2 that the value of dividend increases is higher with the presence of large 
customers. The presence of large customers increases the value of dividend 
increases through the channel of relationship-specific investments. 
 4.5.2.4. Relationship-specific investments 
     To examine Hypothesis 2, the presence of large customers increases the value of 
dividend increases through the relationship-specific investments. A dividend 
increasing firm has a higher likelihood of engaging in the relationship-specific 
investments with its customers because of the signalling effect of a lower bankruptcy 
risk. I use Key Customers R&D to measure the level of relationship-specific 
investments. When the level of Key Customers R&D is higher, the probability of 
conducting relationship-specific investments is higher. Therefore, I examine how the 
Key Customers R&D affect the relation between large customers and the value of 
dividend increases. 
     Following Kale and Shahrur (2007), I construct the variable Key Customers R&D 
as the measure of the level of relationship-specific investments. Key Customers R&D 
is defined as the ratio of each customer’s R&D to total assets, multiplied by the 
percentage of a firm’s sales to each customer (See Appendix A4). The Key 
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Customers R&D will be high if the customer with high R&D expenses purchases a 
significant amount of goods or services from the firm. I use the interaction terms 
such as Top Customer * Key Customers R&D to examine the impact of relationship-
specific investments. 
     In Table 3.11, I report how the relationship-specific investments affect the relation 
between large customers and the value of dividend increases. The dependent 
variable is CAR (-1, 1) across all columns. In Column 2, the coefficient of the 
interaction term Top Large Customer * Key Customers R&D is 0.955 (p-value = 0.06). 
I find a similar pattern in Column 3, with the coefficient of the interaction term All 
Large Customers * Key Customers R&D being 0.922 (p-value = 0.03). Although the 
results are weaker for the events of dividend increases, they indicate that when the 
customer firm has a higher level of R&D expenses, the announcement return of 
dividend increases is increased by the amount of purchases made by the largest 
customer and all large customers. 
     Therefore, the results in Table 3.11 imply that the presence of large customers 
increases the value of dividend increases when the customer firm has a higher level 
of R&D expenses. They support Hypothesis 2 that the presence of large customers 
increases the value of dividend increases through the relationship-specific 
investments. 
4.5.2.5. Signalling effect of dividend increases 
     Li et al. (2008, page 674) states that "because dividends imply a firm commitment 
and are also historically tax disadvantaged relative to repurchases, dividends 
constitute a more costly signal and investors should perceive them as having 
stronger information content". It implies that dividend increase signals good 
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information and lower bankruptcy risk. In Andres et al (2013, page 624), they state 
that "The informational role of dividend announcements is more important in smaller 
firms, which are covered by fewer analysts". As fewer analysts have higher forecast 
error, it implies that higher asymmetric information is associated with more important 
signalling role of dividends. It is associated with higher CAR of dividends. Therefore, 
dividend increase signals good information and lower bankruptcy risk and this 
informational role is more important for the firms with higher asymmetric information. 
According to Thomas (2001), firms are expected to have larger forecast errors 
when they have large differences in information asymmetry between managers and 
outsiders. The signalling effect is expected to be higher when a firm has larger 
forecast errors. I collect data about analyst forecasts on firm performance from 
I/E/B/S estimates. I match the forecast data with the data of dividend increases 
events identified from CRSP. The final sample includes 24,893 events of CAR with 
forecast estimates and 12,201 events of operating performance with forecast 
estimates from 1979 to 2013. As a proxy of signalling effects of payout, Forecast 
Error is defined as the absolute difference between the median forecast and actual 
earnings as a percentage of the median forecast. Table 3.12 reports the signalling 
effects of dividend increases on the relation between large customers and the value 
of dividend increases. 
     In Panel A of Table 3.12, I examine whether the signalling effect influences the 
relation between large customers and the announcement return of dividend 
increases. The Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Forecast Error is 0.002 (p-
value=0.03). This is consistent with Andres et al., (2013) that that higher asymmetric 
information is associated with more important signalling role of dividends and it is 
associated with higher announcement returns of dividend increases. The coefficient 
144 
 
for the interaction term Large Customers * Forecast Error is 0.019 (p-value=0.01). It 
implies that the positive relation between signalling effect and the announcement 
returns of dividend increases are more pronounced for the firms with the presence of 
large customers. I obtain similar results when I use Top Large Customer and All 
Large Customers in Column 2 and Column 3. The Column 2 shows that the 
coefficient of Forecast Error is 0.003 (p-value=0.02). The coefficient for the 
interaction term Top Large Customer * Forecast Error is 0.065 (p-value=0.01). The 
Column 3 shows that the coefficient of Forecast Error is 0.003 (p-value=0.03). The 
coefficient for the interaction term All Large Customers * Forecast Error is 0.066 (p-
value=0.01). The results show that the positive relation between signalling effect and 
the announcement returns of dividend increases are more pronounced for the firms 
with the presence of large customers. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 
that dividend increases signal good information and lower bankruptcy risk which 
promote relationship-specific investments, and therefore the presence of large 
customers increase the value of dividends increases. 
     In Panel B of Table 3.12, I examine how the Forecast Error affect the relation 
between large customers and the operating performance of dividend increases. In 
Column 3, the coefficient for the interaction term All Large Customers * Forecast 
Error is 0.171 (p-value=0.09). This means that the positive relation between 
signalling effect and the operating performance of dividend increases are more 
pronounced for the firms with the presence of large customers. I get similar results 
when I use Large Customers and Top Large Customers in Column 1 and Column 2.  
Although the results are weaker for the events of dividend increases, they show that 
that the positive relation between signalling effect and the operating performance of 
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dividend increases are more pronounced for the firms when their large customers 
make higher level of purchases. 
     Therefore, Table 3.12 supports Hypothesis 2 that dividend increases signal good 
information and lower bankruptcy risk which promote relationship-specific 
investments, and therefore the presence of large customers increases the value of 
dividends increases.  
 
4.5.2.6. Heckman two-stage estimation 
As robustness check, I use the Heckman two-stage estimation to control for the 
self-selection problem. I use the probit model of Table 3.15 as the first stage of the 
Heckman estimation. Panel A of Table 3.13 shows the second stage of the Heckman 
estimation when I include the Inverse Mills Ratio in the regressions of the 
announcement return. In the table of CAR window from day -1 to day 1, I find that 
the coefficient of Top Large Customer is 0.009 (p-value = 0.02) and the coefficient of 
All Large Customers is 0.009 (p-value = 0.01). Although the results are weaker for 
the events of dividends increase, they support my Table 3.13 that the announcement 
return of dividend increases is increased by the presence of large customers.  
Panel B of Table 3.13 reports the second stage of the Heckman estimation in the 
regressions about the operating performance of dividend increases. The coefficient 
of Large Customers is 0.005 (p-value = 0.10). The coefficient of Top Large 
Customers is 0.022 (p-value = 0.10) and the coefficient of All Large Customers is 
0.020 (p-value = 0.10). Although the results are weaker for the events of dividends 
increase, they are consistent with Table 3.10 that the presence of large customers 
increases the operating performance of dividend increases. 
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     Therefore, after controlling the self-selection problem, I find consistent results in 
Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 that both the announcement returns and the net change in 
operating performance are higher for dividend increasing firms with the presence of 
large customers. 
4.5.3. Different Value Consequences of Share Repurchases and Dividend 
Increases 
     I conclude that the presence of large customers has a different value 
consequence between share repurchases and dividends as two forms of corporate 
payout policy through the channels of bargaining position and relationship-specific 
investments.  
4.5.4. Large Customers and the Selection between Share Repurchases and 
Dividend Increases 
     Furthermore, I analyse the relation between the presence of large customers and 
the managers’ choice on the payout methods. Managers make decisions on the 
payout methods because share repurchases and dividend increases have different 
effects on the firms. For example, firms choose dividend payout to distribute 
relatively permanent cash and choose share repurchases to distribute temporary 
cash (Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach, 2000; Lee 
and Suh, 2011; Haw, Ho, Hu, and Zhang, 2011). The financial flexibility of a firm can 
be adjusted by making choices between dividends and share repurchases. 
Repurchasing firms have much more volatile cash flows and distributions than 
dividend-paying firms (Bonaimé, Hankins and Harford, 2013). Kahle (2002) shows 
that firms with a higher leverage ratio are more likely to increase dividends rather 
than repurchase shares, because firms with a dividend payout have more stable 
cash flows and therefore take on more debt. Therefore, I examine how the presence 
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of large customers affects the managers’ choice on the payout methods between 
share repurchases and dividend increases. 
     Table 3.14 shows the probit regression of share repurchases. Share 
Repurchases is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm repurchases shares 
and equals zero otherwise. This is a sample of 8,042 repurchase events and 78,122 
non-repurchase events from 1979 to 2013. I find that the coefficient of Large 
Customers is 0.189 (p-value=0.01). This means that the presence of large customers 
increases the likelihood that firms repurchase shares. The coefficient of Top Large 
Customer is 0.424 (p-value=0.01) and the coefficient of All Large Customers is 0.393 
(p-value=0.01). The results imply that the probability of share repurchases is higher 
when the purchases made by the largest customer and all large customers are 
higher.  
     Table 3.15 shows the probit regression of dividend increases. This is a sample of 
34,919 events of dividend increases and 30,395 events of no dividend increases 
from 1979 to 2013. Dividend Increases is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
firm increases dividends and equals zero otherwise. I find that the coefficient of 
Large Customers is -0.305 (p-value=0.01). This means that the presence of large 
customers reduces the likelihood that firms increase dividends. The coefficient of 
Top Large Customer is -1.596 (p-value=0.01) and the coefficient of All Large 
Customers is -1.412 (p-value=0.01). The results imply that the probability of dividend 
increases is lower when the purchases made by the largest customer and all large 
customers are higher.  
     In summary, the results of Table 3.14 and Table 3.15 indicate that the presence 
of large customers increases the probability of repurchasing shares and decreases 
the probability of increasing dividends. First, firms with large customers will have 
148 
 
higher risks, and they may put more effort into signalling their good future prospect 
by using share repurchases. Second, when large customers stop purchasing, then 
the firm will have a substantial reduction in cash flow so that they do not want to use 
dividend increases, which require more steady cash flow. Therefore, given the higher 
level of risks associated with large customers, firms with the presence of large 
customers are more likely to repurchase shares rather than to increase dividends. 
4.5.5. Large Customers and the Level of Total Payout 
     Table 3.16 shows the relation between the presence of large customers and the 
level of total payout. The dependent variable is Total Payout which is defined as the 
sum of the amount of share repurchases and dividends. I find that the coefficient of 
Large Customers is -0.002 (p-value=0.01). This means that the presence of large 
customers reduces the level of total payout. The coefficient of Top Large Customer 
is -0.007 (p-value=0.01) and the coefficient of All Large Customers is -0.005 (p-
value=0.01). The results imply that the level of total payout is lower when the 
purchases made by the largest customer and all large customers are higher. 
Therefore, the results of Table 3.16 are consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 1 
that the presence of large customers reduces the level of total payout through the 
channel of the bargaining position. 
 
4.6. Robustness Check 
     I report the robustness check in this section. 
4.6.1. Large Customers and the Level of Share Repurchases  
     Table 3.17 shows the relation between the presence of large customers and the 
level of share repurchases. The dependent variable is Share Repurchases which is 
defined as the amount of share repurchases to total assets. I find that the coefficient 
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of Large Customers is -0.001 (p-value=0.08). This means that the presence of large 
customers reduces the level of share repurchases. The coefficient of Top Large 
Customer is -0.006 (p-value=0.01) and the coefficient of All Large Customers is -
0.004 (p-value=0.01). The results imply that the level of share repurchases is lower 
when the purchases made by the largest customer and all large customers are 
higher. Therefore, the results of Table 3.6 are consistent with the prediction of 
Hypothesis 1 that the presence of large customers reduces the level of share 
repurchases through the channel of the bargaining position. 
4.6.2. Large Customers and the Level of Dividends   
     Table 3.18 shows the relation between the presence of large customers and the 
level of dividends. The dependent variable is Dividends which is defined as the 
amount of dividends to total assets. I find that the coefficient of Large Customers is -
0.003 (p-value=0.01). This means that the presence of large customers reduces the 
level of dividends. The coefficient of Top Large Customer is -0.014 (p-value=0.01) 
and the coefficient of All Large Customers is -0.006 (p-value=0.07). The results imply 
that the level of dividends is lower when the purchases made by the largest 
customer and all large customers are higher. Therefore, Table 3.14 supports the 
prediction of Hypothesis 1 that the presence of large customers reduces the level of 
dividends through the channel of relationship-specific investments. 
4.6.3. Alternative Measures for the Level of Dividends  
     I use alternative proxies for the level of dividends to do the robustness check for 
the negative impact of large customers on the level of dividends. DIV/ME and DIV/NI 
are the two new measures of dividend increases. DIV/ME is defined as the amount 
of dividends to market value of equity. DIV/NI is defined as the amount of dividends 
to net income. 
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     In Panel A of Table 3.19, the dependent variable is DIV/ME. The coefficients for 
the proxy variables of large customers are negative and significant. In Panel B of 
Table 3.19, the dependent variable is DIV/NI. The coefficients for the proxy variables 
of large customers are negative and significant. Both the results of Panel A and 
Panel B are consistent with Table 3.14 that the presence of large customers reduces 
the level of dividends.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
     I examine whether large customers affect corporate payout policy. I develop two 
hypotheses based on bargaining position and the relationship-specific investments. 
In terms of share repurchases, I find that both the cumulative abnormal return and 
the net change in operating performance around the announcement of share 
repurchases are lower with the presence of large customers. I also analyse the 
impact of large customers’ bargaining position on the value of share repurchases. 
The results imply that the presence of large customers reduces the value of share 
repurchases through the perspective of bargaining position. In terms of dividends, I 
find that both the cumulative abnormal return and the net change in operating 
performance around the announcement of increase in dividends are higher with the 
presence of large customers. Also, I examine how the relationship-specific 
investments and the signalling effect of dividend increases affect the value of firms 
with the presence of large customers. The results suggest that the presence of large 
customers increases the value of dividend increases through the perspective of 
relationship-specific investments. Moreover, given the higher level of risks 
associated with large customers, firms with the presence of large customers are 
more likely to repurchase shares rather than to increase dividends. Finally, I find a 
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negative impact of large customers on the level of total payout through the channel 
of bargaining position. I conclude that the presence of large customers has a 
different value consequence between share repurchases and dividends as two forms 
of corporate payout policy either through the channel of bargaining position or the 
channel of relationship-specific investments.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
5.1. Findings and Implications 
     I investigate how the firm diversification affect the value of large customers and 
large suppliers. I also analyse the effect of large customers on the corporate payout 
policy.  
     In Chapter Two, I examine how firm diversification affects the value of large 
customers for shareholders. I develop three hypotheses based on risk reduction, 
relationship-specific investments, and bargaining position. I use the excess value as 
a measure of firm value, and find that the value of large customers for shareholders 
is lower in diversified firms than single-segment firms. More specifically, I find that 
the presence of large customers is associated with a reduction in the Excess Value 
when there is diversity in the investment opportunities across segments in a 
diversified firm, and that such reduction in excess value is larger when there is a 
higher diversity. Moreover, I examine the setting of a tariff cut which brings an 
exogenous change in the competitive environment, and find that a reduction in the 
level of large customers is associated with a decrease (an increase) in the value of 
single-segment firms (diversified firms). Furthermore, I find that both the 
announcement returns and the net change in ROA for diversifying M&As are lower 
with the presence of large customers. I conclude that the results support the 
hypothesis that the value of large customers for shareholders is lower in diversified 
firms than single-segment firms through the perspective of bargaining position. 
     Chapter Three examines the relation between firm diversification and the value of 
large suppliers for shareholders, and find that the value of large suppliers for 
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shareholders is higher in diversified firms. I find robust results to support Hypothesis 
2 about the relationship-specific investments that the presence of large suppliers is 
positively valued by shareholders in diversified firms with relationship-specific 
investments. In addition, I analyse the impact of tariff cut on the competitive 
environment find that that a reduction in the ratio of the purchases made by all 
suppliers is associated with a decrease in excess value of diversified firms. In the 
event study of M&As, I find that the presence of large suppliers increases both the 
announcement return and the operating performance of a diversifying M&A. I 
conclude that the results support my hypothesis that the value of large suppliers for 
shareholders is higher in diversified firms through the perspective of relationship-
specific investments. 
      Finally, in Chapter Four, I examine whether large customers affect corporate 
payout policy. In terms of share repurchases, I find that both the cumulative 
abnormal return and the net change in operating performance around the 
announcement of share repurchases are lower with the presence of large customers. 
I also analyse the impact of large customers’ bargaining position on the value of 
share repurchases. The results imply that the presence of a large customer reduces 
the value of share repurchases through the perspective of bargaining position. In 
terms of dividends, I find that both the cumulative abnormal return and the net 
change in operating performance around the announcement of increase in dividends 
are higher with the presence of large customers. Also, I examine how the 
relationship-specific investments and the signalling effect of dividend increases affect 
the value of firms with the presence of large customers. The results suggest that the 
presence of a large customer increases the value of dividend increases through the 
perspective of relationship-specific investments. Moreover, given the higher level of 
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risks associated with large customers, firms with the presence of large customers 
are more likely to repurchase share rather than to increase dividends. Finally, I find a 
negative impact of large customers on the level of total payout through the channel 
of bargaining position. I conclude that the presence of large customers has a 
different value consequence between share repurchases and dividends as two forms 
of corporate payout policy either through the channel of bargaining position or the 
channel of relationship-specific investments. 
5.2. Limitations 
     While extensive empirical analyses have been conducted in the thesis, some 
limitations still exist due to the following reasons.  
     First, Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) No.14 sets a threshold at the 
level of 10% of total annual sales for the mandatory reporting of large customers. 
This implies that a firm with a maximum of 9.9% sales to its largest customer can be 
treated in the same way as a firm with a maximum of 1% sales to its largest 
customer in the empirical analysis if both firms choose not to report their large 
customers. This means that I cannot fully differentiate the impact of relatively large 
customers to the firms below the 10% threshold. Moreover, since I use the data of 
sales to large customers to construct the measure about large suppliers, a similar 
reasoning of the limitation applies to large suppliers too. 
     Second, since I do not have the data about the specific contract terms between 
customers and suppliers, this represents another limitation for the empirical analysis 
that I can conduct. For example, while the price of the sales to large customers (or 
the price for the purchases from large suppliers) is more directly related to the 
bargaining position, I do not have such data and therefore, I can only examine the 
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bargaining position from other less direct perspectives such as trade credit. 
Moreover, the contract terms between customers and suppliers may specify the 
duration of the relationship, the amount of relationship-specific investments, and so 
on. Since I do not have these data that are important for us to examine the 
customer-supplier relationship more accurately, this limits the extent of the empirical 
analysis that I can conduct. 
     Third, while I measure large suppliers as the ratios of the purchase made by a 
firm from its suppliers to the firm’s cost of goods sold, this does not fully take into 
account the specificity of products or the expertise of large suppliers. More 
specialised products and higher expertise of large suppliers will result in a higher 
bargaining position of large suppliers. For example, the specificity of products and 
the expertise of large suppliers are positively associated with the degree of the hold-
up problem. However, since I do not have more detailed data about the specificity of 
products or the expertise of large suppliers, this represents another limitation of my 
study. 
5.3. Further Research 
     First, this thesis has discussed the effects of firm diversification on the value of 
large customers and large suppliers. Firm diversification and firm refocusing are the 
two main activities in which firms engage during their life cycle. Berger and Ofek 
(1999) find that a firm refocusing significantly enhances shareholder wealth. The 
cumulative abnormal returns around the refocusing-related announcement is 
approximately 7.3%. Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1996) find that firms remove 
unrelated businesses through cross-industry spinoffs and managers can focus on 
the operation of core business. This results in a significant value creation around the 
announcement of cross-industry spinoffs. Therefore, I could examine how the 
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corporate refocusing or spinoff is affected by the presence of large customers and 
large suppliers.  
     Second, this thesis finds the association between large customers and corporate 
payout policy. I can also examine what is the value consequence of payout policy in 
the firms with the presence of large suppliers. In addition, I can analyse the effects of 
large customers on firms’ payout policy in different stages of firms including start-up, 
growth, mature and so on. I can further analyse if large customers have different 
effects on cash dividends and stock dividends. 
     Third, while I have used US data in the thesis, I can extend the analysis to 
international data because large customers and/or large suppliers are prevalent in 
other countries in the world. For example, Carillion plc was one of the largest British 
firms in the facilities management industry. The firm had strong power over its 
suppliers to dictate payment arrangements. A few years ago, Carillion was able to 
double its payment periods to its suppliers to 120 days (Plimmer, 2018). However, 
Carillion collapsed in January 2018, which resulted in a devastating impact on their 
suppliers. Some suppliers went bankrupt due to the money owned by Carillion. 
Therefore, I can extend the analysis on the value consequence of firms with the 




Table 1.1. Univariate Statistics 
This table shows univariate statistics. I use a sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 110084 
firm-year observations. Panel A shows the univariate statistics. Excess Value is calculated based on 
the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s 
actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its 
segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry 
median ratio of capital to sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm 
has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Large Customer is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. 
Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales 
of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total 
sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. 
CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts 













 Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
Excess Value -0.0232 -0.0356 -0.4289 0.3592 0.6615 
Firm Diversification 0.3132 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4638 
Large Customer 0.0977 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2969 
Top Large Customer (subsample) 0.1933 0.1500 0.1087 0.2300 0.1518 
All Large Customers (subsample) 0.2302 0.1700 0.1100 0.2987 0.1790 
Size 19.3155 19.0869 17.9221 20.4982 1.8249 
EBIT/SALES 0.0581 0.0691 0.0218 0.1255 0.1723 
CAPX/SALES 0.0838 0.0403 0.0196 0.0840 0.1328 
Leverage 0.1916 0.1531 0.0177 0.3013 0.1883 
 Excess Value 
 Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
Diversified firms -0.0923 -0.1007 -0.4376 0.2501 0.5808 
Single-segment firms 0.0083 0.0000 -0.4237 0.4160 0.6929 
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Table 1.2. Univariate Analysis of Excess Value for Diversified Firms 
 
This table shows univariate analysis of excess value for diversified firm. I use a sample of 4765 
diversified firms from 1976 to 2013 with 34481 firm-year observations. Excess value is calculated 
based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of 
its segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its 
industry median ratio of capital to sales. Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a 
firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. I conduct the mean test and the 




 Excess Value 
Sub-sample: Diversified Firms 
  
 With Large Customers Without Large Customers Difference P-value 
Mean -0.1445 -0.0807 -0.0638 0.01 







Table 1.3. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large Customers 
 
This table shows the relation between firm diversification and the value of large customers. I use a 
sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 110084 firm-year observations. Excess value is 
calculated based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the 
imputed values of its segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales 
multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable 
which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero 
otherwise. Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large 
customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the 
top large customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases 
made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of Capital expenditure to total 
sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. 
P-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Excess Value 
Intercept -7.699 -7.712 -7.709 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.103 -0.101 -0.102 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.022   
 (0.01)   
Firm Diversification* Large Customers -0.086   
 (0.01)   












All Large Customers 
 
 0.127 
   (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Customers   -0.331 
   (0.01) 
Size 1.168 1.169 1.169 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 0.061 0.062 0.062 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.286 0.285 0.285 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.272 -0.272 -0.272 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.033 -0.034 -0.033 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.120 0.120 0.120 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.196 -0.196 -0.196 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.045 -0.043 -0.043 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.428 0.427 0.428 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.154 -0.153 -0.153 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 110084 




Table 1.4. Diversity and Unrelatedness 
 
This table shows how diversity and unrelatedness affect the relation between firm diversification and 
the value of large customers. I use a sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 110084 firm-year 
observations. Excess value is calculated based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the 
imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments with each segment’s imputed value 
equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with different 
SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. In Panel A, Diversity is the ratio of the standard deviation of 
segment asset-weighted q to the equally-weighted average q across segments. Large Customer is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. 
Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the top large customer to the total sales of 
the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total 
sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. 
CAPX/SALES is the ratio of Capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts 
to assets. In Panel B, Unrelatedness is a dummy variable which equals one if the segments of a 
diversified firm do not operate in the same industries, and equals zero otherwise. I cluster the standard 





Table 1.4. (Continued) 
  Panel A: Diversity 
 Excess Value 
Intercept -6.390 -6.400 -6.398 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.095 -0.094 -0.094 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.023   
 (0.01)   
Firm Diversification * Large Customers -0.063   
 (0.01)   
Firm Diversification * Large Customers * Diversity -0.179    
(0.02)   
Top Large Customer  0.162  
  (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Large Customer  -0.322  
  (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Large Customer * Diversity  -0.798  
  (0.05)  
All Large Customers   0.116 
   (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Customers   -0.242 
   (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Customers * Diversity   -0.795 
   (0.03) 
Size 0.992 0.992 0.992 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 1.545 1.543 1.544 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.303 0.302 0.302 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.183 -0.183 -0.183 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.643 -0.641 -0.642 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.058 0.058 0.058 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Size t-2 -0.234 -0.234 -0.234 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.114 -0.112 -0.113 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.277 0.277 0.277 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.129 -0.128 -0.128 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 110084 





Table 1.4. (Continued) 
 
  Panel B: Unrelatedness 
 Excess Value 
Intercept -7.700 -7.712 -7.709 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.101 -0.101 -0.102 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.023   
 (0.01)   
Firm Diversification * Large Customers -0.065   
 (0.01)   
Firm Diversification * Large Customers * Unrelatedness -0.008    
(0.72)   
Top Large Customer  0.180  
  (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Large Customer  -0.486  
  (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Large Customer * Unrelatedness  0.072  
  (0.57)  
All Large Customers   0.127 
   (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Customers   -0.344 
   (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Customers * Unrelatedness   0.016 
   (0.88) 
Size 1.168 1.169 1.169 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 0.061 0.063 0.062 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.286 0.285 0.285 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.272 -0.272 -0.272 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.033 -0.034 -0.033 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.120 0.120 0.120 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.196 -0.196 -0.196 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.044 -0.043 -0.043 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.428 0.428 0.428 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.153 -0.153 -0.153 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 110084 





Table 1.5. Large Customers and Segment-level Resource Transfer 
 
This table shows the relation between large customers and segment-level resource transfer. I use a sample of 3581 
diversified firms from 1976 to 2013 with 75031 segment-year observations. Segment-level Resource Transfer is the 
difference between the industry-adjusted investment in a segment and the weighted average industry-adjusted investments 
across all the segments of a firm (see text for details). Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a segment 
has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Weak Investment Opportunities is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the segment q is below the firm’s average q, and equals zero otherwise. Weak Resource-weighted 
Investment Opportunities is a dummy variable which equals one if the resources-weighted segment q is below the firm’s 
resources-weighted average q, and equals zero otherwise, where the resources are measured by the segment’s beginning-
of-year share of total sales. Weak Investment Opportunities and Weak Resource-weighted Investment Opportunities is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a segment has both Weak Investment Opportunities and Weak Resource-weighted 
Investment Opportunities, and equals zero otherwise. Inverse of Average Investment Opportunities equals one divided by 
the equally-weighted average q across segments. Diversity is the ratio of the standard deviation of segment asset-weighted 
q to the equally-weighted average q across segments. Firm Size is the logarithm of total sales. I cluster the standard errors 





Intercept -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) 
Weak Investment Opportunities -0.001   
  (0.34)   
Large Customers * Weak Investment Opportunities 0.004   
 (0.01)   
Weak Resource-weighted Investment Opportunities  -0.001  
   (0.01)  
Large Customers * Weak Resource-weighted Investment Opportunities  0.003  
  (0.05)  
Weak Investment Opportunities and Weak Resource-weighted Investment Opportunities   -0.001 
   (0.01) 
Large Customers * Weak Investment Opportunities and Weak Resource-weighted Investment 
Opportunities 
  0.007 
   (0.01) 
Inverse of Average Investment Opportunities -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversity -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 75031 75031 75031 





Table 1.6. Trade Credit 
 
This table shows the trade credit based on supplier-customer pairs (i.e., sales of a supplier to specific 
customers). I use a sample of 3309 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 18780 firm-year observations. Panel A 
shows the relation between large customers and suppliers’ accounts receivable. Supplier’s Accounts 
Receivable is calculated as log (1+(supplier’s accounts receivable)*(fraction of supplier’s overall sales to 
the customer)). Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two 
segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Large Customer is a dummy variable 
which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large 
Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the top large customer to the total sales of the firm. All 
Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. 
Size is the logarithm of sales. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of 
equity, divided by the assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Corporate Cash Holdings 
is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to assets. Panel B shows the relation between 
large customers and customers’ accounts payable. Customer’s Accounts Payable is calculated as (1+ 
(customer firm’s accounts payable) * (supplier’s sales to the customer/customer’s overall costs of goods 
sold)). P-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Supplier’s Accounts Receivable 
 Supplier’s Accounts Receivable 
Intercept -10.020 -9.921 -9.640 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.179 -0.458 -0.329 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.804   
 (0.01)   
Firm Diversification * Large Customers 0.049   
 (0.07)   
Top Large Customer  1.886  
  (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Large Customer  1.657  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   1.191 
   (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Customers   0.551 
   (0.01) 
Size 0.620 0.634 0.620 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.013 0.002 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.65) (0.34) 
Leverage -0.813 -0.955 -0.885 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Corporate Cash Holdings -1.478 -1.589 -1.548 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.597 -0.596 -0.576 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -1.430 -1.983 -1.898 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 18780 18780 18780 





 Table 1.6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Customer’s Accounts Payable 
 Customer’s Accounts Payable 
Intercept -9.913 -9.961 -9.728 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.188 -0.418 -0.257 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.741   
 (0.01)   
Firm Diversification * Large Customers 0.089   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  2.095  
  (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Large Customer  1.618  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   1.479 
   (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Customers   0.397 
   (0.01) 
Size 0.603 0.619 0.606 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.018 0.008 0.011 
 (0.01) (0.20) (0.10) 
Leverage -0.627 -0.744 -0.690 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Corporate Cash Holdings -0.917 -1.047 -1.023 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.402 -0.405 -0.383 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -1.506 -1.937 -1.812 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 18780 18780 18780 





Table 1.7. The Setting of Tariff Cut: First-Stage Regressions 
This table shows the relation between a tariff cut and the change in large customers. I use a sample of 
2913 firms in the manufacturing industries from 1976 to 2005 with 22301 firm-year observations. ∆X 
indicates the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t+1. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the 
purchases made by the top large customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio 
of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable 
which equals one if the percentage reduction of tariff in the industry of the segment that a large customer 
belongs to is 2 times higher than its industry median percentage change, and equals zero otherwise. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with different 
SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of 
EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of Capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debts to assets. The variable S&P is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm is part of 
the S&P index and equals 0 otherwise. PNDIV is the fraction of all firms in the industry that are diversified 
firms. PSDIV is the fraction of industry sales accounted for by diversified firms. GDP Growth is the growth 
rate in real GDP. Contraction is the number of months in a year when the economy was in recession. 
A_TA, A_EBIT, and A_CAPX are the average values of the variables Size, EBIT/SALES, and 
CAPX/SALES in the previous three years. MAJOREX is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is 
listed on the NASDAQ, NYSE, or AMEX, and equals zero otherwise. FOREIGN is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm is incorporated outside the United States and equals zero otherwise. I cluster the 




Table 1.7 (Continued) 
 ∆ Top Large  
Customer 




Intercept 0.027 0.070 Intercept -5.116 
  (0.37) (0.14)   (0.01) 
Tariff Cut -0.003 -0.004 Size 0.003 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.94) 
Size -0.009 -0.014 EBIT/SALES 0.018 
 (0.01) (0.02)   (0.88) 
EBIT/SALES 0.008 -0.002 CAPX/SALES -0.922 
 (0.23) (0.88)   (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.014 0.020 Size t-1 -0.190 
 (0.20) (0.32)   (0.01) 
Size t-1 0.006 0.006 EBIT/SALES t-1 0.149 
 (0.05) (0.27)   (0.40) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 0.003 0.009 CAPX/SALES t-1 0.023 
 (0.74) (0.56)   (0.94) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 -0.013 -0.020 Size t-2 -0.353 
 (0.23) (0.31)   (0.01) 
Size t-2 0.000 0.001 EBIT/SALES t-2 0.356 
 (0.92) (0.78)   (0.07) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.006 -0.010 CAPX/SALES t-2 -0.100 
 (0.26) (0.35)   (0.77) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 -0.009 -0.015 S&P 0.106 
 (0.37) (0.40)   (0.01) 
Leverage 0.001 0.002 PNDIV 2.776 
 (0.54) (0.68)  (0.01) 
Size Squared 0.001 0.001 PSDIV 0.203 
 (0.26) (0.08)  (0.01) 
   GDP Growth 0.015 
    (0.01) 
   GDP Growth t-1 0.016 
    (0.01) 
   Contraction 0.019 
    (0.01) 
   Contraction t-1 0.019 
    (0.01) 
   A_AT 0.733 
    (0.01) 
   A_EBIT -0.578 
    (0.03) 
   A_CAPX -1.920 
    (0.01) 
   MAJOREX -0.043 
    (0.07) 
   Foreign -0.325 
    (0.01) 
Number of Observations 22301 22301 Number of Observations 22301 





Table 1.8. The Setting of Tariff Cut: Second-Stage Regressions 
This table shows how a tariff cut affects the relation between firm diversification and the value of large 
customers. I use a sample of 2913 firms from 1976 to 2005 with 22301 firm-year observations. ∆X indicates 
the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t+1. Excess value is calculated based on the method in 
Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its 
imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments with each 
segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to 
sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with 
different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
percentage reduction of tariff in the industry of the segment that a large customer belongs to is 2 times 
higher than its industry median percentage change, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the 
ratio of the purchase made by the top large customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is 
the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of 
total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure 
to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. This table reports the regressions using 
the instrumental variables approach. I follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and use the estimated probability of 
diversification from the probit model reported in Table 1.7 as a generated instrument for the diversification 
status (see text for details). I also use the Change in Top Large Customer and Change in All Large 
Customers from the first stage reported in Table 1.7 as the generated instruments for the presence of large 
customers (see text for details). I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. P-value is noted in the 
parentheses.  
 
 ∆ Excess Value 
Intercept -0.195 -0.339 
 (0.37) (0.14) 
Firm Diversification 0.052 0.045 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆ Top Large Customer 7.265  
 (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * ∆ Top Large Customer -17.759  
 (0.01)  
∆ All Large Customers  6.190 
  (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * ∆ All Large Customers  -10.813 
  (0.02) 
Size 0.346 0.380 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES -0.091 -0.066 
 (0.06) (0.18) 
CAPX/SALES 0.265 0.283 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.653 -0.674 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 0.022 -0.007 
 (0.63) (0.88) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 -0.075 -0.117 
 (0.28) (0.08) 
Size t-2 0.323 0.327 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 0.084 0.099 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 -0.213 -0.189 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.012 0.005 
 (0.40) (0.74) 
Size Squared -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.39) (0.13) 
Number of Observations 22301 22301 




Table 1.9. Univariate Statistics for the Sample of M&As 
 
This table shows the univariate statistics for the sample of M&As. I use a sample of 7282 M&As from 1979 
to 2013. CAR (-1, 1) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 1) around the announcement date and 
is calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return (see text 
for details). ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA 
is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA 
from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching (see text for details). 
Diversifying M&As is a dummy variable that equals one if both conditions are met: (1) the acquirer’s main 
two-digit SIC code is different from the target’s main two-digit SIC code, and (2) the acquirer’s Herfindahl 
index calculated based on segment sales at year t+1 is smaller than the acquirer’s Herfindahl index 
calculated based on segment sales at year t-1, and equals zero otherwise. Presence of Large Customers is 
a dummy variable that equals one if there exists at least one large customer in the combined firm after 
M&As, and equals zero otherwise. Unfriendly is a dummy variable that equals one if an M&A takes place in 
an unfriendly way, and equals zero otherwise. Private Target is a dummy variable if the target is a private 
firm, and equals zero otherwise. Cash Payment is a dummy variable that equals one if the method of 
payment is cash for a deal, and equals zero otherwise. Deal Value is the ratio of the deal value to the 
market capitalization of the acquirer. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market value of equity 
plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the 
percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the 
ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years.  
 
 Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
CAR (-1, 1) 0.0069 0.0026 -0.0260 0.0352 0.0700 
Net ∆ROA 0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0634 0.0619 0.1734 
Diversifying M&As 0.1313 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3377 
Presence of Large Customers 0.1633 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3696 
Unfriendly 0.0147 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1203 
Private Target 0.7172 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4504 
Cash Payment 0.2347 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4238 
Deal Value 4.2606 0.0351 0.0000 0.1574 344.0805 
Size 19.6924 19.5809 18.3133 20.9188 1.8987 
M / B 2.5720 1.7744 1.2643 2.8743 2.2396 
Capital Expenditure 0.0625 0.0454 0.0238 0.0788 0.0648 
R&D 0.0670 0.0082 0.0000 0.0883 0.1303 
Dividends 0.0119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0137 0.0247 
Leverage 0.1601 0.1192 0.0067 0.2635 0.1658 
Cash Flow 0.0334 0.0566 0.0227 0.0945 0.1672 
Tangibility 0.4302 0.3441 0.1701 0.6003 0.3270 
Sales Growth 0.4127 0.1760 0.0506 0.4357 0.8514 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0812 0.0331 0.0161 0.0801 0.1356 
ROA t-1 0.0920 0.1024 0.0548 0.1557 0.1314 





Table 1.10. Large Customers and the Announcement Returns of M&As 
This table shows the relation between announcement returns and the presence of large customers. I use a sample of 7282 
M&As from 1979 to 2013. CAR (-1, 1) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 1) around the announcement date 
and is calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return (see text for details). 
Diversifying M&As is a dummy variable that equals one if both conditions are met: (1) the acquirer’s main two-digit SIC 
code is different from the target’s main two-digit SIC code, and (2) the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based on 
segment sales at year t+1 is smaller than the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based on segment sales at year t-1, 
and equals zero otherwise. Presence of Large Customers is a dummy variable that equals one if there exists at least one 
large customer in the combined firm after M&As, and equals zero otherwise. Unfriendly is a dummy variable that equals 
one if an M&A takes place in an unfriendly way, and equals zero otherwise. Private Target is a dummy variable if the target 
is a private firm, and equals zero otherwise. Cash Payment is a dummy variable that equals one if the method of payment 
is cash for a deal, and equals zero otherwise. Deal Value is the ratio of deal value to the market capitalization of acquirer. 
Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided 
by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Dividends is  
the ratio of dividends to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the 
percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based the estimates of a probit 
model, in which the dependent variable is Diversifying M&As and the independent variables are the same as the 
independent variables as reported in Column 3 of Table 1.7. P-value is noted in the parentheses. 
        CAR (-1, 1) 
Intercept 0.064 0.039 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversifying M&As 0.001 0.001 
 (0.97) (0.62) 
Presence of Large Customers 0.008 0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversifying M&As * Presence of Large Customers -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.08) (0.07) 
Unfriendly 0.011 0.012 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Private Target 0.015 0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Payment 0.011 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Deal Value -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.80) (0.84) 
Size -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.23) (0.07) 
Capital Expenditure -0.046 -0.055 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D -0.035 -0.037 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -0.071 -0.060 
 (0.04) (0.08) 
Leverage 0.006 0.006 
 (0.26) (0.32) 
Cash Flow -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Tangibility 0.012 0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.93) (0.45) 
Cash Flow Volatility -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.72) (0.54) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.051 
  (0.01) 
Number of Observations 7282 7282 
Adjusted R Squared 0.03 0.04 
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Table 1.11. Large Customers and the Operating Performance for M&As 
This table shows the relation between the operating performance and the presence of large customers. I use a sample of 
6879 M&As from 1979 to 2013. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net 
∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from 
year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching (see text for details). Diversifying M&As 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based on segment sales at year t+1 is 
smaller than the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based on segment sales at year t-1, and equals zero otherwise. 
Presence of Large Customers is a dummy variable that equals one if there exists at least one large customer in the 
combined firm after M&As, and equals zero otherwise. Unfriendly is a dummy variable that equals one if an M&A takes 
place in an unfriendly way, and equals zero otherwise. Private Target is a dummy variable if the target is a private firm, 
and equals zero otherwise. Cash Payment is a dummy variable that equals one if the method of payment is cash for a 
deal, and equals zero otherwise. Deal Value is the ratio of the deal value to the market capitalization of the acquirer. Size 
is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Dividends is 
the ratio of dividends to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the 
percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based the estimates of a probit 
model, in which the dependent variable is Diversifying M&As and the independent variables are the same as the 
independent variables as reported in Column 3 of Table 1.7. P-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 Net ROA Change 
Intercept -0.225 -0.151 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversifying M&As -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.91) (0.76) 
Presence of Large Customers 0.006 0.006 
 (0.33) (0.35) 
Diversifying M&As *Presence of Large Customers -0.030 -0.029 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
Unfriendly -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.39) (0.42) 
Private Target 0.012 0.011 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Cash Payment 0.014 0.014 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Deal Value -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Size 0.013 0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.001 0.005 
 (0.18) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.044 -0.105 
 (0.24) (0.02) 
R&D -0.131 -0.104 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -0.123 -0.170 
 (0.17) (0.06) 
leverage -0.293 -0.009 
 (0.01) (0.55) 
Tangibility -0.225 0.020 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Sales Growth -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.91) (0.19) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.006 -0.146 
 (0.33) (0.01) 
ROA t-1 -0.030 -0.355 
 (0.07) (0.01) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.046 
  (0.20) 
Number of Observations 6879 6879 
Adjusted R Squared 0.05 0.06 
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Table 1.12. Probit Regression 
This table shows the probit regression. I use a sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 110084 
firm-year observations. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least 
two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total 
assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure 
to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. The variable S&P is a dummy 
variable that equals one when the firm is part of the S&P index and equals 0 otherwise. PNDIV is the 
fraction of all firms in the industry that are diversified firms, PSDIV is the fraction of industry sales 
accounted for by diversified firms. GDP Growth is the growth rate in real GDP. Contraction is the 
number of months in a year when the economy was in recession. A_TA, A_EBIT, and A_CAPX are 
the average values of the variables Size, EBIT/SALES, and CAPX/SALES in the previous three years. 
MAJOREX is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is listed on NASDAQ, NYSE, or AMEX, and 
equals zero otherwise. FOREIGN is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated 





 Firm Diversification 
Intercept -4.549 
  (0.01) 
Size 0.072 
  (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES -0.123 
  (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES -0.200 
  (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.066 
  (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.094 
  (0.16) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.067 
  (0.44) 
Size t-2 0.063 
  (0.02) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 0.124 
  (0.07) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 -0.130 
  (0.17) 
S&P 0.111 





GDP Growth 0.014 
 (0.01) 
















Number of Observations 110084 
Pseudo R Squared 0.24 
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Table 1.13. Heckman Two-Stage Estimation and Instrumental Variables Approach 
This table shows the robustness checks using the Heckman two-stage estimation and the instrumental variables 
approach. I use a sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 110084 firm-year observations. Panel A shows 
the second stage of the Heckman estimation. Excess value is calculated based on the method in Berger and 
Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, 
where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments with each segment’s imputed value 
equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. Firm Diversification is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero 
otherwise. Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and 
equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the top large customer to the 
total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total 
sales of the firm. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure 
to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based on the 
estimates in the probit regression reported in Table 1.4 (see text for details). Panel B reports the regressions 
using instrumental variables approach. I follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and use the estimated probability of 
diversification from the probit model reported in Table 1.4 as a generated instrument for the diversification status 
(see text for details). I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. P-value is noted in the parentheses.  
Panel A: Second Stage of Heckman Estimation 
 Excess Value 
Intercept -7.874 -7.885 -7.883 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification 0.175 0.175 0.175 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.021    
(0.01)   
Firm Diversification * Large Customers -0.083   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  0.176  
  (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Large Customer  -0.417  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   0.125 
   (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Customers   -0.324 
   (0.01) 
Size 1.175 1.176 1.176 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 0.059 0.061 0.060 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.293 0.292 0.292 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.270 -0.270 -0.270 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.033 -0.034 -0.034 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.127 0.127 0.127 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.202 -0.202 -0.202 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.051 -0.050 -0.050 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.447 0.446 0.446 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.159 -0.158 -0.159 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.180 -0.179 -0.179 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 110084 
Adjusted R Squared 0.19 0.19 0.19 
174 
 
Table 1.13 (Continued) 
Panel B: Instrumental Variables Approach 
 Excess Value 
Intercept -8.027 -8.043 -8.036 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.139 -0.141 -0.141 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.040    
(0.01)   
Firm Diversification * Large Customers -0.110   
 (0.01)   












All Large Customers   0.182 
   (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Customers   -0.362 
   (0.01) 
Size 1.186 1.187 1.187 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 0.051 0.052 0.052 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
CAPX/SALES 0.298 0.297 0.297  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.272 -0.272 -0.272 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.039 -0.040 -0.040 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.115 0.114 0.114 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.079 -0.077 -0.077 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.407 0.404 0.405  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.187 -0.186 -0.186 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 110084 





Table 1.14. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large Customers–Number of 
Segments 
This table shows the relation between firm diversification and the value of large customers. I use a 
sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 110084 firm-year observations. Excess value is 
calculated based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the 
imputed values of its segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales 
multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. Number of Segments as a measure of firm 
diversification is the total number of segments in a firm. Large Customer is a dummy variable which 
equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer 
is the ratio of the purchases made by the top large customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large 
Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size 
is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the 
ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. I cluster 
the standard errors by firm and year. P-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Excess Value 
Intercept -7.583 -7.598 -7.596 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Segments -0.050 -0.049 -0.050 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.077   
 (0.01)   
Number of Segments * Large Customers -0.051   
 (0.01)   












All Large Customers 
 
 0.337 
   (0.01) 
Number of Segments * All Large Customers   -0.202 
   (0.01) 
Size 1.157 1.158 1.158 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 0.060 0.061 0.061 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.283 0.282 0.282 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.272 -0.272 -0.272 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.036 -0.037 -0.037 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.115 0.114 0.115 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.197 -0.197 -0.197 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.047 -0.046 -0.046 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.421 0.420 0.420 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.162 -0.161 -0.161 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 110084 








Table 1.15. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large Customers – Firm 
Concentration 
This table shows the relation between firm diversification and the value of large customers. I use a 
sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 110084 firm-year observations. Excess value is 
calculated based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the 
imputed values of its segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales 
multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. Firm Concentration is an asset-based 
Herfindahl index which is calculated by the sum of the squares of each segment’s assets as a 
percentage of the firm’s total assets. Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm 
has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the 
purchases made by the top large customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the 
ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of 
total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. I cluster the standard 
errors by firm and year. P-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Excess Value 
Intercept -7.461 -7.473 -7.470 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Concentration 0.261 0.258 0.258 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers -0.191   
 (0.01)   
Firm Concentration * Large Customers 0.213   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  -0.888  
  (0.01)  
Firm Concentration * Top Large Customer  1.063  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   -0.765 
   (0.01) 
Firm Concentration * All Large Customers   0.889 
   (0.01) 
Size 1.113 1.114 1.113 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 0.060 0.062 0.061 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.279 0.278 0.278 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.272 -0.272 -0.272 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.033 -0.034 -0.034 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.115 0.115 0.115 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.196 -0.196 -0.196 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.045 -0.044 -0.044 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.418 0.417 0.417 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.152 -0.151 -0.152 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 110084 







Table 1.16. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large Customers –Alternative 
Measures of Large Customers 
This table shows the relation between firm diversification and the value of large customers. I use a 
sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 110084 firm-year observations. Excess value is calculated 
based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a 
firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its 
segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry 
median ratio of capital to sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at 
least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Size 1 is the ratio of the 
average market value of customer to the market value of the supplier firm. Relative Size 2 is calculated by 
the average market value of firms in the industries that a customer belongs to divided by the market value 
of the supplier firm. I use the concentration ratio of customers as industry-level proxies for the presence of 
large customers. Concentration 1 is defined as the average of a firm’s Herfindahl-Hirschman index value 
in the industries that a customer belongs to. Concentration 2 is the average of the ratio of the market 
value of a customer firm to the average market value of firms in the industries that a customer belongs to. 
Size is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the 
ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. I cluster the 
standard errors by firm and year. P-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 Excess Value 
Intercept -7.663 -7.585 -7.686 -7.687 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.104 -0.108 -0.108 -0.108 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Relative Size 1 -0.005    
 (0.01)    
Firm Diversification * Relative Size 1 -0.012    
 (0.01)    
Relative Size 2  -0.018   
  (0.01)   
Firm Diversification * Relative Size 2  -0.008   
  (0.01)   
Concentration 1   0.001  
   (0.96)  
Firm Diversification * Concentration 1   -0.070  
   (0.04)  
Concentration 2    0.001 
    (0.22) 
Firm Diversification * Concentration 2    -0.002 
    (0.01) 
Size 1.165 1.158 1.167 1.167 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 0.057 0.054 0.060 0.060 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.287 0.288 0.286 0.287 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.272 -0.271 -0.272 -0.272 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.032 -0.031 -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.121 0.121 0.120 0.120 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.196 -0.196 -0.196 -0.196 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.045 -0.046 -0.045 -0.045 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.427 0.427 0.428 0.427 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.155 -0.156 -0.155 -0.154 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 110084 110084 
Adjusted R Squared 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
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Table 1.17. Bargaining Position and Trade Credit  
This table shows the trade credit based on supplier-customer pairs (i.e., sales of a supplier to specific 
customers). I use a sample of 3309 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 18780 firm-year observations.  Panel 
A shows the relation between large customers and suppliers’ accounts receivable. Supplier’s Accounts 
Receivable is calculated as log (1+(supplier’s accounts receivable)*(fraction of supplier’s overall sales 
to the customer)). Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two 
segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Size 1 is the ratio of the 
average market value of customer to the market value of the supplier firm. Relative Size 2 is 
calculated by the average market value of firms in the industries that a customer belongs to divided by 
the market value of the supplier firm. Size is the logarithm of sales. M/B is the market value of equity 
plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts 
to assets. Corporate Cash Holdings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. Tangibility 
is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to assets. 
Panel B shows the relation between large customers and customer’s accounts payable. Customer’s 
Accounts Payable is calculated as (1+ (customer firm’s accounts payable) * (supplier’s sales to the 
customer/customer’s overall costs of goods sold)). P-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
       Panel A: Supplier’s Accounts Receivable 
   Supplier’s Accounts Receivable 
Intercept -9.775 -9.603 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.443 -0.390 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Relative Size 1 0.034  
 (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Relative Size 1 0.051  
 (0.01)  
Relative Size 2  0.022 
  (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * Relative Size 2  0.054 
  (0.01) 
Size 0.633 0.629 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.023 0.021 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.757 -0.780 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Corporate Cash Holdings -1.411 -1.404 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.575 -0.591 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -1.845 -1.962 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 18780 18780 





 Table 1.17. (Continued) 
 
  Panel B: Customer’s Accounts Payable 
    Customer’s Accounts Payable 
Intercept -10.220 -10.523 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.403 -0.306 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Relative Size 1 0.062  
 (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Relative Size 1 0.051  
 (0.01)  
Relative Size 2  0.080 
  (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * Relative Size 2  0.036 
  (0.01) 
Size 0.636 0.653 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.034 0.045 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.617 -0.650 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Corporate Cash Holdings -0.879 -0.859 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.409 -0.433 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -2.013 -2.147 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 18780 18780 





Table 1.18. The Setting of Tariff Cut: First-Stage Regressions (Different Tariff 
Cut-off Point) 
This table shows the relation between a tariff cut and the change in large customers. I use a sample of 
2913 firms in the manufacturing industries from 1976 to 2005 with 22301 firm-year observations. ∆X 
indicates the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t+1. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the 
purchases made by the top large customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio 
of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable 
which equals one if the percentage reduction of tariff in the industry of the segment that a large customer 
belongs to is 1.5, 2.5 or 3 times higher than its industry median percentage change, and equals zero 
otherwise. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments 
with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is 
the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is 
the ratio of long-term debts to assets. I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. P-value is noted in 
the parentheses.  
 
 
Tariff Cut 1.5 Tariff Cut 2.5 Tariff Cut 3.0 
 ∆ Top Large 
Customer 
∆ All Large 
Customers 
∆ Top Large 
Customer 
∆ All Large 
Customers 
∆ Top Large 
Customer 
∆ All Large 
Customers 
Intercept 0.027 0.070 0.028 0.071 0.028 0.071 
  (0.37) (0.14) (0.35) (0.13) (0.35) (0.13) 
Tariff Cut -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.009 -0.014 -0.009 -0.014 -0.009 -0.014 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
EBIT/SALES 0.008 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.24) (0.86) (0.22) (0.89) (0.22) (0.88) 
CAPX/SALES 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.020 0.014 0.020 
 (0.21) (0.33) (0.20) (0.31) (0.20) (0.31) 
Size t-1 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.05) (0.27) (0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.28) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.009 
 (0.73) (0.55) (0.74) (0.56) (0.74) (0.56) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 -0.013 -0.020 -0.013 -0.020 -0.013 -0.020 
 (0.23) (0.31) (0.23) (0.32) (0.23) (0.32) 
Size t-2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.91) (0.77) (0.92) (0.78) (0.92) (0.78) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.006 -0.010 -0.006 -0.010 -0.006 -0.010 
 (0.26) (0.35) (0.26) (0.35) (0.25) (0.35) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 -0.009 -0.015 -0.009 -0.015 -0.009 -0.015 
 (0.37) (0.40) (0.37) (0.41) (0.37) (0.41) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.55) (0.70) (0.54) (0.68) (0.54) (0.69) 
Size Squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.27) (0.09) (0.25) (0.08) (0.24) (0.08) 
Number of Observations 22301 22301 22301 22301 22301 22301 







Table 1.19. The Setting of Tariff Cut: Second-Stage Regressions (Different Tariff 
Cut-off Point) 
This table shows how a tariff cut affects the relation between firm diversification and the value of large 
customers. I use a sample of 2913 firms from 1976 to 2005 with 22301 firm-year observations. ∆X indicates 
the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t+1. Excess value is calculated based on the method in 
Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its 
imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments with each 
segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to 
sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with 
different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
percentage reduction of tariff in the industry of the segment that a large customer belongs to is 1.5, 2.5 or 3 
times higher than its industry median percentage change, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer 
is the ratio of the purchases made by the top large customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large 
Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size is 
the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of 
Capital Expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. This table reports the 
regressions using the instrumental variables approach. I follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and use the 
estimated probability of diversification from the probit model reported in Table 1.4 as a generated 
instrument for the diversification status (see text for details). I also use the Change in Top Large Customer 
and Change in All Large Customers from the first stage reported in Table 1.9 as the generated instruments 
for the presence of large customers (see text for details). I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. P-
value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 ∆ Excess Value 
 Tariff Cut 1.5 Tariff Cut 2.5 Tariff Cut 3.0 
Intercept -0.168 -0.340 -0.167 -0.314 -0.188 -0.380 
 (0.45) (0.15) (0.44) (0.17) (0.39) (0.10) 
Firm Diversification 0.049 0.044 0.051 0.043 0.049 0.040 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆ Top Large Customer 7.971  7.027  9.151  
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * ∆ Top Large Customer -20.302  -19.876  -23.857  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
∆ All Large Customers  6.532  6.129  7.924 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * ∆ All Large Customers  -11.369  -11.688  -13.828 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Size 0.344 0.381 0.339 0.375 0.349 0.389 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES -0.092 -0.066 -0.086 -0.067 -0.097 -0.063 
 (0.06) (0.18) (0.08) (0.17) (0.05) (0.20) 
CAPX/SALES 0.262 0.278 0.273 0.287 0.254 0.267 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.653 -0.675 -0.649 -0.673 -0.657 -0.678 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 0.022 -0.009 0.024 -0.005 0.021 -0.015 
 (0.64) (0.85) (0.61) (0.91) (0.66) (0.76) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 -0.072 -0.114 -0.082 -0.120 -0.061 -0.107 
 (0.30) (0.09) (0.23) (0.08) (0.38) (0.11) 
Size t-2 0.323 0.327 0.324 0.327 0.323 0.326 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 0.084 0.102 0.079 0.097 0.087 0.108 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 -0.212 -0.185 -0.218 -0.194 -0.206 -0.172 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.012 0.005 0.013 0.006 0.012 0.004 
 (0.40) (0.75) (0.36) (0.71) (0.42) (0.80) 
Size Squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.48) (0.14) (0.48) (0.16) (0.41) (0.09) 
Number of Observations 22301 22301 22301 22301 22301 22301 




Table 2.1. Univariate Statistics 
This table shows univariate statistics. I use a sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2015 with 110084 
firm-year observations. Panel A shows the univariate statistics. Excess value is calculated based on 
the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s 
actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its 
segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry 
median ratio of capital to sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm 
has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Top Supplier is the 
ratio of the purchases from the top supplier to the costs of goods sold of the firm. All Suppliers is the 
ratio of the purchases from by all suppliers to the costs of goods sold of the firm. Size is the logarithm 
of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Panel B shows the 
univariate statistics on Excess Value for diversified firms and single-segment firms. 
 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics 
 Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
Excess Value  -0.0232 -0.0356 -0.4289 0.3592 0.6615 
Firm Diversification 0.3132 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4638 
Top Supplier (subsample) 0.0519 0.0058 0.0008 0.0277 0.2077 
All Suppliers (subsample) 0.0601 0.0070 0.0009 0.0347 0.2225 
Size 19.3155 19.0869 17.9221 20.4982 1.8249 
EBIT/SALES 0.0581 0.0691 0.0218 0.1255 0.1723 
CAPX/SALES 0.0838 0.0403 0.0196 0.0840 0.1328 





Panel B: Univariate Statistics on Excess Value (Sales)  
 Excess Value  
 Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
Diversified firms -0.0923 -0.1007 -0.4376 0.2501 0.5808 
Single-segment firms 0.0083 0.0000 -0.4237 0.4160 0.6929 
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Table 2.2. Univariate Analysis of Excess Value for Diversified Firms 
 
This table shows the univariate analysis of excess value for diversified firm. I use a sample of 4765 
diversified firms from 1976 to 2013 with 34481 firm-year observations. Excess value is calculated 
based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of 
its segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its 
industry median ratio of capital to sales. Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a 
firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. I conduct the mean test and the 
median test for the difference, and report the p-value in the table. 
 
 
 Excess Value (Sales) 
Sub-sample: Diversified Firms 
  
 With Large Suppliers Without Large Suppliers Difference P-value 
Mean 0.0468 -0.0940 0.1408 0.03 








Table 2.3. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large Suppliers 
 
This table shows the relation between firm diversification and the value of large suppliers. I use a 
sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2015 with 110084 firm-year observations. Excess value is 
calculated based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the 
imputed values of its segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales 
multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable 
which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero 
otherwise. Top Supplier is the ratio of the purchases from the top supplier to the costs of goods sold of 
the firm. All Suppliers is the ratio of the purchases from by all suppliers to the costs of goods sold of 
the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. 
CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts 
to assets. I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. The p-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Excess Value         
Intercept -7.681 -7.674 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.110 -0.110 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Top Supplier 0.002  
 (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Supplier 0.068  
 (0.04)  
All Suppliers  0.001 
  (0.18) 
Firm Diversification * All Suppliers  0.065 
  (0.04) 
Size 1.164 1.165 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES -0.044 -0.064 
 (0.06) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.995 0.986 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.280 -0.282 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 0.001 0.022 
 (0.98) (0.38) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 -0.050 -0.050 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Size t-2 -0.187 -0.186 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.046 -0.041 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.363 0.367 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.166 -0.166 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 






Table 2.4. Trade Credit 
This table shows the trade credit based on supplier-customer pairs (i.e., sales of a supplier to 
specific customers). I use a sample of 3309 firms from 1976 to 2013 with 18780 firm-year 
observations.  Panel A shows the relation between large customers and suppliers’ accounts 
receivable. Supplier’s Accounts Receivable is calculated as log (1+(supplier’s accounts 
receivable)*(fraction of supplier’s overall sales to the customer)). Firm Diversification is a dummy 
variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals 
zero otherwise. Top Large Supplier is the ratio of the purchase made by the top large customer to 
the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large 
suppliers to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of sales. M/B is the market value of equity 
plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Corporate Cash Holdings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends 
to assets. Panel B shows the relation between large customers and customer’s accounts payable. 
Customer’s Accounts Payable is calculated as (1+ (customer firm’s accounts payable) * (supplier’s 
sales to the customer/customer’s overall costs of goods sold)). The p-value is noted in the 
parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Supplier’s Accounts Receivable 
          Supplier’s Accounts Receivable 
Intercept -8.911 -8.911 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.196 -0.197 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Top Large Supplier 0.150  
 (0.03)  
Firm Diversification * Top Large Supplier -0.784  
 (0.01)  
All Large Suppliers  0.163 
  (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Suppliers  -0.634 
  (0.01) 
Size 0.585 0.585 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.010 0.010 
 (0.14) (0.15) 
Leverage -0.641 -0.642 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Corporate Cash Holdings -0.866 -0.866 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.454 -0.454 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -2.557 -2.560 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 18782 18782 





 Table 2.4. (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Customer’s Accounts Payable  
 Customer’s Accounts Payable 
Intercept -8.956 -8.956 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.233 -0.234 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Top Large Supplier 0.128  
 (0.02)  
Firm Diversification * Top Large Supplier -0.541  
 (0.01)  
All Large Suppliers  0.133 
  (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Large Suppliers  -0.432 
  (0.02) 
Size 0.600 0.600 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.009 0.009 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Leverage -0.771 -0.771 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Corporate Cash Holdings -1.403 -1.403 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.606 -0.606 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -2.216 -2.217 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 18782 18782 






Table 2.5. Relationship-Specific Investments 
This table shows how supplier industries R&D affects the relation between firm diversification and the 
value of large suppliers. I use a sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2015 with 110084 firm-year 
observations. Excess value is calculated based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined 
as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value 
is the sum of the imputed values of its segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the 
segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy 
variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero 
otherwise. Supplier Industries R&D is defined as the weighted mean of each supplier’s industry R&D, 
where the weighting is the ratio of the purchase made from each supplier to the costs of goods sold of the 
firm. Top Supplier is the ratio of the purchases from the top supplier to the costs of goods sold of the firm. 
All Suppliers is the ratio of the purchases from by all suppliers to the costs of goods sold of the firm. 
EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure to total 
sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. 
The p-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Excess Value  
Intercept -7.993 -7.993 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.110 -0.110 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Top Supplier 0.007  
 (0.62)  
Firm Diversification * Top Supplier -0.002  
 (0.94)  
Top Supplier *Supplier Industries R&D -0.003  
 (0.73)  
Firm Diversification * Top Supplier * Supplier Industries R&D  1.901  
 (0.01)  
All Suppliers  -0.004 
  (0.12) 
Firm Diversification * All Suppliers  0.008 
  (0.68) 
All Supplier * Supplier Industries R&D  0.004 
  (0.02) 
Firm Diversification * All Suppliers * Supplier Industries R&D  1.860 
  (0.01) 
Size 1.230 1.230 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/ SALES 0.014 0.014 
 (0.57) (0.57) 
CAPX/ SALES 0.301 0.301 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.300 -0.300 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/ SALES t-1 -0.034 -0.034 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
CAPX/ SALES t-1 0.116 0.116 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.204 -0.204 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/ SALES t-2 -0.059 -0.059 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/ SALES t-2 0.455 0.455 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.157 -0.157 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 





Table 2.6. Unrelatedness 
This table shows how a firm’s unrelatedness of segments affects the relation between firm 
diversification and the value of large suppliers. I use a sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2015 with 
110084 firm-year observations. Excess value is calculated based on the method in Berger and Ofek 
(1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, 
where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments with each segment’s imputed 
value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with different 
SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Unrelatedness is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
segments of a diversified firm do not operate in the same industries, and equals zero otherwise. Top 
Supplier is the ratio of the purchases from the top supplier to the costs of goods sold of the firm. All 
Suppliers is the ratio of the purchases from by all suppliers to the costs of goods sold of the firm. 
EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure to total 
sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. 
The p-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 
 Excess Value  
Intercept -8.000 -7.998 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.109 -0.110 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Top Supplier 0.346  
 (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Supplier  -0.699  
 (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Supplier * Unrelatedness  0.649  
 (0.01)  
All Suppliers  0.001 
  (0.21) 
Firm Diversification * All Supplier   -0.070 
  (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Supplier * Unrelatedness   0.115 
  (0.01) 
Size 1.231 1.231 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/ SALES 0.014 0.014 
 (0.56) (0.57) 
CAPX/ SALES 0.300 0.301 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.300 -0.300 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/ SALES t-1 -0.034 -0.034 
  (0.22) (0.22) 
CAPX/ SALES t-1 0.116 0.116 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.204 -0.204 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/ SALES t-2 -0.059 -0.059 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/ SALES t-2 0.456 0.455 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.157 -0.157 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 







Table 2.7. The Setting of Tariff Cut: First-Stage regressions 
 
This table shows the relation between tariff cut and the change in suppliers. I use a sample of 2473 firms in 
the manufacturing industries from 1976 to 2005 with 23599 firm-year observations. ∆X indicates the 
change in variable X from year t-1 to year t+1. Top Supplier is the ratio of the purchases from the top 
supplier to the costs of goods sold of the firm. All Suppliers is the ratio of the purchases from by all 
suppliers to the costs of goods sold of the firm. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
percentage reduction of tariff in the industry of the segment that a large customer belongs to is 1.5 times 
higher than its industry median percentage change, and equals zero otherwise. Firm Diversification is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals 
zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. 
CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to 
assets. The variable S&P is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm is part of the S&P index and 
equals 0 otherwise. PNDIV is the fraction of all firms in the industry that are diversified firms, PSDIV is the 
fraction of industry sales accounted for by diversified firms. GDP Growth is the growth rate in real GDP. 
Contraction is the number of months in a year when the economy was in recession. A_TA, A_EBIT, and 
A_CAPX are the average values of the variables Size, EBIT/SALES, and CAPX/SALES in the previous 
three years. MAJOREX is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is listed on NASDAQ, NYSE, or 
AMEX, and equals zero otherwise. FOREIGN is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is 
incorporated outside the United States and equals zero otherwise. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for years in the sample. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for industries in the 




Table 2.7. (Continued) 
 
 
 ∆ Top Supplier ∆ All Suppliers  Firm Diversification 
Intercept -1.018 -0.989 Intercept -2.923 
  (0.03) (0.04)   (0.01) 
Tariff Cut -0.046 -0.036 Size -0.108 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) 
Size 0.021 0.023 EBIT/SALES -0.135 
  (0.66) (0.66)   (0.31) 
EBIT/ SALES 0.179 0.193 CAPX/SALES -1.077 
 (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) 
CAPX/ SALES 0.026 0.005 Size t-1 -0.396 
 (0.82) (0.97)   (0.01) 
Size t-1 0.099 0.102 EBIT/SALES t-1 0.434 
  (0.01) (0.01)   (0.03) 
EBIT/ SALES t-1 -0.104 -0.091 CAPX/SALES t-1 -0.479 
 (0.19) (0.27)   (0.17) 
CAPX/ SALES t-1 0.051 0.081 Size t-2 -0.494 
 (0.67) (0.53)   (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.025 -0.034 EBIT/SALES t-2 0.520 
  (0.22) (0.11)   (0.03) 
EBIT/ SALES t-2 0.003 -0.027 CAPX/SALES t-2 -0.573 
 (0.95) (0.65)   (0.14) 
CAPX/ SALES t-2 0.039 0.018 S&P 0.171 
 (0.67) (0.85)   (0.01) 
Leverage 0.094 0.085 PNDIV 1.241 
 (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.002 -0.002 PSDIV 1.434 
 (0.05) (0.08)  (0.01) 
Year Dummy YES YES GDP Growth 0.020 
Industry Dummy YES YES  (0.01) 
   GDP Growth t-1 0.014 
    (0.01) 
   Contraction 0.028 
    (0.01) 
   Contraction t-1 0.026 
    (0.01) 
   A_AT 1.062 
    (0.01) 
   A_EBIT -0.166 
    (0.60) 
   A_CAPX -1.491 
    (0.01) 
   MAJOREX -0.060 
    (0.02) 
   Foreign 0.075 
    (0.07) 
Number of Observations 23599 23599 Number of Observations 23599 





Table 2.8. The Setting of Tariff Cut: Second-Stage Regressions 
This table shows how tariff cut affects the relation between firm diversification and the value of large 
suppliers. I use a sample of 2473 firms from 1976 to 2005 with 23599 firm-year observations. ∆X 
indicates the change in variable X from year t-1 to year t+1. Excess value is calculated based on the 
method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual 
value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments 
with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its industry median ratio 
of capital to sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least two 
segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the percentage reduction of tariff in the industry of the segment that a large customer 
belongs to is 1.5 times higher than its industry median percentage change, and equals zero otherwise. 
Top Supplier is the ratio of the purchases from the top supplier to the costs of goods sold of the firm. 
All Suppliers is the ratio of the purchases from by all suppliers to the costs of goods sold of the firm. 
Size is the logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is 
the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. This 
table reports the regressions using instrumental variables approach. I follow Campa and Kedia (2002) 
and use the estimated probability of diversification from the probit model reported in Table 4 as a 
generated instrument for the diversification status (see text for details). I also use the Change in Top 
Large Supplier and Change in All Large Suppliers from the first stage reported in Table 9 as the 
generated instruments for the presence of large suppliers (see text for details). I cluster the standard 
errors by firm and year. The p-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 ∆ Excess Value 
Intercept -0.852 -0.942 
 (0.07) (0.04) 
Firm Diversification -0.011 -0.029 
 (0.62) (0.20) 
∆ Top Large Supplier -6.190  
 (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * ∆ Top Large Supplier 9.966  
 (0.03)  
∆ All Large Suppliers  -6.933 
  (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * ∆ All Large Suppliers  11.129 
  (0.01) 
Size 0.454 0.461 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES -0.139 -0.124 
 (0.04) (0.07) 
CAPX/SALES 0.473 0.468 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.524 -0.521 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 0.097 0.103 
 (0.20) (0.18) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 -0.044 -0.031 
 (0.72) (0.79) 
Size t-2 0.144 0.143 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.121 -0.132 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.141 0.127 
 (0.11) (0.14) 
Leverage -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
Size Squared -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.16) (0.12) 
Number of Observations 23599 23599 





Table 2.9. Univariate Statistics for the Sample of M&As 
 
This table shows the univariate statistics for the sample of M&A. I use a sample of 7282 M&As from 1979 to 
2013. CAR (-5, 5) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-5, 5) around the announcement date and is 
calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return (see text for 
details). ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is 
the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA 
from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are the non-event firms in the same industry which have the 
closest size and M/B ratio (see text for details). Diversifying M&As is a dummy variable that equals one if 
both conditions are met: (1) the acquirer’s main two-digit SIC code is different from the target’s main two-
digit SIC code, and (2) the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based on segment sales in year t+1 is 
smaller than the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based on segment sales in year t-1, and equals zero 
otherwise. Presence of Large Suppliers is a dummy variable that equals one if there exists at least one 
large supplier in the combined firm after M&As, and equals zero otherwise. Unfriendly is a dummy variable 
that equals one if an M&A takes place in an unfriendly way, and equals zero otherwise. Private Target is a 
dummy variable if the target is a private firm, and equals zero otherwise. Cash Payment is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the method of payment is cash for a deal, and equals zero otherwise. Deal Value 
is the ratio of deal value to the market capitalization of the acquirer. Size is the logarithm of total sales. 
Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to sales. Dividends 
is the ratio of dividends to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio 
of income before extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to 
assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. 
 
 Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
CAR (-5, 5) 0.0063 0.0038 -0.0508 0.0613 0.1060 
Net ∆ROA -0.0227 -0.0091 -0.0730 0.0490 0.1471 
Diversifying M&As 0.1690 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3748 
Presence of Large Suppliers 0.0271 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1622 
Unfriendly 0.0147 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1203 
Private Target 0.7172 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4504 
Cash Payment 0.2347 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4238 
Deal Value 4.2606 0.0351 0.0000 0.1574 344.0805 
Size 19.6924 19.5809 18.3133 20.9188 1.8987 
M / B 2.5720 1.7744 1.2643 2.8743 2.2396 
Capital Expenditure 0.0620 0.0454 0.0238 0.0788 0.0610 
R&D 0.0670 0.0082 0.0000 0.0883 0.1303 
Dividends 0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0137 0.0169 
Leverage 0.1601 0.1192 0.0067 0.2635 0.1658 
Cash Flow 0.0334 0.0566 0.0227 0.0945 0.1672 
Tangibility 0.4302 0.3441 0.1701 0.6003 0.3270 
Sales Growth  0.3254 0.1760 0.0506 0.4357 0.4723 









Table 2.10. Large Suppliers and the Announcement Returns of M&As 
 
This table shows the relation between announcement returns and the presence of large suppliers. I 
use a sample of 7282 M&As from 1979 to 2013. CAR (-5, 5) is the cumulative abnormal return over 
days (-5, 5) around the announcement date and is calculated using the market model with the CRSP 
equally weighted index as the market return (see text for details). Diversifying M&As is a dummy 
variable that equals one if both conditions are met: (1) the acquirer’s main two-digit SIC code is 
different from the target’s main two-digit SIC code, and (2) the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated 
based on segment sales in year t+1 is smaller than the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based 
on segment sales in year t-1, and equals zero otherwise. Presence of Large Suppliers is a dummy 
variable that equals one if there exists at least one large supplier in the combined firm after an M&As, 
and equals zero otherwise. Unfriendly is a dummy variable that equals one if an M&A takes place in 
an unfriendly way, and equals zero otherwise. Private Target is a dummy variable if the target is a 
private firm, and equals zero otherwise. Cash Payment is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
method of payment is cash for a deal, and equals zero otherwise. Deal Value is the ratio of deal value 
to the market capitalization of acquirer. Size is the logarithm of total sales. Capital Expenditure is the 
ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to sales. Dividends is the ratio of 
dividends to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment 
to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the 
prior 5 years. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based the estimates of the probit model reported in 
Column 3 of Table 2.9. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 CAR (-5, 5) 
Intercept 0.058 0.066 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversifying M&As -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.24) (0.20) 
Presence of Large Suppliers -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.68) (0.68) 
Diversifying M&As *Presence of Large Suppliers 0.041 0.042 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Unfriendly -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.89) (0.88) 
Private Target 0.020 0.020 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Payment 0.015 0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Deal Value -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.25) (0.25) 
Size -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.047 -0.044 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
R&D -1.052 -1.045 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -0.249 -0.254 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.019 0.019 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Cash Flow -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Tangibility 0.013 0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth  -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.15) (0.17) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.015 
  (0.49) 
Number of Observations 7282 7282 
Adjusted R Squared 0.02 0.02 
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Table 2.11. Large Suppliers and the Operating Performance for M&As 
This table shows the relation between the operating performance and the presence of large suppliers. I use a 
sample of 6879 M&As from 1979 to 2013. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA 
from year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are the non-event firms in the 
same industry which have the closest size and M/B ratio (see text for details). Diversifying M&As is a dummy 
variable that equals one if both conditions are met: (1) the acquirer’s main two-digit SIC code is different from 
the target’s main two-digit SIC code, and (2) the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based on segment 
sales in year t+1 is smaller than the acquirer’s Herfindahl index calculated based on segment sales in year t-
1, and equals zero otherwise. Presence of Large Suppliers is a dummy variable that equals one if there 
exists at least one large supplier in the combined firm after an M&As, and equals zero otherwise. Unfriendly 
is a dummy variable that equals one if an M&A takes place in an unfriendly way, and equals zero otherwise. 
Private Target is a dummy variable if the target is a private firm, and equals zero otherwise. Cash Payment is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the method of payment is cash for a deal, and equals zero otherwise. 
Deal Value is the ratio of deal value to the market capitalization of acquirer. Size is the logarithm of total 
assets. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. 
Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to sales. Dividends 
is the ratio of dividends to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio 
of income before extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to 
assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Inverse 
Mills Ratio is calculated based the estimates of the probit model reported in Column 3 of Table 2.9. The p-
value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
      Net ∆ROA 
Intercept -0.050 -0.062 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Diversifying M&As -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.44) (0.52) 
Presence of Large Suppliers -0.045 -0.045 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversifying M&As *Presence of Large Suppliers 0.054 0.053 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Unfriendly -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.18) (0.19) 
Private Target 0.004 0.004 
 (0.32) (0.31) 
Cash Payment -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.70) (0.67) 
Deal Value -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.32) (0.33) 
Size 0.003 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
M / B -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.038 -0.042 
 (0.25) (0.21) 
R&D 0.241 0.239 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividends -0.071 -0.058  
(0.54) (0.62) 
Leverage 0.039 0.039 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility 0.001 0.002 
 (0.89) (0.80) 
Sales Growth  -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility -0.027 -0.028  
(0.06) (0.05) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.026 
  (0.41) 
Number of Observations 6879 6879 
Adjusted R Squared 0.04 0.04 
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Table 2.12. Probit Regression 
This table shows the probit regression. I use a sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2015 with 
110084 firm-year observations. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a 
firm has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Size is the 
logarithm of total assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio 
of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. The 
variable S&P is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm is part of the S&P index and 
equals 0 otherwise. PNDIV is the fraction of all firms in the industry that are diversified firms, 
PSDIV is the fraction of industry sales accounted for by diversified firms. GDP Growth is the 
growth rate in real GDP. Contraction is the number of months in a year when the economy was in 
recession. A_TA, A_EBIT, and A_CAPX are the average values of the variables Size, 
EBIT/SALES, and CAPX/SALES in the previous three years. MAJOREX is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm is listed on Nasdaq, NYSE, or AMEX, and equals zero otherwise. FOREIGN 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated outside the United States and 




 Firm Diversification 
Intercept -4.549 
  (0.01) 
Size 0.072 
  (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES -0.123 
  (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES -0.200 
  (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.066 
  (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.094 
  (0.16) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.067 
  (0.44) 
Size t-2 0.063 
  (0.02) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 0.124 
  (0.07) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 -0.130 
  (0.17) 
S&P 0.111 





GDP Growth 0.014 
 (0.01) 
















Number of Observations 110084 
Pseudo R Squared 0.24 
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Table 2.13. Robustness Checks: Heckman Two-Stage Estimation and 
Instrumental Variables Approach 
This table shows the robustness checks using the Heckman two-stage estimation and instrumental 
variables approach. I use a sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2015 with 110084 firm-year 
observations. Panel A shows the second stage of the Heckman estimation. Excess value is calculated 
based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of 
its segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales multiplied by its 
industry median ratio of capital to sales. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable which equals one if a 
firm has at least two segments with different SIC codes, and equals zero otherwise. Top Supplier is 
the ratio of the purchase made by the top supplier to the total sales of the firm. All Suppliers is the 
ratio of the purchases made by all suppliers to the total sales of the firm. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of 
EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio 
of long-term debts to assets. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based on the estimates in the probit 
regression reported in Table 5 (see text for details). Panel B reports the regressions using the 
instrumental variables approach. I follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and use the estimated probability 
of diversification from the probit model reported in Table 4 as a generated instrument for the 
diversification status (see text for details). I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. The p-value is 
noted in the parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Second Stage of Heckman Estimation 
 Excess Value 
Intercept -7.846 -7.838 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification 0.152 0.151 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Top Supplier 0.002  
 (0.01)  
Firm Diversification * Top Supplier 0.071  
 (0.03)  
All Suppliers  0.001 
  (0.17) 
Firm Diversification * All Suppliers  0.068 
  (0.03) 
Size 1.172 1.173 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES -0.048 -0.068 
 (0.04) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.989 0.980 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.278 -0.281 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 0.003 0.025 
 (0.91) (0.33) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 -0.037 -0.037 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Size t-2 -0.192 -0.191 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.052 -0.047 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.382 0.386 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.171 -0.170 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.170 -0.169 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 




Table 2.13 (Continued) 
Panel B: Instrumental Variables Approach 
 Excess Value 
Intercept -8.004 -8.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification -0.147 -0.146 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Top Supplier 0.027  
 (0.03)  
Firm Diversification * Top Supplier 0.122  
 (0.02)  
All Suppliers  -0.009 
  (0.01) 
Firm Diversification * All Suppliers  0.043 
  (0.01) 
Size 1.184 1.184 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 0.049 0.049 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
CAPX/SALES 0.299 0.299  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.272 -0.272 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.038 -0.038 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.115 0.115 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.201 -0.201 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.079 -0.079 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.407 0.407  
(0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.189 -0.188 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 












Table 2.14. Firm Diversification and the Value of Large Suppliers – Number of 
Segments 
 
This table shows the relation between firm diversification and the value of large suppliers. I use a 
sample of 12677 firms from 1976 to 2015 with 110084 firm-year observations. Excess value is 
calculated based on the method in Berger and Ofek (1995) and is defined as the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value, where the imputed value is the sum of the 
imputed values of its segments with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sales 
multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. Number of Segments as a measure of firm 
diversification is the total number of segments in a firm. Top Supplier is the ratio of the purchases 
from the top supplier to the costs of goods sold of the firm. All Suppliers is the ratio of the 
purchases from by all suppliers to the costs of goods sold of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total 
assets. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales. CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. I cluster the standard 
errors by firm and year. The p-value is noted in the parentheses.  
 
 Excess Value  
Intercept -7.568 -7.580 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Segments -0.053 -0.053 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Top Supplier 0.001  
 (0.08)  
Number of Segments * Top Supplier 0.140  
 (0.01)  
All Suppliers  -0.001 
  (0.98) 
Number of Segments * All Suppliers  0.133 
  (0.01) 
Size 1.156 1.157 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES 0.058 0.059 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.282 0.282 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.271 -0.271 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-1 -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
CAPX/SALES t-1 0.115 0.115 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-2 -0.197 -0.197 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
EBIT/SALES t-2 -0.047 -0.047 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
CAPX/SALES t-2 0.420 0.420 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.163 -0.163 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size Squared -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 110084 110084 




Table 3.1. Univariate Statistics 
 
This table shows univariate statistics.  I use a sample of 8411 repurchase events from 1979 to 2013. 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, +1) around the announcement date and is 
calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return (see 
text for details). Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large 
customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the 
Top Large Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases 
made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Share Repurchases is defined as the 
amount of share repurchases to total assets. Dividends is the ratio of the amount of dividends to total 
assets. Percent Sought is the number of shares sought in the repurchases scaled by the total shares 
outstanding. Run-up (prior 6 months) is the abnormal stock price return from month -6 to month 0 
relative to the announcement date (see text for details). Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is 
the the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to 
assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the 
percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Firm Age is the age of the 
firm. Turnover is the ratio of the monthly trading volume to the total shares outstanding. The p-value is 
noted in the parentheses. 
 
 
Variables Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
Share Repurchases CAR (-1, +1) 0.0369 0.0219 -0.0081 0.0671 0.0776 
Large Customers 0.0844 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2780 
Top Large Customer 0.1694 0.1382 0.1027 0.2088 0.1221 
All Large Customers 0.2040 0.1500 0.1100 0.2651 0.1562 
Share Repurchases 0.0143 0.0000 0.0000 0.0048 0.0527 
Percent Sought 0.0964 0.0706 0.0458 0.1109 0.0906 
size 19.4653 19.3110 18.0747 20.7869 1.9275 
M / B 1.8220 1.4652 1.1162 2.0947 1.1937 
Capital Expenditure 0.0592 0.0461 0.0238 0.0795 0.0491 
R & D 0.0365 0.0000 0.0000 0.0373 0.0759 
Leverage 0.1510 0.1046 0.0037 0.2424 0.1648 
Cash Flow 0.1526 0.1481 0.0955 0.2034 0.0944 
Tangibility 0.4742 0.3959 0.1911 0.6616 0.3848 
Sale Growth 0.0776 0.0796 0.0796 0.0796 0.0445 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0557 0.0312 0.0162 0.0671 0.0631 
Firm Age 17.7270 14.0000 8.0000 25.0000 12.5257 






Table 3.2. Univariate Analysis on the Value of Share Repurchases 
 
This table shows univariate analysis on the value of share repurchases. Panel A shows the univariate 
analysis on the announcement return of share repurchases. I use a sample of 8,411 events of share 
repurchases from 1979 to 2013. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days around the 
announcement date (-1, 1) and is calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted 
index as the market return (see text for details). Panel B shows univariate analysis on the operating 
performance of share repurchases. This is a sample of 8,278 events of share repurchases from 1979 
to 2013. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net 
∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s 
change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm 
has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. I conduct the mean test and the median 
test for the difference, and report the p-value in the table.  
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis on the announcement returns of share repurchases 
 Repurchase CAR (-1, +1)   
 With Large Customers Without Large Customers Difference P-value 
Mean 0.0287 0.0377 -0.0090 0.01 




Panel B: Univariate analysis on the operating performance of share repurchases 
 Net Change in ROA   
 With Large Customers Without Large Customers Difference P-value 
Mean -0.0125 0.0007 -0.0132 0.04 






Table 3.3. Large Customers and the Announcement Returns of Share 
Repurchases 
 
This table shows the relation between announcement returns and the presence of large customers. I 
use a sample of 8411 repurchase events from 1979 to 2013. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return 
over days (-1, 1) around the announcement date and is calculated using the market model with the 
CRSP equally weighted index as the market return (see text for details). Large Customer is a dummy 
variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top 
Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales of 
the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total 
sales of the firm. Run-up (prior 6 months) is the abnormal stock price return from month -6 to month 0 
relative to the announcement date (see text for details). Percent Sought is the number of shares 
sought in the repurchases scaled by the total shares outstanding. Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
M/B is the the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. 
Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales 
Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard 
deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. The The p-
value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 
                           CAR (-1, 1) 
Intercept 0.133 0.132 0.132 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers -0.010   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  -0.025  
  (0.04)  
All Large Customers   -0.022 
   (0.03) 
Run-up (prior 6 months) -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Percent Sought 0.109 0.110 0.109 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.018 0.017 0.018 
 (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) 
R&D 0.043 0.042 0.042 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.83) (0.81) (0.83) 
Cash Flow -0.048 -0.049 -0.049 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) 
Sales Growth  0.039 0.044 0.044 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.102 0.102 0.102 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 8411 8411 8411 






Table 3.4. Large Customers and the Operating Performance of Share 
Repurchases 
 
This table shows the relation between the operating performance and the presence of large 
customers. I use a sample of 8,278 repurchase events from 1979 to 2013. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to 
assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an 
acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The 
comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching (see text for details). Large Customer is 
a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero 
otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the 
total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers 
to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the the market value of equity 
plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of 
capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is 
the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales 
over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Percent Sought is the number of shares sought in 
the repurchases scaled by the total shares outstanding. The The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 
 Net ROA Change 
Intercept -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers -0.014   
 (0.02)   
Top Large Customer  -0.052  
  (0.04)  
All Large Customers   -0.041 
   (0.05) 
Size 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Capital Expenditure -0.133 -0.133 -0.134 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.113 0.112 0.112 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.023 0.023 0.023 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Tangibility 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth -0.077 -0.078 -0.078 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.048 0.048 0.049 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Percent Sought -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
Number of Observations 8278 8278 8278 





Table 3.5. Bargaining Position  
 
Panel A: Bargaining position and announcement return of share repurchases  
This table shows the relation between the bargaining position of large customers and the 
announcement return of share repurchases. I use a sample of 8278 repurchase events from 1979 to 
2013. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 1) around the announcement date and is 
calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return (see 
text for details). Relative Size 1 is a ratio of average market value of the customer to the market value 
of the supplier firm. Relative Size 2 is calculated by the average market value of firms in the industries 
that the customer belongs to divided by the market value of the supplier firm. I use the concentration 
ratio of customers as industry-level proxies for the presence of large customers. Concentration 1 is 
defined as the average of the firm’s Herfindahl-Hirschman index value in the industries that the 
customer belongs to. Concentration 2 is the average of the ratio of the market value of customer firm 
to the average market value of firms in the industries that the customer belongs to. Run-up (prior 6 
months) is the abnormal stock price return from month -6 to month 0 relative to the announcement 
date (see text for details). Percent Sought is the number of shares sought in the repurchases scaled 
by the total shares outstanding. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the the market value of 
equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio 
of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is 
the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales 
over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. The The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 
 CAR (-1, 1) 
Intercept 0.146 0.143 0.132 0.132 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Relative Size 1 -0.002    
 (0.01)    
Relative Size 2  -0.002   
  (0.01)   
Concentration 1   -0.011  
   (0.09)  
Concentration 2    -0.001 
    (0.02) 
Run-up -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Percent Sought 0.109 0.110 0.109 0.109 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.017 
 (0.47) (0.43) (0.38) (0.36) 
R&D 0.040 0.039 0.042 0.042 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.93) (0.88) (0.77) (0.83) 
Cash Flow -0.050 -0.051 -0.049 -0.049 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.45) (0.44) (0.41) (0.39) 
Sales Growth  0.045 0.041 0.044 0.046 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 8411 8411 8411 8411 
Adjusted R Squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 




Table 3.5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Bargaining position and operating performance of share repurchases 
This table shows the relation between the bargaining position of large customers and the operating 
performance of share repurchases. I use a sample of 8278 repurchase events from 1979 to 2013. 
ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the 
difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA 
from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are the non-event firms in the same industry which have 
the closest size and M/B ratio (see text for details). Relative Size 1 is a ratio of the average market 
value of customer to the market value of the supplier firm. Relative Size 2 is calculated by the average 
market value of firms in the industries that the customer belongs to divided by the market value of the 
supplier firm. I use the concentration ratio of customers as industry-level proxies for the presence of 
large customers. Concentration 1 is defined as the average of firm’s Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
value in the industries that the customer belongs to. Concentration 2 is the average of the ratio of the 
market value of customer firm to the average market value of firms in the industries that the customer 
belongs to. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the the market value of equity plus assets 
minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to 
assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio 
of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the 
previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Percent Sought is the number of shares sought in 
the repurchases scaled by the total shares outstanding. The The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
  Net ROA Change 
Intercept -0.041 -0.041 -0.037 -0.044 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
Relative Size 1 -0.002    
 (0.05)    
Relative Size 2  -0.002   
  (0.08)   
Concentration Ratio 1   -0.044  
   (0.05)  
Concentration Ratio 2    -0.001 
    (0.07) 
Size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) 
Capital Expenditure -0.136 -0.137 -0.137 -0.134 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.113 0.111 0.109 0.113 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Tangibility 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth -0.079 -0.078 -0.080 -0.078 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.051 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Percent Sought -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) 
Number of Observations 8278 8278 8278 8278 
Adjusted R Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 






Table 3.6. Robustness Checks: Heckman Two-Stage Estimation 
 
Panel A: Large Customers and the Announcement Returns of Share Repurchases  
This table shows the robustness checks using the Heckman two-stage estimation. I use a sample of 
8411 repurchase events from 1979 to 2013. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 1) 
around the announcement date and is calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally 
weighted index as the market return (see text for details). Large Customer is a dummy variable which 
equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer 
is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large 
Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size 
is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value 
of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is 
the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio 
of income before extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash 
Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in 
the prior 5 years. Percent Sought is the number of shares sought in the repurchases scaled by the 
total shares outstanding. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based on the estimates in the probit 
regression reported in Table 5 (see text for details). The The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
                           CAR (-1, 1) 
Intercept 0.133 0.131 0.131 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers -0.010   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  -0.025  
  (0.04)  
All Large Customers   -0.022 
   (0.03) 
Run-up (prior 6 months) -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Percent Sought 0.109 0.109 0.109 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.018 0.017 0.017 
 (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) 
R&D 0.043 0.042 0.042 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.85) (0.83) (0.85) 
Cash Flow -0.048 -0.048 -0.048 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) 
Sales Growth  0.039 0.044 0.044 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.102 0.102 0.102 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
IMR -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) 
Number of Observations 8411 8411 8411 





Table 3.6 Continued 
Panel B. Large Customers and the Operating Performance of Share Repurchases 
This table shows the robustness checks using the Heckman two-stage estimation. I use a sample of 
8278 repurchase events with Net ROA Change from 1979 to 2013. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. 
∆ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s 
change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The 
comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching (see text for details). Large Customer is 
a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero 
otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the 
total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers 
to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the the market value of equity 
plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of 
capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the 
percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Percent Sought is the 
number of shares sought in the repurchases scaled by the total shares outstanding. The Inverse Mills 
Ratio is calculated based on the estimates in the probit regression reported in Table 5 (see text for 
details).  The The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Net ROA Change 
Intercept -0.038 -0.038 -0.039 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Large Customers -0.013   
 (0.04)   
Top Large Customer  -0.046  
  (0.07)  
All Large Customers   -0.036 
   (0.09) 
Size 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
M / B -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) 
Capital Expenditure -0.116 -0.116 -0.116 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.127 0.126 0.126 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.027 0.027 0.027 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility 0.028 0.028 0.028 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth -0.078 -0.079 -0.079 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.057 0.058 0.058 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Percent Sought -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.60) (0.61) (0.60) 
IMR -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 8278 8278 8278 






Table 3.7. Univariate Statistics 
 
This table shows univariate statistics.  I use a sample of 25,928 events of dividend increase from 
1979 to 2013. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, +1) around the announcement 
date and is calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market 
return (see text for details). Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at 
least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the 
purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the 
ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Dividends is the ratio 
of the amount of dividends to total assets. Percent Sought is the number of shares sought in the 
repurchases scaled by the total shares outstanding. Run-up (prior 6 months) is the abnormal stock 
price return from month -6 to month 0 relative to the announcement date (see text for details). Size is 
the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of 
equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the 
ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment 
to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the 
prior 5 years. Firm Age is the age of the firm. Turnover is the ratio of the monthly trading volume to 
the total shares outstanding. The The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 
Variables Mean Median 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Std Dev 
Dividend CAR (-1, +1) 0.0095 0.0049 -0.0122 0.0248 0.0375 
Large Customers 0.0516 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2212 
Top Large Customer 0.2055 0.1460 0.1207 0.2140 0.1585 
All Large Customers 0.2322 0.1600 0.1258 0.2744 0.1765 
Dividend 0.0251 0.0148 0.0050 0.0288 0.0548 
Run-up 0.1139 0.0970 -0.0135 0.2216 0.2213 
Dividend Change 0.0451 0.0200 0.0100 0.0350 0.2386 
Size 20.6313 20.6762 19.2735 21.9019 1.9058 
M / B 1.6537 1.4013 1.1166 1.9006 0.8379 
Capital Expenditure 0.0720 0.0586 0.0336 0.0932 0.0575 
R & D 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0084 0.0327 
Leverage 0.2109 0.1970 0.0819 0.3160 0.1558 
Cash Flow 0.1697 0.1573 0.1180 0.2092 0.0768 
Tangibility 0.6054 0.5754 0.3450 0.8623 0.3366 
Sale Growth 0.1273 0.0796 0.0796 0.1375 0.1725 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.1542 0.1531 0.1531 0.1531 0.0245 
Firm Age 25.5623 23.0000 13.0000 35.0000 15.8698 






Table 3.8. Univariate analysis on the value of dividend increases 
 
This table shows univariate analysis on the value of dividend increases. Panel A shows the univariate 
analysis on the announcement return of dividend increases. This is a sample of 25,928 events of 
share repurchases with CAR from 1979 to 2013. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days 
around the announcement date (-1, 1) and is calculated using the market model with the CRSP 
equally weighted index as the market return (see text for details). Panel B shows univariate analysis 
on the operating performance of share repurchases. This is a sample of 17,264 events of share 
repurchases from 1979 to 2013. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from 
year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Large Customer is a dummy variable which 
equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. I conduct the mean 
test and the median test for the difference, and report the p-value in the table. 
 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis on the announcement returns of dividend increases 
 Dividend Increase CAR (-1, +1)   
 With Large Customers Without Large Customers Difference P-value 
Mean 0.0111 0.0089 0.0022 0.02 
Median 0.0053 0.0049 0.0004 0.67 
 
Panel B: Univariate analysis on the operating performance of dividend increases 
 Net Change in ROA   
 With Large Customers Without Large Customers Difference P-value 
Mean 0.0157 0.0099 0.0058 0.07 






Table 3.9. Large Customers and the Announcement Returns of Dividend 
Increases 
 
This table shows the relation between announcement returns of dividend increases and the presence 
of large customers. I use a sample of 25,928 dividend increase events from 1979 to 2013. CAR is the 
cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 1) around the announcement date and is calculated using 
the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return (see text for details). 
Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and 
equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large 
Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all 
large customers to the total sales of the firm. Run-up (prior 6 months) is the abnormal stock price 
return from month -6 to month 0 relative to the announcement date (see text for details). Dividend 
Change is the difference between the amount of dividends in year t=0 and in year t-1. Size is the 
logarithm of total assets. M/B is the the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of 
equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the 
ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment 
to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the 
prior 5 years. The The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
                           CAR (-1, 1) 
Intercept 0.050 0.050 0.050 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.001   
 (0.15)   
Top Large Customer  0.011  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   0.010 
   (0.01) 
Run-up (prior 6 months) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividend Change 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.038 0.038 0.038 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Tangibility 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.36) (0.40) (0.37) 
Sales Growth  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.85) (0.76) (0.75) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.019 0.019 0.019 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Number of Observations 25928 25928 25928 






Table 3.10. Large Customers and the Operating Performance of Dividend 
Increases 
 
This table shows the relation between the operating performance of dividend increases and the 
presence of large customers. I use a sample of 17,264 dividend increases events from 1979 to 2013. 
ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the 
difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA 
from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching (see text for 
details). Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large 
customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the 
Top Large Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases 
made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is 
the the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to 
assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the 
percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Dividend Change is the 
difference between the amount of dividends in year t=0 and in year t-1. The The p-value is noted in 
the parentheses. 
 
 Net ROA Change 
Intercept 0.046 0.062 0.058 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.005   
 (0.09)   
Top Large Customer  0.022  
  (0.10)  
All Large Customers   0.020 
   (0.09) 
Size -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.011 0.012 0.012 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.054 -0.045 -0.046 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.52) (0.28) (0.25) 
Tangibility 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.17) 
Sales Growth -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.60) (0.65) (0.63) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.025 0.075 0.074 
 (0.55) (0.06) (0.06) 
Dividend Change 0.010 0.011 0.011 
 (0.21) (0.16) (0.16) 
Number of Observations 17264 17264 17264 





Table 3.11. Relationship-Specific Investment and Dividend Increases 
 
This table shows how the relationship-specific investment affects the relation between large 
customers and the announcement return of dividend increases. I use a sample of 25,928 dividend 
increase events from 1979 to 2013. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 1) around 
the announcement date and is calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted 
index as the market return (see text for details). Key Customers R&D is defined as the ratio of each 
customer’s R&D to total assets, multiplied by the percentage of firm’s sales to each customer. Large 
Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals 
zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer 
to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large 
customers to the total sales of the firm. Run-up (prior 6 months) is the abnormal stock price return 
from month -6 to month 0 relative to the announcement date (see text for details). Dividend Change is 
the difference between the amount of dividends in year t=0 and in year t-1. Size is the logarithm of 
total assets. M/B is the the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided 
by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales 
Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard 
deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. The The p-
value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 CAR (-1, 1) 
Intercept 0.038 0.038 0.038 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Key Customer R&D 0.062 -0.207 -0.239 
 (0.71) (0.13) (0.09) 
Large Customers 0.000  0.003 
 (0.72)   
Large Customers * Key Customers R&D  -0.057   
 (0.79)   
Top Large Customer  0.003  
  (0.40)  
Top Large Customer * Key Customers R&D  0.955  
  (0.06)  
All Large Customers    
   (0.37) 
All Large Customers * Key Customers R&D    0.922 
   (0.03) 
Run-up -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividend Change 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.033 0.034 0.033 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.93) (0.98) (0.98) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.027 0.027 0.027 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 25928 25928 25928 
Adjusted R Squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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Table 3.12. Signalling Effect of Dividend Increases  
Panel A: Large Customers and Announcement Return of Dividend Increases 
This table shows the signalling effects of dividend increases on the relation between large customers 
and the announcement returns. I use a sample of 24,893 dividend increases events with forecast 
estimates from 1979 to 2013. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-1, 1) around the 
announcement date and is calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted index 
as the market return (see text for details). Forecast Error is the absolute difference between the 
median forecast of EPS and the actual EPS, divided by the median forecast EPS.  Large Customer is 
a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero 
otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the 
total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers 
to the total sales of the firm. Dividend Change is the difference between the amount of dividends in 
year t=0 and in year t-1. Run-up (prior 6 months) is the abnormal stock price return from month -6 to 
month 0 relative to the announcement date (see text for details). Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. 
Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales 
Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard 
deviation of the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. The p-value 
is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 CAR (-1, 1) 
Intercept 0.039 0.039 0.039 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Forecast Error 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Large Customers -0.001   
 (0.71)   
Large Customers * Forecast Error 0.019   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  -0.001  
  (0.98)  
Top Large Customer * Forecast Error  0.065  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   -0.001 
   (0.86) 
All Large Customers * Forecast Error   0.066 
   (0.01) 
Run-up (prior 6 months) -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividend Change 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.034 0.034 0.034 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.023 0.023 0.023 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sales Growth -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.033 0.033 0.033 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 24893 24893 24893 
Adjusted R Squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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Table 3.12. Continued 
Panel B: Large Customers and Operating Performance of Dividend Increases 
This table shows the signalling effects of dividend increases on the relation between large customers 
and the firm’s operating performance. I use a sample of 12,201 dividend increases events with 
forecast estimates from 1979 to 2013. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA 
from year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its 
matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched 
by propensity score matching (see text for details). Forecast Error is the absolute difference between 
the median forecast and actual earnings as a percentage of the median forecast.  Large Customer is 
a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero 
otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the 
total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers 
to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market value of equity 
plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of 
capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the 
percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Dividend Change is the 
difference between the amount of dividends in year t=0 and in year t-1. The p-value is noted in the 
parentheses. 
 
 Net ROA Change 
Intercept 0.103 0.113 0.105 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Forecast Error 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.75) (0.79) (0.76) 
Large Customers 0.004   
 (0.29)   
Large Customers * Forecast Error 0.023   
 (0.37)   
Top Large Customer  0.013  
  (0.50)  
Top Large Customer * Forecast Error  0.179  
  (0.10)  
All Large Customers   0.010 
   (0.56) 
All Large Customers * Forecast Error   0.171 
   (0.09) 
Size -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.019 0.019 0.019 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.020 0.017 0.019 
 (0.29) (0.35) (0.32) 
R&D 0.079 0.078 0.077 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Leverage -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -0.089 -0.078 -0.079 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.27) (0.35) (0.40) 
Sales Growth -0.012 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.039 0.077 0.074 
 (0.39) (0.08) (0.09) 
Dividend Change -0.078 -0.059 -0.064 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 12201 12201 12201 





Table 3.13. Robustness Checks: Heckman Two-Stage Estimation 
 
Panel A: Large Customers and the Announcement Returns of Dividend Increases  
This table shows the robustness checks on the relation between Large Customers and the 
Announcement Returns of Dividend Increases by using Heckman two-stage estimation. I use a 
sample of 25928 dividend increases events from 1979 to 2013. CAR is the cumulative abnormal 
return over days (-1, 1) around the announcement date and is calculated using the market model with 
the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return (see text for details). Large Customer is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. 
Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales 
of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total 
sales of the firm. Run-up (prior 6 months) is the abnormal stock price return from month -6 to month 0 
relative to the announcement date (see text for details). Dividend Change is the difference between 
the amount of dividends in year t=0 and in year t-1. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the 
market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to 
assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the 
percentage change in sales over the previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Size is the logarithm of 
total assets. The Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based on the estimates in the probit regression 
reported in Table 12 (see text for details). The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
                                    CAR (-1, 1) 
Intercept 0.055 0.055 0.055 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.001   
 (0.40)   
Top Large Customer  0.009  
  (0.02)  
All Large Customers   0.009 
   (0.01) 
Run-up (prior 6 months) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dividend Change 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.041 0.040 0.040 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (0.39) (0.37) (0.38) 
Tangibility 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) 
Sales Growth  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.86) (0.80) (0.79) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.026 0.026 0.026 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
IMR -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) 
Number of Observations 25928 25928 25928 




Table 3.13. Continued 
 
Panel B: Large Customers and the Operating Performance of Dividend Increases 
This table shows the robustness checks on the relation between large customers and the operating 
performance of dividend increases by using Heckman two-stage estimation. I use a sample of 17,264 
dividend increases events from 1979 to 2013. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to assets. ∆ROA is the change 
in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its 
matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched 
by propensity score matching (see text for details). Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals 
one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the 
ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large 
Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size 
is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of 
equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the 
ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the 
previous year. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets in the prior 5 years. Dividend Change is the difference between the 
amount of dividends in year t=0 and in year t-1. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Inverse Mills 
Ratio is calculated based on the estimates in the probit regression reported in Table 12 (see text for 
details). The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Net ROA Change 
Intercept 0.052 0.071 0.066 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.005   
 (0.10)   
Top Large Customer  0.022  
  (0.10)  
All Large Customers   0.020 
   (0.10) 
Size -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.011 0.013 0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.053 -0.040 -0.044 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.40) (0.14) (0.22) 
Tangibility 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (0.13) (0.29) (0.21) 
Sales Growth -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.44) (0.47) (0.47) 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.007 0.074 0.054 
 (0.87) (0.06) (0.18) 
Dividend Change 0.009 0.010 0.010 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.20) 
IMR 0.019 0.018 0.018 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 17264 17264 17264 









Table 3.14. Probit Regression of Share Repurchases 
 
This table shows the relation between the presence of large customers and the probability of share 
repurchases. I use a sample of 86,164 firm-year observations from 1979 to 2013. Share Repurchases 
is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm repurchase shares, and equals zero otherwise. 
Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and 
equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large 
Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all 
large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market 
value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is 
the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Dividends is the ratio of 
dividends to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the 
previous year. Firm Age is the age of the firm. Turnover is the ratio of the monthly trading volume to 
the total shares outstanding. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Share Repurchases 
Intercept -5.203 -5.177 -5.181 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers 0.189   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  0.424  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   0.393 
   (0.01) 
Size 0.146 0.145 0.145 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.39) (0.44) (0.43) 
Capital Expenditure -1.142 -1.133 -1.133 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 1.061 1.096 1.091 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -1.286 -1.286 -1.286 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 3.176 3.176 3.177 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth  -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Firm Age 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Turnover 0.591 0.602 0.598 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 86164 86164 86164 





Table 3.15. Probit Regression of Dividend Increases 
 
This table shows the relation between the presence of large customers and the probability of dividend 
increases. I use a sample of 65,314 firm-year observations from 1979 to 2013. Dividend Increases is 
a dummy variable which equals one if the firm increases dividends and equals zero otherwise. Large 
Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals 
zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer 
to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large 
customers to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market value of 
equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio 
of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales Growth 
is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. Firm Age is the age of the firm. Turnover is 




Intercept -5.479 -5.467 -5.463 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers -0.305   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  -1.596  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   -1.412 
   (0.01) 
Size 0.266 0.266 0.266 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.079 0.077 0.076 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -2.846 -2.838 -2.836 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D -6.633 -6.603 -6.578 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.295 -0.296 -0.297 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 10.338 10.359 10.356 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth  0.851 0.852 0.852 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Turnover -3.605 -3.605 -3.603 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 65314 65314 65314 





Table 3.16. Large Customers and the Level of Total Payout 
This table shows the relation between the presence of large customers and the level of total payout. I 
use a sample of 86,165 firm-year observations from 1979 to 2013. Total Payout is defined as the sum 
of the amount of share repurchases and dividends. Large Customer is a dummy variable which 
equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer 
is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large 
Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size 
is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of 
equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the 
ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the 
previous year. Firm Age is the age of the firm. Turnover is the ratio of the monthly trading volume to 
the total shares outstanding. I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. The p-value is noted in the 
parentheses.  
 
 Total Payout 
Intercept -0.051 -0.050 -0.051 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers -0.002   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  -0.007  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   -0.005 
   (0.01) 
Size 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.33) (0.32) (0.33) 
Leverage -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.064 0.064 0.064 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Turnover -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 86165 86165 86165 






Table 3.17. Large Customers and the Level of Share Repurchases 
 
This table shows the relation between the presence of large customers and the level of share 
repurchases. I use a sample of 86,165 firm-year observations from 1979 to 2013. Share Repurchases 
is defined as the amount of share repurchases to total assets. Large Customer is a dummy variable 
which equals one if a firm has at least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large 
Customer is the ratio of the purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales of the firm. 
All Large Customers is the ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the 
firm. Size is the logarithm of total assets. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book 
value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. 
R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is 
the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in 
sales over the previous year. Firm Age is the age of the firm. Turnover is the ratio of the monthly 
trading volume to the total shares outstanding. I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. The p-
value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Share Repurchases 
Intercept -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Presence of Large Customers -0.001   
 (0.08)   
Top Large Customer  -0.006  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   -0.004 
   (0.01) 
Size 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.034 -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.045 0.045 0.045 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.69) (0.70) (0.70) 
Turnover 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 86165 86165 86165 





Table 3.18. Large Customers and the Level of Dividends 
 
This table shows the relation between the presence of large customers and the level of dividends. I 
use a sample of 65,314 firm-year observations from 1979 to 2013. Dividends is defined as the amount 
of dividends to total assets. Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at 
least one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the 
purchases made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the 
ratio of the purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm 
of total assets. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided 
by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. 
Firm Age is the age of the firm. Turnover is the ratio of the monthly trading volume to the total shares 
outstanding. I cluster the standard errors by firm and year. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 Dividends 
Intercept 0.082 0.082 0.082 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Presence of Large Customers -0.003   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  -0.014  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   -0.006 
   (0.07) 
Size -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.024 0.024 0.024 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.126 -0.126 -0.126 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D -0.208 -0.209 -0.209 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.031 0.031 0.031 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.255 0.255 0.255 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth  -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Turnover -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Number of Observations 65314 65314 65314 






Table 3.19. Large Customers and the Level of Dividends – Alternative 
Measures of Dividends  
This table shows the relation between the presence of large customers and the level of dividends. I 
use a sample of 60,619 firm-year observations from 1979 to 2013. DIV/ME is defined as the amount of 
dividend increases to the market value of equity. DIV/NI is defined as the amount of dividend 
increases to net income. Large Customer is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has at least 
one large customer, and equals zero otherwise. Top Large Customer is the ratio of the purchases 
made by the Top Large Customer to the total sales of the firm. All Large Customers is the ratio of the 
purchases made by all large customers to the total sales of the firm. Size is the logarithm of total 
assets. M/B is the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity, divided by 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to assets.  Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. 
Firm Age is the age of the firm. Turnover is the ratio of the monthly trading volume to the total shares 
outstanding. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Large customers and the ratio of dividends to the market value of equity 
 DIV/ME 
Intercept 0.052 0.052 0.051 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large Customers -0.003   
 (0.01)   
Top Large Customer  -0.012  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   -0.005 
   (0.01) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.073 -0.073 -0.074 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D -0.085 -0.085 -0.086 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.050 0.050 0.050 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow 0.153 0.153 0.153 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth  -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Turnover -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 60619 60619 60619 





Panel B: Large customers and the ratio of dividends to net income 
 DIV/NI 
Intercept 3.957 3.961 3.957 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Presence of Large Customers -0.142   
 (0.02)   
Top Large Customer  -0.913  
  (0.01)  
All Large Customers   -0.513 
   (0.01) 
Size -0.155 -0.155 -0.154 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M / B 0.576 0.576 0.576 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.658 -0.652 -0.664 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
R&D -0.258 -0.243 -0.260 
 (0.72) (0.73) (0.72) 
Leverage 1.641 1.641 1.640 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cash Flow -16.379 -16.373 -16.380 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Sales Growth  -1.008 -1.008 -1.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Turnover 1.486 1.486 1.486 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 60619 60619 60619 







Appendix A1. Calculations of Excess Value 
I use the Excess Value measure developed by Berger and Ofek (1995). This measure 
compares a firm’s actual market value with an imputed value as if its segments were 
operated as single-segment firms.  
For diversified firms, Excess Value equals the percentage difference between a firm’s total 
value and the total imputed value of the firm’s divisions as stand-alone firms. In the first step, 
I use sales multipliers to estimate the segment imputed values. The following equation 
demonstrates that the imputed value for each segment is calculated by multiplying the 
segment’s sales by the median ratio of the market value to sales for single-segment firms in 
the same industry. The imputed value of the firm is the sum of the imputed value for each 
segment. 




In the second step, the following equation shows that the Excess Value is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to the imputed value.  
EXVAL = Ln(V/I(V)) 
The Excess Value measures the value loss or gain from firm diversification. Positive 
(negative) Excess Value implies that firm diversification is (not) beneficial for shareholders.  
 
 
Appendix A2. Segment-level Resource Transfer 
 
I follow Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and use the variable Segment-level Resource 
Transfer as the measure of the amount of resource transfer within diversified firms. 
Segment-level Resource Transfer is the difference between the industry-adjusted investment 
in a segment and the weighted average industry-adjusted investments across all the 
segments of a firm. This can be indicated by the following equation:  
 


















where Ij is the capital expenditure of segment j; 
                        BAj is the book value of assets of segment j;  
𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠 /𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠  is the asset-weighted average capital expenditure to assets ratio for the 
single-segment firms in the corresponding industry; 
wj is the ratio of segment assets to firm assets; 





Appendix A3. Supplier Industries R&D Intensity 
 
     I follow Kale and Shahrur (2007) and use the variable Supplier Industries R&D as the 
measure of the level of relationship-specific investments. Supplier Industries R&D is defined 
as the weighted mean of each supplier’s industry R&D, where the weighting is the ratio of 
the purchase made from each supplier to the costs of goods sold of the firm. This can be 
indicated by the following equation:  
 
 




∗  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑖 
 
 
Where, Supplier Industry R&Dj is the jth supplier industry’s R&D expenditure divided by its  
             total assets; 
         Industry Input Coefficientji is the dollar amount of the jth supplier industry’s output used  
         as an input to produce one dollar of the output of the jth industry; 





Appendix A4. Key Customer R&D 
 
     I follow Kale and Shahrur (2007) and use the variable Key Customers R&D as the 
measure of the level of relationship-specific investments. Key Customers R&D is defined as 
the ratio of each customer’s R&D to total assets, multiplied by the percentage of firm’s sales 
to each customer. This can be indicated by the following equation.  
 
 
𝐾𝑒𝑦 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑅&𝐷 = ∑ 𝐾𝑒𝑦 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑅&𝐷𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
∗  𝐾𝑒𝑦 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗 
 
 
     where Key Customer R&Dj is the customer’s R&D expenditure divided by its total assets;                   
                Key Customers Percentage Soldj is the percentage of firm’s sales to each customer;                 




Appendix B. Propensity Score Matching 
 
The table shows the results for the propensity score matching. I use a logistic regression with the 
observations of acquirers and the observations of non-acquirers from the Compustat database. I 
match each acquirer firm with a non-acquirer firm by propensity score matching. I define non-
acquirers as the firms that do not have any M&As in the same fiscal year as the acquirers. Matched 
firms are selected based on the nearest propensity score in the entire sample or the same industry as 
defined by the 2-digit SIC code.  
      
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is an acquirer, and equals zero 
otherwise. Size is the logarithm of assets. M/B is the assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to 
non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. Dividends is the ratio of 
dividends to assets.  Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the previous year. The p-
value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 
 Acquirer=1, Non-acquirer=0 
Intercept -7.236 
  (0.01) 
Size 0.177 
  (0.01) 
M/B 0.033 
  (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure 0.980 
  (0.01) 
Leverage -0.286 
  (0.01) 









Sales Growth 0.234 
 
(0.01) 
Number of Observations 278457 






Appendix C. Propensity Score Matching 
      
The table shows the results for the propensity score matching. I use a logistic regression. There are 
13794 observations of share repurchases and 301930 observations of non-repurchases from the 
Compustat database. I match each repurchase event with a non-repurchase event by propensity 
score matching. I define non-repurchases as the firms that do not have any repurchase events in the 
same fiscal year as the firms with repurchase events. Matched firms are selected based on the 
nearest propensity score in the entire sample or the same industry as defined by the 2-digit SIC code.  
      
     The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has at least one share 
repurchase event, and equals zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of assets. M/B is assets minus the 
book value of equity plus the the market value of equity, divided by assets. Capital Expenditure is the 
ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to assets. Cash 
Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to assets. 
Dividends is the ratio of dividends to assets.  Sales Growth is the percentage change in sales over the 
previous year. Firm Age is the age of the firm. Turnover is the ratio of the monthly trading volume to 
the total shares outstanding. The The p-value is noted in the parentheses. 
 
 

















Sales Growth -0.123 
 (0.01) 




Number of Observations 315724 
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